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ABSTRACT
This dissertation outlines the trajectory of Yugoslavia’s decline through an examination
of select works of Yugoslav cinema from the late 1960s to the late 1980s which cogently
commented on their sociopolitical context. It brings together various interpretive perspectives
and utilizes film studies, cultural studies, political history, and postcolonial studies to discuss
how the Yugoslav society and its political system are scrutinized through allegory, satire, and
genre revisionism, for instance, and to elucidate what the films contribute to discourse on the
origins of Yugoslavia’s violent breakup. Through a discussion of cinema, arguably the most
politically subversive form of expression in the Yugoslav public sphere, this dissertation offers
insight not only into why the country broke up but also, and perhaps more importantly, into what
was lost when it broke up. Although it revolves around Yugoslavia’s failure, the dissertation
validates the egalitarian, anti-imperialist Yugoslav idea and offers a take on the country’s demise
that is free of Balkanist stereotypes and anti-communist paranoia common to most discussions of
Yugoslavia’s end. It counters the view of Yugoslavia as a dictatorship which disintegrated when
dormant ethnic antagonisms of its peoples were inexplicably reawakened, and ties the emergence
of ethnic nationalism to Yugoslavia’s economic collapse of the 1970s and 1980s caused by the
grasping reach of Western economic liberalism.
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1Preface
My relationship to this project is a deeply personal one. In this preface, I briefly outline
the journey that brought me to it in order to clarify the political and ideological sentiments that
shape this project as well as the biases found within it. My analysis of Yugoslav cinema, which
aims to offer insight into what Yugoslavia was and why it broke up, is filtered through my own
sense of loss when the country dissolved. This loss is twofold: the loss of home and of the only
stable cultural identity I ever knew enmeshed with the disappearance of a country and its
ideological underpinnings. For me, Yugoslavia’s dissolution was not just a passing moment in
the annals of European history. It was a defining moment that profoundly changed my life, and
its intangible phantasmagoric effect on me is deeply integrated into my readings of the films.
This dissertation, then, is not an exploration of a subject matter I selected simply because it
intrigued me: I was compelled to tackle it in order to understand myself. In a very real sense, the
project found me, not I it. It was, I am happy to say, a therapeutic pursuit in that it helped me
regain my Yugoslav cultural identity. It provided me with a forum within which to begin to
conceptualize, following more than two decades of internalizing outsiders’ perceptions of what
Yugoslavia was and why it is no more, a validation of the Yugoslav idea as a politically
progressive one (however flawed it may have been in practice). I did this by offering a take on
the country’s demise that is free of Balkanist stereotypes and anti-communist paranoia, and by
tying the country’s break up to the grasping reach of Western economic liberalism.
I belong to the generation that grew up in the 1980s when Yugoslavia was becoming
unrecognizable, and reached adulthood in the early 1990s when it descended into a civil war.
The experience was not unlike the Freudian uncanny that Pavle of Backbone or Ivan of The Rat
Saviour experience—society was being radically altered in some unsettling, but, for a young
adult, difficult to define way. I was a passive observer, a subject of this process, quickly
2becoming the Other in my own home. Despondent Milutin’s question in In the Name of the
People, “Did not my house use to stand here?” perhaps best defines my personal link to this
project since for me, too, it is symbolic of the strange sense of having been set adrift upon losing
my home. Unlike Milutin’s, however, mine is not a futile question but one that locates the
answer in concrete historical and political processes which can be defined. Owing to the
temporal distance from the events which made me both homeless and stateless, I was able to take
into consideration a plurality of views on the subject of what happened to Yugoslavia. Inquiries
of this kind have typically been the domain of the social sciences. Though I draw on the
assessments offered by political scientists, historians, sociologists, and economists, my own
approach is firmly rooted in the humanities and therefore somewhat at odds with the
methodology of the social sciences which relies on statistics about inflation, unemployment, or
ethnic geography. It is perhaps precisely this disharmony that makes my dissertation a unique
exploration of both Yugoslav cinema and Yugoslavia itself.
This dissertation is far from dispassionate or neutral: it is a work structured by my pan-
Slavic socialist worldview and a complete absence of cynicism towards ideas which border on
utopian as they seek to offer ways to create egalitarian societies. During the research process, I
dismissed outright the inherently neocolonial accounts written by outsiders with, as writer
Rebecca West puts it, “a pet Balkan people,” that is, a history of maligning this or that former
Yugoslav ethnic group while championing another, and I stayed away from anti-communist ones
which tend to perceive Yugoslavia as an oppressive abomination (which was easy to do as the
two typically intersect, anyway). Part of the driving force behind this project, and what perhaps
makes it decidedly subjective rather than objective (if a claim to objectivity can be made at all),
is my deep resentment of those forces which worked to undermine Yugoslavia—a tendency for
3which I fail to locate a valid justification. I offer this qualification because my dissertation, in
direct and indirect ways, deals with the subject of culpability for Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The
aim was certainly not to distribute blame but the reader will find my views regarding the roles of
domestic and foreign actors involved in Yugoslavia’s disintegration rather unambiguous.
Yet, a kind of surreal dreamlike opaqueness inherent to traumatic experiences is a
constitutive element of this text. During the writing process I frequently made myself recall a
childhood experience involving film as a reminder that what I am doing is indeed deeply
subjective and to structure my approach to how Yugoslav cinema functions to shed light on what
happened to Yugoslavia accordingly. School kids of my generation were often taken to local
cinemas to watch reruns of Partisan war films from the 1960s and 1970s. These were well-made
action epics meant to solidify our commitment to socialism by showing us the sacrifices our
grandfathers had made for our freedom in World War II. On one occasion—I was nine years old
at the time—my class showed up at the local cinema only to find out that there had been a
booking mix up and that the film we were supposed to watch had not arrived. The only film
available was the regularly scheduled one. Not wanting the trip to the movies to be a complete
waste, our teacher agreed, I can only presume without making inquiries about what the film was,
that we would watch it. Unfortunately for a class of third-graders, that film was Variola Vera, a
dreary psychological horror film based on a true story about an outbreak of smallpox, meant for
grown-ups able to understand its infectious disease allegory. The film started slowly. We
fidgeted nervously and laughed at an occasional vulgar line of dialogue. And then it began in
earnest: bloodied hospital gowns, puss-filled boils, grimacing faces, bodies writhing in agony.
We screamed and held each other’s hands for comfort. The teacher shushed us in vain. I felt
revulsion like I had never known before. We walked out the cinema playing tag, “infecting” each
4other with smallpox, immunity being granted to those who claimed to have been inoculated with
Gamma Globulin (like the few lucky characters in the film), trying to make light of the
experience.
This unintentional subversion of state propaganda that resulted from an innocent booking
mix up remained informative for me. Instead of an epic action film in which the Nazis were
machine gunned down by the dozen, we witnessed a harsh albeit allegorical criticism of the state.
This, one of my most traumatic childhood memories, was a symbolic rite of passage from being
a wide-eyed Tito’s Pioneer to getting an idea, however vague, that my country had some serious
problems. I did not understand why these problems needed to be addressed obliquely rather than
directly and I did not grasp the full meaning of the film’s allegory involving hellish conditions
inside a quarantined Belgrade hospital, but I was sure that Variola Vera was not about smallpox.
The characters and events in the film seemed to analogize and correspond to those involved in
the “crisis” or the “situation” as the grown-ups referred to Yugoslavia’s economic (and
otherwise) problems in the early 1980s. I was beginning to understand why my father looked so
worried—a bit like Valent of The Dream About a Rose (whom he even resembles). For the first
time ever, I felt unsafe in my country. I began to suspect that Yugoslavia, a country I loved at
least as much as I loved my parents, was crumbling. Recalling this experience helped alert me to
the ability of art to have a compelling degree of cultural currency and to evoke both intellectual
and visceral responses of the audiences to their social and political environment, perhaps most
unsettlingly via oblique allegory. This, in turn, helped me see Yugoslav cinema as a cultural
industry whose output was capable of profound insight into the time and place in which it was
produced. I see the films analyzed as part of a primal need to engage with each other through art.
These are the stories we told ourselves in the latter half of the twentieth century and they likely
5served the same purpose as the stories our ancestors might have told each other around the
campfire (in my imagination, before they divided into antagonistic tribes) while trying to
understand themselves—their past, present, and future. Ultimately, what I have attempted to do
in this project was ascertain what insight into Yugoslavia the thirteen films analyzed, Variola
Vera included, have to offer.
This text puts forth my personal view of the events I address and I use the films to
contextualize those views and to present a subjective narrative of what occurred in Yugoslavia.
The films tell my story. This then is not a pseudo-authoritative master narrative of Yugoslavia. It
is not even a master narrative of my own experience. Rather, like those of Veselin and Braco of
Maternal Half-Brothers, it is one of many which even when they contradict one another, together
comprise a more complete picture and speak to what happened to those who called ourselves
Yugoslavs. I am almost hesitant to qualify my dissertation this way because, after all, any form
of expression is bound to be a personal view—a fiction constructed by the author’s worldview.
The need to both express my grief and to understand its causes are the driving forces behind the
fiction inherent in my inquiry, via cinema, into what made Yugoslavia what it was and what led
to its demise.
Perhaps the biggest challenge to this text might come in the form of criticism of the bias
necessitated by my Yugonostalgia which, the argument might go, predisposed me to look kindly
on some and overly critically on others involved in Yugoslavia’s internal political upheavals.
Admittedly, I do not go out of my way to make my arguments balanced. I strongly believe that,
to paraphrase writer Muharem Bazdulj, rarely does good writing come from balance—it comes
from passionate partisanship. Though my Yugonostalgia certainly ensured that whoever worked
to tear down Yugoslavia is duly criticised for it, I stand by the views expressed in this text as I
6see them as wholly unmalicious and never derisive in respect to any former Yugoslav ethnic
group. In any case, once my research develops further and this text becomes a monograph, I
suspect that some of what may now be perceived as imbalance will likely be at least slightly
corrected by inclusion of more films—by expanding the fiction told here. The balance-seeking
critics, however, are likely to be dismayed by what will be an even stronger validation of
Yugoslavia’s progressive practices like the workers’ self-management (giving the workers
control over means of production) and radical steps towards withering away the state through
decentralization (ensuring that decision are made as locally as possible), and by my even
stronger criticism of those who, completely contrary to the spirit of Yugoslavia’s constitutional
changes, cynically and unwisely used decentralization to extricate themselves from Yugoslavia
and plunge it into a civil war.
The fates of countries and their citizens should not hinge on how good they are at
capitalism. I have vivid memories of my working class parents struggling to navigate the system
in which they were involved in practical terms and in the best of faith—as union representatives
and workers’ council leaders. I watched them become dispensable, stupefied by the shock of
Yugoslavia’s transition into a state unrecognizable to them. Like the characters of some of the
films I examine, they saw the connotative meaning of Yugoslavia vanish not because there was
something inherently wrong with the workers’ self-management system which gave both them
and Yugoslavia itself identity but because of the encroachment of liberal capitalism from outside.
I remember midday electricity and water restrictions and even occasional food shortages on
account of austerity measures insisted upon by organizations whose names were terse foreign
acronyms, organizations that demanded economic reforms which contradicted the spirit of the
self-management system and eventually left the workers without a voice—a voice many soon
7found in ethnic antagonisms. It is precisely the soul-crushing consequences of this imposed shift
from socialism towards capitalism—from one system of values to another—for ordinary citizens
that I wanted to depict. No economist, historian, sociologist or political scientist can describe
how this dynamic might have felt for the Yugoslavs, but this dissertation exists because I believe
that Variola Vera did. Put bluntly, this project owes everything to my nine year old self and to
the memory of my parents.
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On the Margins of Europe at the Center of the World: Yugoslavia and Its Cinema
The peoples of Yugoslavia do not want fascism. They do not want a totalitarian regime,
they do not want to become slaves of the German and Italian financial oligarchy as they
never wanted to become reconciled to the semi-colonial dependence imposed on them by
the so-called Western democracies after the first imperialist war.
—Josip Broz Tito
Broadly, this dissertation focuses on the cinema of the Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia and examines the ways Yugoslav filmmakers depicted the country’s sociopolitical
context from the late 1960s, when the country, like much of Europe, experienced major political
upheavals, to the late 1980s, shortly before it broke up. This text is not an inclusive survey of
Yugoslav cinema of that era—giants like Aleksandar Petrović, or the Prague School filmmakers
are not discussed, and neither are the avant-garde or documentary genres. It is one that discusses
thirteen feature films, chosen after painstaking consideration, in order to examine how nuances
of the Yugoslav socialist project are reflected upon by what was arguably the most politically
subversive form of expression in the Yugoslav public sphere. I focus on both overtly and
obliquely politically deft films which constitute instructive instances of examination and
assessment of the Yugoslav political, social and economic crises. I chose to concentrate on the
roughly twenty-year period because this was the most eventful and tumultuous era in the political
history of the “new,” socialist Yugoslavia during which the Yugoslav film industry produced
correspondingly intensely politically engaged works. The 1960s saw the first openly irreverent
Yugoslav films which questioned both the political and economic direction in which the political
elite was taking the country. Though somewhat diluted in the 1970s by the spate of state-
sponsored films which sought to elicit a new enthusiasm for the Yugoslav brand of socialism by
depicting the mythical Partisan battles against the Nazis in World War II, Yugoslav cinema
continued to weigh in on the general sense of disillusionment with the state. By the 1980s, some
9films even dared to suggest that Yugoslavia was headed for a violent breakup on account of a
history of ethnic discord aggravated by the country’s economic and political instability. More
precisely then, this dissertation outlines the dynamics of the gradual unraveling of the Yugoslav
socialist project as depicted in Yugoslav cinema, with an emphasis on the confluence of
economic, political, and historical circumstances that led to the country’s violent dissolution.
My approach consists of rigorous textual analysis which always maintains the linearity of
my arguments from which emerge the contours of a chronological narrative about Yugoslavia.
Though most films discussed lend themselves to different theoretical paths, the overarching
framework is found in the Lockean view that Yugoslav cinema as a cultural industry was able to
formulate new knowledge of and insight into its sociopolitical environment via “reflection” in
the form of allegory, satire, or genre revisionism, among other approaches. According to John
Locke, knowledge and ideas about our environment come from experience which is either one of
“sensation” or “reflection.” The former conveys to us what we perceive directly through our
senses while the latter produces new ideas “being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its
own operations within itself.”1 I deem the thirteen films examined to be a part of the “reflection”
mechanism by which the Yugoslav society sought to assess and understand itself. It is, of course,
with the benefit of hindsight that I chose the thirteen films because I recognized them as works
of their moment—uniquely in tune with what I ascertained to have been the social and political
climate of their time. As I extrapolate what knowledge and ideas about Yugoslavia the thirteen
films, which range from Brechtian formal exercises to appropriations of “low brow” genres like
the slasher, have to offer, I combine film studies with cultural studies, political history, and
1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689; repr., Amherst: Prometheus Books,
1995), 110.
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postcolonial studies to provide a portrait of the socialist Yugoslavia—both what happened and
how it was understood upon “reflection.”
I see the chief contribution to scholarship on Yugoslav cinema of this dissertation as
twofold. Little has been written about Yugoslav cinema—most of the works I discuss have not
been previously examined at all. More significantly, as I deploy my arguments, even when in
agreement with the films’ criticism of the Yugoslav system, I never question the validity of the
Yugoslav idea. Almost all discourse on Yugoslavia and its breakup has been biased by rabid
anti-communist paranoia and odious Balkanist stereotypes. Woven into my analysis of the films
is a rejection of interpretations of Yugoslavia’s breakup which propose that atavistic jingoistic
passions appeared among the Yugoslavs, especially the stubbornly communist Serbs who, the
argument typically goes, sensing that their hegemonic grip on Yugoslavia was slipping, attacked
other Yugoslav peoples in order to retain it. Such views were proliferated in the 1990s by
Western politicians, media pundits, historians, and journalists who, aghast at the “savagery” of
Balkan tribes, called for “humanitarian” bombings while celebrating the end of Yugoslavia as
another victory for Western democracy and capitalism. My analysis of the films implicitly
indicts the view of Yugoslavia as a repressive regime which struggled to oversee its
“uncivilized” peoples. Such views tend to see the Balkans as a European frontier akin to the
mythical Wild West, and explain Yugoslavia’s breakup along ethnic lines by perpetuating the
stereotype of an innate inability to organize a peaceful society. My analysis of the films is
designed to suggest that internal and external factors—vestiges of foreign imperialism, Cold War
dynamics, process of European integration, capitalism and its global neocolonial reach,
economic crisis, debt and the resulting political and economic reforms—converged to destabilize
Yugoslavia, lead to ethnic discord, and bring about the country’s end.
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“Did not my house used to stand here?” asks Milutin of Živko Nikolić’s In the Name of
the People (1987) upon realizing that his newly-built home had been razed to the ground by
crooked policemen. The question, of course, asks the late 1980s Yugoslav spectators to consider
what has become of the just socialist country they had been promised. Throughout my analysis
of the thirteen films, I pose and attempt to answer the same question as well as the one inherent
in it: Why Yugoslavia? The films analyzed take a persuasively critical view of the Yugoslav
political structures. I engage the films’ criticism of the system never losing sight of the fact that
Yugoslavia’ was “invented” to ensure peace, stability, equality, dignity, self-sufficiency for
peoples who toiled under various colonial powers for centuries, and who, following World War
II, were reluctant to accept the global encroachment of the inherently neocolonialist capitalist
economic system. As imperfect as it was, Yugoslavia was the optimal home for the South Slavs
who, trodden on by empires and invaders for centuries, divided by nationalism and religion,
could finally organize their political environment without outside meddling, and even under a
new identity—that of the supra-national Yugoslav designation. This text is undoubtedly biased
by my nostalgia for Yugoslavia, and I suspect an attentive reader will be able to discern that
underneath its straightforward objective—to discuss the Yugoslav society via an exploration of
Yugoslav cinema—also lies a condemnation of the internal forces which persistently and, my
analysis of the films consistently implies, shortsightedly sought to destroy Yugoslavia in order to
achieve narrow ethnic objectives. What follows then is also a personal lament for Yugoslavia—
no longer a place but an idea to which I remain bound. Milutin’s question is my question, too.
Why then did Yugoslavia not only fail to deliver on its promise but collapse in a bloody
ethnic war, seemingly as if some of its peoples never believed in the promise, deeply resented the
novelty of a supra-national identity, and wanted the country to collapse? This question structures
12
this dissertation and forms the chief conceptual thread that runs through my analysis of the
thirteen films. I write this on the 100th anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb
who was considered a Yugoslav national hero. In what used to be Yugoslavia, the anniversary is
controversial and exposes ethnic divisions along the lines that mirror the historical attitudes of its
peoples towards Yugoslavia itself. Those who appeared eager to extricate themselves from
Yugoslavia and from socialism (roughly the country’s western portion) today see Princip as a
cold-blooded murderer while those who wanted to remain socialist and maintain Yugoslavia (the
eastern part of the country) see him as a fighter against foreign imperialism. This dissertation
deals with precisely this division, especially when it ventures into the touchy subject of the chain
of events that led to Yugoslavia’s dissolution. It discusses how there came to be, as the historian
Maria Todorova puts it, such great “differences within one type”—how the western part of the
country came to see itself as civilizationally advanced, a fact presumably manifested in its
eagerness to leave Yugoslavia, embrace Western-style democracy and capitalism, while looking
down on the “Byzantine” backwardness of the eastern part of the country, supposedly evident in
its loyalty to socialist values and to the Yugoslav idea.2
My investigation into the roots of these “differences” necessitated that my scrutiny of the
thirteen films touch not only on Yugoslav but also on pre-Yugoslav history and politics. Later in
this introduction I provide broad contours of the more distant historical and political background
2 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 19. (only the phrase
“differences within one type”) During the research process I found out just how divisive a topic these “differences”
and their impact on Yugoslavia’s demise tends to be—thoroughly researched sources of scholarly value offered
divergent depictions of Yugoslavia’s history, culture and politics. Some of these sources, however, were written by
authors with a history of maligning one of Yugoslav peoples as incorrigibly bellicose, while championing another as
inherently freedom-loving. I stayed away from such partisan sources as well as from those that that malign
Yugoslavia as repressive communist edifice. Naturally, I opted for the ones with which I found myself aligned
ideologically.
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to contextualize my analysis of the films, which, in order to remain streamlined, assumes the
reader’s awareness of this overview as it focuses on the films’ more immediate sociopolitical
contexts. This overview addresses the subordinate status of the territories that would eventually
comprise Yugoslavia within the European cultural, political, and power hierarchy. It involves
glances at Yugoslavia’s inception following the power shifts and revisions of European borders
after World War I as well as a look at the romantic nationalism-inspired nineteenth century roots
of the Yugoslav idea which emerged while the region was still under Austro-Hungarian and
Ottoman rules. I particularly focus on the severely neglected subject of the ethnic divisions these
twin imperial presences produced in the territory of future Yugoslavia, and stress that Yugoslavia
was a postcolonial context within which several nations enjoyed sovereignty for the first time in
their histories. This emphasis on how the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian overlords, who too
often drew, to quote the British literary scholar, Andrew Hammond, “insensitive borders,” first
necessitated Yugoslavia’s creation and then, ironically, ensured its demise by instilling in the
future Yugoslavs the notion that the relative west is inherently more civilized than the relative
east, is integral to my discussion of the ethnic discord “reflected” on by some of the films .3
This east-west dichotomy gifted to Yugoslavia by its imperial overlords is also relevant
to my analysis of films that have as their subtext Yugoslavia’s later interactions with entities like
the European Community (EC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which exacerbated
ethnic divisions by keeping parts of Yugoslavia out of Europe on account of their economic
underdevelopment and by plunging the country deep into debt, in turn aggravating the economic
crisis which, as the political writer Diana Johnstone argues, resulted from Yugoslavia’s “failed
3 Andrew Hammond, “The Uses of Balkanism: Representation and Power in British Travel Writing, 1850-
1914,” The Slavonic and East European Review 82, no. 3 (2004): 615. (only the phrase “insensitive borders”)
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efforts to adapt to the world capitalist system”—efforts insisted upon by these very entities.4 The
historical overview also runs through some of the landmark events in the political life of socialist
Yugoslavia. My analysis of the thirteen films builds on this background and involves further
discussion of events like the Tito-Stalin split and Yugoslavia’s subsequent expulsion from the
Cominform in 1948, the appearance of the New Class (elite politicians in control of all economic
and political matters), economic prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s as it gave way to the
economic crisis which reached its apex in the 1970s and 1980s, the 1968 student demonstrations
which pushed for democratic and economic reforms, the appearance in the early 1970s of the
“liberal” forces which demanded democratization and decentralization, the 1974 Constitution
which accommodated many of those demands, and likely paved the way for Yugoslavia’s
disintegration, and the increase, in the 1980s, in the popular interest in historical traumas and the
subsequent explosion of ethnic nationalism. As I outline these events, I define the Yugoslav
Dream and stress that behind this notion rested a simple but ultimately unfulfilled desire of the
South Slavs to live in a progressive egalitarian society and to be free of outside political and
economic meddling. Yugoslavia cannot be understood without grasping the idealism behind the
Yugoslav Dream, nor can it be understood what was lost when Yugoslavia collapsed. Ultimately,
that unfulfilled potential and that loss are precisely what my dissertation is about.
This work is divided into three chapters, each of which deals with a particular aspect of
the Yugoslav Dream and its depiction in cinema, though there is some overlap of topics
discussed from chapter to chapter. The progression is roughly chronological except in cases of a
handful of films whose subject matter makes them better suited to be discussed before or after
their “rightful” turn. My examination of how the loss of the Yugoslav Dream has been depicted
4 Diana Johnstone, Fool’s Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 2002), 20.
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in Yugoslav cinema begins with the second wave of liberalization of Yugoslav society, when the
state, although still not tolerant of extreme forms of dissent, jettisoned strict guidelines and
draconian censorship laws, enabling filmmakers to articulate cogent criticism of the state in their
works. Guided by a milder version of the Stalinist-Zhdanovist dogma of socialist realist art, post-
World War II film production in Yugoslavia was tightly controlled by the state and served its
propaganda purposes.5 Until the 1950s, Yugoslav cinema was strictly tasked with celebrating the
revolutionary struggle of World War II and the socialist ideals on which this new and improved
incarnation of Yugoslavia was built. The conflict in the late 1940s with the Soviet Union resulted
in Yugoslavia’s removal from the Cominform, followed by the process of de-Stalinization (or
rather, Titoization) in the early 1950s. With it came more relaxed attitudes towards personal
freedoms (except, of course, for those who remained devoted to Stalin), political
decentralization, opening up to the West, the beginnings of market socialism and workers’ self-
management system as well as the removal of dogma that had governed film production. The
filmmakers were able to eschew the up-to-now obligatory idealization of Yugoslav socialism,
and express more critical attitudes towards the society; even the topic of the revolutionary
struggle of World War II was now approached with “a new realism.”6
The 1960s, a period of even further liberalization, brought with it a new brand of
filmmakers. Yugoslavia’s first authentic film movement, New Film, emerged in the early 1960s,
5 Daniel Goulding, Liberated Cinema: The Yugoslav Experience, 1945-2001, rev. ed. (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2003), xi. For an overview of Yugoslav film industry, including ideological and thematic
leanings, from World War II through the 1950s, see Petar Volk, “Balada o trubi i maglama,” in Branko Belan, Sjaj i
bijeda filma (Zagreb: Epoha, 1966), 281-335. For more on development of film industry in post war Yugoslavia,
including industrial organization, ideological direction, and censorship, see Petar Volk, Istorija jugoslovenskog filma
(Belgrade: Institut za film, 1986), 128-135.
6 David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Film, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996),
745.
16
and boldly challenged the Yugoslav establishment by criticizing the bloated and inefficient
bureaucracy, deficiencies of the workers’ self-management system, corruption and entitlement of
the political elites. By the end of the decade, the movement had acquired the moniker Black
Wave, and by the early 1970s, its flagship auteurs had either stopped making films or left the
country.7 While some Black Wave films merely expressed disillusionment, others called for
revolutionary changes, in turn, calling attention to “the role of art in transforming the society.”8
Stories about directionless young outsiders unable to benefit from socialist prosperity exposed
the system’s inherent inequalities. In doing so, Black Wave films echoed the sentiments of the
most prominent Yugoslav dissident, Milovan Djilas, whose 1957 polemical indictment of the
Yugoslav bureaucratic elite, The New Class, assessed Yugoslavia as a highly stratified, class-
based society ruled by corrupt politicians who shun egalitarianism, see political control as a form
of property, and are unlikely to give it up without a revolution. Black Wave was also loosely in
alignment with the Praxis School, a philosophical movement which, from 1963 to 1975,
developed ideas held by Yugoslav communists who were leaning towards Marxist humanism—a
rejection of all dogmatism, and further democratization and liberalization. Black Wave films put
Yugoslavia on the world’s cultural map by raising the profile of the country as a major
contributor to a series of filmmaking “waves” of the 1960s which challenged the political
establishments around the world, and also made respectable sums of money from overseas
7 Because it was first applied by an establishment-friendly film critic, and meant as a slight, the moniker is
rejected by some Yugoslav film scholars, but it remains commonly used, and I prefer to employ it as it does sum-up
the tendency of the films to paint the Yugoslav reality darkly and unromantically.
8 Gal Kirn, “New Yugoslav Cinema—A Humanist Cinema? Not Really,” in Surfing the Black: Yugoslav
Black Wave Cinema and Its Transgressive Moments, eds. Gal Kirn, Dubravka Sekulić and Žiga Testen (Maastricht:
Jan van Eyck Academie, 2012), 18.
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distribution.9 So, rather than banning them outright, the state made it difficult for the more
“problematic” Black Wave filmmakers to secure funding at home and “encouraged” some to
leave the country for the West, where, ironically, they were highly appreciated.
Chapter One is dedicated entirely to Black Wave and its engagement with the politically
turbulent 1960s. Unified not by aesthetic but rather by political and ideological concerns, Black
Wave filmmakers likely felt inspired and emboldened when, in June of 1968, Belgrade was hit
by street and university campus demonstrations in which thousands of students clashed with the
police and demanded changes—democratization, greater freedoms, jobs, removal of the inept
political elites entrenched in power—explicitly questioning the substance of the Yugoslav
Dream. That the establishment partly blamed the Praxis School for the unrest made sense, but
the youths questioning their bright socialist future had even more strident advocates among the
Black Wave filmmakers. In this chapter, I discuss the ideological alignment of four Black Wave
films with the 1968 student demonstrations, while also paying attention to the films’ either
detached modernist aesthetic which methodically (and cynically) exposed social inequality and
political dogmatism, or a social realist one which located hardship and abjection where there was
supposed to be only socialist contentment. My discussion of the four films focuses on how they
address the first major cracks in the veneer of the Yugoslav Dream, specifically their depictions
9 Though Yugoslav filmmakers whose films were “problematic” did not face the kind of repressive
measures that filmmakers in other socialist countries did, if they caught the attention of Tito, an avid film-lover who
employed a full-time projectionist, they were likely to be “encouraged” to tone down their anti-establishment
sentiments. An often told apocryphal story suggests that after watching Želimir Žilnik’s Early Works (1969), Tito
exclaimed: “What do these lunatics want?!” While there were definite no-go zones for filmmakers (Tito himself, for
example), an offense had to be a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the state in order to draw attention. There was
not a precise mechanism by which films were banned. The censors typically suggested changes be made to films
(and often never fully enforced them) rather than banned films outright. In the spirit of self-management,
distributors and producers were tasked with administering self-censorship—they had to prevent from being realized
those works which were “anti-Yugoslav.” Sometimes an unofficial ban would come into effect after a politician,
having seen the film, objected to it and his underlings eagerly sought to suppress it in order to please him. From
recollections by several Black Wave filmmakers in a documentary television series titled Zabranjeni bez zabrane,
directed by Dinko Tucaković and Milan Nikodijević, 2007.
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of the mechanisms by which the political elites, responsible for the economic crisis and rampant
unemployment, fostered a politically dogmatic class system full of economic inequality, and
made a mockery of the workers’ self-management system by making its sole purpose be to create
an illusion that the workers were in control.
Ambush (Živojin Pavlović, 1969) addresses the disappearance of authentic revolutionary
socialist ideals which insist on improvement and drive change for the common good, and their
replacement with agendas of careerists, conformists, and opportunists interested only in their
own gain and ready to compromise without regret. When I’m Dead and Gone (Živojin Pavlović,
1969) is about an unemployed, untalented wannabe singer who lives off the kindness of the
desperate women he meets, and who dies a pathetic, meaningless death after realizing that the
future holds nothing but misery and hardship. In Early Works (Želimir Žilnik, 1969), confounded
by their own ideological ineptitude and by the harshness of life in rural Yugoslavia, four hip
young communists fail in their quest to take the spirit of socialist revolution to the masses. In an
examination of the relationship between sexual repression and institutional repression, Dušan
Makavejev’s WR: Mysteries of the Organism (1971) depicts Yugoslav youth desperate for
greater political and personal freedoms, but unsure of how to achieve them because even as the
social and political structure evolves and changes, it remains reliant on didactic revolutionary
romanticism, indoctrination, and cults of personality. I examine how the films illuminate aspects
of Yugoslavia’s sociopolitical dynamics and, in turn, point to the disappearance of the Yugoslav
Dream, by discussing each film through the prism of the notion of realism. Philosopher Erich
Fromm’s contrasting notions of “positive” and “negative” freedom form the framework for my
analysis of Pavlović as a borderline anti-humanist whose films “expose the reality in its
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revolutionary development” in a harsh social realist tradition.10 I discuss his films as examples of
realist cinema with minimally intrusive aesthetics valued by André Bazin, and as cinematic
equivalents of anti-modernist literary realism valued by Georg Lukács whereby even abstract
depictions of characters’ subjective experiences are capable of profound insight into objective
reality. I contrast Pavlović’s approach with modernist experiments, formally indebted to Bertolt
Brecht’s didactic Epic Theatre and to the montage aesthetic of Sergei Eisenstein, of Makavajev’s
and Žilnik’s films which can be said to fall into the category of Praxis School-inspired Marxist
humanism in that they expose “the discrepancy between official ideology and historical
reality.”11
The aesthetic vibrancy and political boldness of Black Wave was never quite matched by
any other tendency in Yugoslav cinema, but films continued to be made which dealt with the
darker side of Yugoslav reality. In Chapter Two I discuss films which, though less audacious
stylistically and formally, continued the tradition of biting social critique and seemed to have
little belief in the socialist system because, they maintained, the country was still being
mismanaged and led into a financial ruin by the greedy New Class elites. The background to this
chapter is the economic crisis and drastic reduction in standards of living in the 1970s and 1980s
caused by the austerity measures insisted upon by the IMF in order to restructure Yugoslavia’s
economy and enable the country to repay the high interest loans given to it by the financial
organization. Also part of this background is the EC’s insistence on economic and political
reforms which facilitated ethnic discord by promoting feelings of exceptionalism in Yugoslav
republics better predisposed to administer such changes. In the first portion of the chapter, I
10 Kirn, “New Yugoslav Cinema,” 23.
11 Ibid.
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discuss three films which blend science fiction and psychological horror genres, and employ the
trope of disease as a metaphor for Yugoslavia’s transformation into a society on the brink of
economic collapse. In the allegorical The Rat Saviour (Krsto Papić 1976), the masses are
manipulated and exploited by a race of rat-like shapeshifters, reminiscent of the New Class, who
have infiltrated all walks of life. The Yugoslavia of Backbone (Vlatko Gilić, 1975) is plagued by
a mysterious disease—a metaphor for citizens’ disillusionment and anger—which drives the
infected to suicide and survivors to turn on each other. Variola Vera (Goran Marković, 1982)
deals with the true story of the 1972 outbreak of smallpox which necessitated a quarantine of
Belgrade’s main hospital and an involvement of the World Health Organization (WHO)—a
thinly veiled reference to the IMF’s involvement in Yugoslavia’s affairs. Threaded through my
discussion of the three films is Freud’s concept of the uncanny which I use to illuminate how the
films allude to the gap between what Yugoslavia was expected to become—a just socialist
society—and what it has become: a class-based society whose socialist values have been eroded.
The second half of the chapter deals with three films which depict the erosion of the
power of the working class—an absurdity in a socialist society—and an almost complete
dismantling of the workers’ self-management system. I utilize Natalie Zemon Davis’ discussion
of historical films able to distill the spirit of the era they depict by reinventing it rather than
through accuracy of historical detail to examine In the Name of the People (Živko Nikolić,
1987), a film dealing with the repercussions of the infamous surveillance scandal, which saw the
country’s top policeman, Aleksandar Ranković, sent into semi-exile in 1966, on the ordinary
working people. I rely on director and critic Paul Schrader’s discussion of film noir to examine
the ways The Dream About a Rose (Zoran Tadić, 1986), a working class film noir, utilizes the
genre’s tropes to depict the desperation of an honest, law abiding family man struggling to
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survive in a Yugoslavia increasingly controlled by criminals—both those holding political office
and those operating on the streets. I employ Milica Bakić-Hayden’s discussion of Balkanism to
deal with Rams and Mammoths (Filip Robar Dorin, 1985), a film about the experiences of
migrant workers from underdeveloped parts of the country looking for work elsewhere in
Yugoslavia but finding only prejudice and discrimination. My discussion of the six films
develops against the background of Yugoslavia’s ill-advised attempts to integrate into global
capitalist economy, especially the efforts towards establishing closer ties with Western Europe,
and the resulting internal struggles between the forces advocating a return to a more centralized
state and those arguing for further political and economic liberalization. Ultimately, my
discussion functions to outline yet another phase of erosion of the Yugoslav Dream: the
entrenchment in power of the decidedly un-socialist New Class who effectively ended the
workers’ self-management, facilitated the economic crisis and dependence on foreign borrowing,
which, in turn, severely destabilized the Yugoslav system by exposing class divisions and
inequality between different regions of the country and even spurred on ethnic divisions.
In Chapter Three, I focus on the films made during the end of the Yugoslav era
bookended by Yugoslavia’s president-for-life Josip Broz Tito’s death in 1980 and by the ethnic
war of the early 1990s. From those final years of Yugoslavia’s existence, I deal with films which
strongly hint that the country might be dysfunctional beyond repair—films that seem to no
longer believe in the Yugoslav socialist project, anticipate the country’s dissolution, and even
prophecy its apocalyptic end. The films’ pessimism is hardly surprising given Yugoslavia’s
sociopolitical dynamics at the time. The economic crisis seemed to bring to the surface festering
ethnic grievances planted during the region’s pre-Yugoslav imperial subjugation. To make
matters worse, the preference of the EC to trade (and otherwise deal) with the more economically
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advanced parts of the country firmed up the division between the “backward” east and
“civilized” west of the country. The atmosphere was one of impending doom as touchy subjects
involving inter-ethnic relations and historical traumas came to dominate public discourse. A
trend of re-examination of Yugoslav history, especially of the roles of different Yugoslav
ethnicities in World War II—a subject rarely discussed in depth until the 1980s—turned into
paranoia and cults of victimhood, and eventually into ethnic scapegoating. The country was
beginning to dissolve as talk of imminent secession of this or that republic unsettled the public.
Nationalist rhetoric, which went into overdrive when it became obvious that territorial claims of
different ethnic groups overlapped, served as a prologue to the catastrophe of the early 1990s.
The chapter focuses on three films which seem to suggest that the ethnic discord, driven
by the worsening economic crisis of post-Tito Yugoslavia, is so severe that it might unravel the
country. Maternal Half-Brothers (Zdravko Šotra, 1988) deals with the Serb-Croat rift by
examining how two half-brothers were affected by the genocide committed by the Ustashe, elite
military units of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, commonly
referred to by the acronym NDH), on the Serbs in World War II. Dangerous Trail (Miomir
Stamenković, 1984) deals with the Albanian irredentists’ campaign, which picked up steam in
the 1980s, to rid the Serbian province of Kosovo of its Serb inhabitants and secede from
Yugoslavia. My discussion of the two films revolves around how they address the looming
shadow of the infamous 1974 Constitution which so radically decentralized Yugoslavia that,
many argued, it effectively paved the way for Yugoslavia’s dissolution, causing some, especially
the Serbs, to lament the fall of Yugoslavia’s staunchest centralist, Aleksandar  Ranković. Both
films seem to suggest that the processes of Yugoslavia’s decentralization and democratization
were actually driven by ethnic nationalism and secessionist motives, couched in disingenuous
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resentment of the perceived Serb economic and political domination. They suggest that
Yugoslavia’s constitutional reforms worked to invite meddling by Yugoslav ethnic nationalists
of one ilk or another living in the West who saw Yugoslavia as a repressive edifice. I discuss
how the two films deal with the subject of the so-called “emigration”—those who left the
country for ideological reasons and actively worked from the West to destroy Yugoslavia and
“liberate” their co-ethnics by restoring an idealized pre-Yugoslav society—by relying on
historian Benedict Anderson’s notion of “long-distance nationalism” as well as on literary and
cultural studies scholar Svetlana Boym’s discussion of nostalgia.
While Maternal Half-Brothers and Dangerous Trail question the validity of the notion
of “Brotherhood and Unity,” Déjà vu (Goran Marković, 1987) seems to suggest that peaceful
coexistence is about to be replaced with conflict and war. I analyze Déjà vu, a slasher horror film
about a man driven to madness by his obsession with the tragic fate of his parents who were
persecuted for being enemy collaborators after World War II, relying on film scholar Robin
Wood’s concept of “incoherent texts”—ideologically confused yet insightful films—as well as
on film scholar Carol Clover’s feminist assessment of the slasher genre. I especially focus on the
symbolism of the main character’s obsession with the past which eventually explodes into an
uncontainable murderous rage, and suggest that it anticipates the arrival of politicians who, in the
early 1990s, used Yugoslavs’ obsessions with historical trauma to manipulate their co-ethnics,
gain or retain power, and lead Yugoslavia into war. Overall, my discussion suggests that the
three films locate in the country’s constitutional instability and breakdown of interethnic
relationships the beginnings of the catastrophe of the 1990s and hint not only that “Brotherhood
and Unity” component of the Yugoslav Dream is now void but question if there still is (or even if
there ever was) a Yugoslavia at all.
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Conclusion focuses principally on recapping and reiterating the main points of the
dissertation while also stressing that Yugoslavia’s destruction brought its peoples little more than
neocolonial dependence—“humanitarian” bombings, perpetual political and economic
instability, and loss of sovereignty. Instead of a single entity, and therefore better positioned to
negotiate global political and economic currents while looking out for the best interest of its
peoples, there are now several antagonistic, highly socially stratified societies run by oligarchic
political elites beholden to various foreign interests and actors who aim not to aid but to exploit
their “client” states.
Yugoslavia’s European Dream
The land sweeps on as one; there is no line to mark where Occident ends and Orient
begins; but somewhere down there the order of things reverses.
—Frederick Moore, The Balkan Trail
Until the formation of Yugoslavia, the South Slavs were rarely in control of their own
societies. About two thirds of the territory of the future Yugoslavia, the eastern part of the
country, remained occupied by the Ottoman Empire for four centuries, while the western part
was integrated into Austro-Hungarian Empire. Although some of the future Yugoslav peoples at
different times managed to secure limited autonomy, they remained either marginalized or
enslaved. An important consequence of both imperial occupations was that the future Yugoslav
peoples did not get to form nation states when most other Europeans did, nor did they establish
political and cultural alliances and connections with other Europeans on an equal footing. Those
under the Ottomans fared much worse as they were effectively deleted from Europe. That they
were unable to reintegrate into Europe as independent nations when the opportunity presented
itself after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is, however, the responsibility of the European
powers who tended to see the Balkan upstarts as uncivilized barbarians who did not belong to the
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European cultural sphere. After the two imperial powers departed, there remained, running
through the middle of what would become Yugoslavia, a line of division between the Oriental
(Byzantine, at best), “backward” eastern regions and the “civilized” (though not on par with
Western Europe) western regions. This division was a major obstacle in the process of joining of
the South Slavs into one state, and even once the country was formed, this “border” remained a
factor in how the country was perceived from within and from without because of the perception
of “irreconcilable” cultural differences between the global East and West. The east of the country
was perceived as dogmatic and undemocratic, the west as liberal and progressive. The “border”
was an obstacle to ethnic harmony as well—differences in the level of economic development
between regions (the west was far more developed partly because it inherited more advanced
infrastructure from its colonizers than the east) often caused inter-republican friction.
The Western perception of much of the Balkans as marginally European at best has been
operational since the Ottoman conquest but became especially pronounced during the decline of
the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when Western Europe faced
the problem of having to reintegrate the Balkans into Europe “proper.” As the Ottoman Empire
weakened and crumbled, the subjugated Balkan Christians began to look towards a European
future. Western Europe, however, perceived the Balkans as an aberration which, having been
“Orientalized,” could not be expected to achieve the West’s civilizational standards. Throughout
the nineteenth century when the Balkan independence movements needed European support the
most, many major European powers like Great Britain saw the Balkan Christians as no better
than their own colonial subjects: unfit to self-govern.12 The rivalries among European powers
12 When Balkan Christians fought back against their Ottoman overlords, the rebellions were not just
squashed but usually followed by mass slaughter of civilians. I refer specifically to Christians because Balkan
converts to Islam were for all practical purposes considered Turks, and generally hoped for survival of the Ottoman
Empire, and therefore of their privileged way of life. Typically, once the word of Ottoman massacres of Christians
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meant that Balkan upstarts were pawns in power struggles. The Russians advocated independent
Slavic states in the Balkans which the British saw as a Russian expansionist ploy and supported
the dying Ottoman Empire, denying the Balkan peoples their right to independence.13
That their fate was in the hands of European powers was not lost on Balkan Christians—
public opinion in places like London mattered. Balkan Christians lobbied European powers,
hoping for support for their cause. The dynamic of begging to be heard and considered was made
additionally divisive by Western politicians and philanthropists who sometimes selected only
one Balkan people as deserving of Western attention and worthy of independence. They tended
to champion their “pet Balkan people” by trying to convince the public that their favourites have
reached the Great Powers, the reaction was one of horror and outrage with nothing done to actually assist the
subjects of the Ottoman Empire in their struggles to free themselves from subjugation. Discussing the Balkanist
discourse found in British travel writing of the time, which suggested a dichotomy consisting of the savage Christian
Slavs and despotic but noble and civilized Turks, which provided “proof” of correctness of the British foreign policy
in the Balkans, literary scholar Andrew Hammond suggests that it is hardly surprising that the British encouraged
the kind of popular representation of the Balkans “that would vindicate the denial of self-rule to Balkan populations;
the projection of irrationality, savagery, and prejudice onto indigenes […] was clearly the answer, indicating a
region unable to govern itself peaceably and therefore in need of administration from without.” Andrew Hammond,
“Imagined Colonialism: Victorian Travellers in South East Europe,” Nineteenth–Century Contexts 28, no. 2 (2006):
100. As only peripherally European, and therefore hardly civilized enough to be pitied, Balkan Christians tended to
be thought of as equivalent to Britain’s own colonial subjects, and better left in someone else’s “care.” Hammond
points out: “A non-British colony like the Balkans […] was treated [by the British] with the same vilification. The
consensus was that this was a swathe of barbarous territory, geographically Europe perhaps, but defined by such
tribalism and violence that its peoples marked an alien, outlandish presence on European soil.” Hammond,
“Imagined Colonialism,” 87-88.
13 British Turcophilia ensured inaction following Turkish reprisals against Slavs’ rebellions, leaving the
Slavs with no one to look to for help except the Russians. The British Empire, however, had a stake in propping up
the Ottoman claim to the Balkans in order to maintain its own colonial possessions. Fearing Russian expansionism
and its potential for disrupting British routes to the Far East, the British actively assisted the Ottomans in their
efforts to hold onto their Balkan territory. In a letter to the editor of The Times, urging the government to intervene
and secure autonomy and self-rule for Macedonia, following the failed Ilinden Uprising of 1903, British politician
and Balkan activist, Noel Buxton, alludes to the cynical maneuvering by the British vis-à-vis the Balkan Christians
under the Ottomans. He refers to the outcome of the Congress of Berlin as amounting to a sabotage by the British of
the Treaty of San Stefano by which Macedonia was taken away from the Ottoman Empire and made a part of
Bulgaria. In Berlin, Macedonia was given back to the Ottoman Empire in order to thwart Russian plans for a strong
Bulgarian state, friendly to its interests. That the Macedonians had rebelled was hardly surprising, Buxton argued;
that Macedonian civilians are now suffering, he implied, was a consequence of the British foreign policy. Noel
Buxton, letter to the editor, Times, September 12, 1903.
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finally become “properly” European whereas all others are still “Balkan.”14 The stigma attached
to being “Balkan” was (and still is) a distinct part of the legacy of Ottoman imperialism in the
region. In the imaginations of the Yugoslav peoples, the term “Balkan” always more fully
described someone else—someone relatively geographically more eastern and therefore less
European than they were.15 The underhanded strategies of European powers produced a highly
polarized region, and a political dynamic in which the Western actors were positioned as
defenders of Western values against the encroachment of Russia’s Eastern Orthodoxy presumed
to be positioning itself to replace the Islamic Turks. This polarization situated the Catholic
Slovenes and Croats—almost “proper” Europeans—on one side, and Orthodox Serbs,
Montenegrins and Macedonians—the Byzantines—on the other, sowing the seeds of future
ethnic animosity and division.16
14 In her travel book, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, author Rebecca West explains that many Westerners
who visited the region, “concerned” about the subjugated, puzzlingly ignored the role of the Ottomans in keeping
the Balkan Christians at odds with each other. Such Westerners “came back with a pet Balkan people established in
their hearts as suffering and innocent, eternally the massacred and never the massacrer. […] The same sort of
person, devoted to good works and austerities, who is traditionally supposed to keep a cat and a parrot, often set up
on the hearth the image of the Albanian or the Bulgarian or the Serbian or the Macedonian Greek people, which had
all the force and blandness of pious fantasy.” Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through
Yugoslavia (London: Macmillan & Co., 1944), 19. The role of the selective benefactor that Westerners often
assumed in the region was itself an insidious expression of Balkanism. This tendency to pick the righteous among
the Balkan nations only deepened local divisions by blaming one (or all but one) of the subjugated peoples instead
of the Ottomans for the frequent crises. These lazy philanthropist fantasies caused irreversible damage to the region
because they deepened divisions by shading the region in different degrees of “Balkanness.”
15 A particularly corrosive aspect of this dynamic was the delusional notion that comfort can be found in the
knowledge that another’s alleged backwardness is greater than one’s own. Milica Bakić-Hayden refers to this
dynamic as “nesting orientalism.” Milica Bakić-Hayden, “The Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former
Yugoslavia,” Slavic Review 54, no. 4 (1995): 917-931.
16 Discussing Balkanism in literature, author and literary scholar Vesna Goldsworthy explains how this
logic of descending Europeanness works: “If the Orthodox Christian peoples of the Balkans are depicted as
‘Eastern’ in relation to Western Europe, they are traditionally portrayed as ‘European’ in comparison to the Islamic
world, and described as the upholders of the Christian European identity, antemurale Christianitatis, ‘the guardians
at the gate’.” Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998), 8.
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Yugoslavism emerged as an anti-imperialist idea—a solution which would free the South
Slavs from Ottoman and Habsburg subjugation, and from being at the mercy of the schemes of
others who maliciously meddled in Balkan affairs. It started to gain credence with the emergence
of the Illyrian Movement in the 1830s—the first cogent attempt at unification of the South Slavs.
The Illyrian Movement paved the way towards the formation of Yugoslavia by increasing
awareness among the South Slavs of the benefits of formal unification—by arguing that South
Slavs can have control of their political environment only if they reject petty nationalisms and
enter the European political stage as one.17 Inspired by German Romantic nationalism, the
movement was driven by Croatian intellectuals living under the Habsburg rule, quickly attracting
attention from other Habsburg Slavs—Slovenians, and those Serbs living outside of Serbia
proper. The “Illyrians” rightly reasoned that the South Slavs are culturally, linguistically and
ethnically largely indistinguishable and therefore predisposed to be joined into a single state.18
Gradually, many South Slavic politicians, intellectuals, writers, and artists became
activists for the Yugoslav cause. Organizations were created which worked on propagating the
Yugoslav idea as well as on practical matters which would facilitate the unification efforts.
17 The Congress of Berlin is a particularly illustrative instance of the disregard for the Balkan upstarts’
ambitions by European powers. The Congress, which took place in June and July of 1878 with the aim of redrawing
the administrative borders of the Balkans according to the interests of the Great Powers, put on display the West’s
paranoia about Russia’s military strength and political clout following its victory in the Russo-Turkish War. The
British saw the Pan-Slavic movement, which had been gaining in popularity, as integral to an alleged Russian
expansionist ploy. True enough, the plight of the fellow Orthodox Christians under the Ottomans did not go
unnoticed by the Russians who were sympathetic to it and hoped for closer ties with Slavs in the Balkans. Although
the Ottomans’ defeat meant the loss of most of their Balkan possessions, the Congress looked for ways to
accommodate the Ottomans at the expense of Balkan Christians who desperately wanted to be politically
emancipated, free of the Ottoman oppressors, and part of Europe again. As far as the future Yugoslav lands were
concerned, Macedonia was given back to the Ottomans, Bosnia and Herzegovina was taken under administration of
Austria-Hungary, Serbia, along with Montenegro, finally became fully independent, but both lost some of their
territories. For more, see Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999,
Updated ed. (Toronto: Penguin Books, 2012), 136-150.
18 For more on the logic behind this reasoning, see Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation
(Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998), 19-66.
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Literary language standardization and creation of a Yugoslav literary canon were priorities as
was finding historical commonalities as a way of establishing a joint mythology. These attempts
at synthesizing a Yugoslav culture and identity were precursors to unification and they elicited
healthy debates regarding whether this new identity should be formed around one that already
existed or if it should be an amalgamation of equal parts. Although there were legitimate fears of
Serbianization of the future Yugoslav culture (Serbia, having already achieved autonomy and
independence, had the potential for imposing its own identity on others), the genuine
Yugoslavism prevailed.19 Writers and artists who shared Yugoslav sentiments often
painstakingly incorporated into their work all the potential Yugoslav peoples’ cultural motifs as
they searched for new themes which, they hoped, would spark enthusiasm for Yugoslavism.20
Yugoslavism persisted and in 1915 the Yugoslav Committee was formed in London,
consisting of Croats and Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Committee,
which had some financial backing from Serbia, propagated the Yugoslav idea among the South
Slavs under the rule of Austria-Hungary, and made efforts to establish connections with those of
the same mind in Serbia.21 It also propagated the idea among the European powers through
lobbying, publishing pamphlets, and staging art exhibits with Yugoslav themes. Although the
Committee had a somewhat strained relationship with the government of Serbia, the two met in
Corfu in 1917 where a declaration was composed which called for unification of the Serbs,
19 As John Lampe points out, the Illyrians “discovered that opposition from the Hungarian and Austrian
cores of the Habsburg monarchy frustrated them from within, while the existence of an independent Serbia did so
from without.” John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 41.
20 For a detailed account of how the future Yugoslav culture was forged early on, see Wachtel, Making a
Nation, 67-127.
21 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 103.
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Croats and Slovenes into one kingdom in which each of the three peoples would be free to use
their language and alphabet, free to openly identify as members of their ethnic group, free to
practice one of the three main religions, Catholicism, Orthodoxy or Islam. Although it did not
mention by name many ethnic minorities living in the territory of the future state, the document
called for equality of all future Yugoslav citizens.22 This was the first official act which ratified
the validity of the Yugoslav idea and it effectively paved the way for the establishment of the
Yugoslav state with the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty as its monarchs. The end of World War I
resulted in the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as the Ottoman Empire,
allowing for the establishment, on December 1, 1918, of the first incarnation of Yugoslavia: The
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (colloquially already referred to as Yugoslavia).
Although conceived as a framework within which almost all South Slavs (Bulgarians
were the only South Slavic people not included in the new state) would finally be free and equal,
the new state immediately faced interethnic strife, establishing a dichotomous political dynamic
that would haunt Yugoslavia to its final days. Serbian cultural and political dominance was
evident as Serbia, which was formally independent since the Congress of Berlin, brought to the
deal a set of functioning state institutions and a developed sense of national consciousness.
Having fought on the winning side in World War I—unlike the Croats and Slovenes—the Serbs
also developed a sense of entitlement in having majorly contributed to the conditions for the
creation of the new state. Some among Croats and Slovenes feared Serbian nationalism and its
perceived single-minded drive to bring all Serbs together into one state while giving little regard
22 As John Lampe points out, that no mention was made of other ethnic groups was perhaps the chief
weakness of the document. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 105
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to others’ vital national interests.23 Conversely, some Serbs saw Croats and Slovenes as
opportunists who were not genuinely interested in the Yugoslav idea but, finally free of Austria-
Hungary, were simply waiting for the right opportunity to leave the new union and form their
own separate states. There was a great deal of debate regarding the political, economic,
administrative and cultural organization of the new state—the level of centralization, the wisdom
of promoting the Yugoslav identity over narrower ethnic identities, the predominant language
and alphabet to be used. As established by the St. Vitus Day Constitution, the country became a
unitary monarchy—a move whose wisdom was questioned across the political spectrum.24 While
optimism for Yugoslavia grew among the Serbs, others became somewhat alienated from it
because of the persistent perception that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a state
meant to serve the national and political interests of the Serbs first.
After the prominent Croat politician, Stjepan Radić, was assassinated inside the Yugoslav
parliament by a Serb politician in June 1928, King Aleksandar—who succeeded his father, King
Petar, seven years prior—proclaimed a dictatorship (after abolishing the constitution, and
proroguing the parliament). What became known as the January 6 Dictatorship saw the voices of
those who opposed unitarization repressed.25 In the years to follow, Aleksandar renamed the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into Kingdom of Yugoslavia, divided the country into
nine non-ethnically based federal units—banovinas—liberalized the economy, and decreed a
new constitution, which gave him greater power.26 Serb and Croat politicians clashed over
23 The Congress of Berlin had thwarted Serbia’s earlier ambitions to unify with Bosnia and Herzegovina,
where many Serbs lived.
24 For more on the circumstances surrounding the St. Vitus Day Constitution, and the country’s transition
into a parliamentary kingdom, see Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 125-128.
25 For more on the January 6 Dictatorship, see Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 163-171.
26 For more on how the liberal economic approach backfired, see Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 171-173.
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volatile issues such as the specifics of the ethnic distribution within the banovinas. Both
attempted to establish contiguous territories inhabited by their own people.27 This period saw the
establishment of the Ustashe – Croatian Revolutionary Organization (later Movement), which
together with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) worked to
destabilize the state. Aleksandar was assassinated in an Ustashe-IMRO plot in Paris in 1934.28
Because Aleksandar’s son Petar was a minor, Aleksandar’s cousin Pavle became the regent of
Yugoslavia and the acting head of state. The years between the assassination and World War II
were full of internal tensions with the schism between the Serbs and Croats widening. In order to
appease the Croats who aspired to secede and establish an independent state, a banovina was
established in 1939 which contained within its borders most of the Croats living in Yugoslavia.
Although he was opposed to German expansionism, Pavle signed a neutrality agreement with
Hitler in 1941. For this, Pavle was overthrown in a military-led coup d’état and Petar became the
king. Just days later, Yugoslavia was invaded by Germany, forcing the young King Petar II and
the government into exile in London. The country was quickly conquered and parceled off
primarily between Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria with the newly-founded Independent
State of Croatia acting as a German satellite state. Yugoslavia’s first incarnation ceased to exist.
27 Yugoslavism had to contend with Serbian and Croatian notions of how the future state should be
organized. This same dynamic destabilized Yugoslavia throughout its existence. As John Lampe points out, “these
two ideas for a unitary nation-state were incompatible with each other and with any wider Yugoslav idea. The
Serbian and Croatian ideas sought to build on existing, not the ‘imagined communities’ of European colonial
construction described by Benedict Anderson. These ideas were still romantic. They staked out huge territories on
the basis of medieval claims to ethnic homelands or historic borders. To support their claims, advocates elaborated
on actual traditions, such as commemorating the Serbs’ Kosovo battle of 1389. The celebration of these events still
fits modern nationalism’s use of the past for verification, what Eric Hobsbawm has called ‘invented tradition.’
Serbian nationalists did so to demonstrate unique suffering during the Ottoman conquest and Croats to show cultural
superiority, both wishing to connect their group alone to European civilization. In the process, each claimant began
to see or, to paraphrase Benedict Anderson, ‘imagine’ the other as a historical adversary.” Lampe, Yugoslavia as
History, 40.
28 For more on the assassination, see Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 173-176.
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Out of the ashes of the so-called “old” Yugoslavia emerged a “new” one. It was
proclaimed in the small Bosnian city of Jajce on November 29, 1943 under the name of
Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, and consisted of six equal units (first states, later republics)
rather than one towards which others would gravitate. Tito knew that Yugoslavia’s multiethnic
make up could be potentially problematic and promoted “Brotherhood and Unity”—a concept
soon to become integral to the Yugoslav Dream—from the beginning.29 As World War II came
to a close, the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was declared—an act quickly
followed by the King’s abdication and his acceptance of Tito as the leader of Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslavism of the “new” Yugoslavia was different from the previous version in that rather than
erasing the differences between constituent peoples, the approach was to advocate a supra-
national Yugoslav identity which “would overarch and connect the national cultures rather than
eliminate them.”30 This Yugoslav identity evolved over time, but it always elicited varying
degrees of commitment by different ethnic groups. Perhaps due to a continued mistrust of the
Serbs’ intentions, Croats, Slovenes, and the non-Slavic Albanians remained almost solely
committed to their own ethnic corpora.
Building a socialist Yugoslav identity after the interethnic carnage of World War II was a
major challenge. The war had an internal dimension which saw members of just about all ethnic
groups fight each other in one uniform or another and under the guise of one ideology or
another—an unfortunate fact that never stopped destabilizing Yugoslavia.31 A German puppet
state, the NDH staged a genocidal campaign in World War II and exterminated many of the
29 It was important that the new start happen in the multiethnic, and therefore symbolically neutral, Bosnia
and Herzegovina rather than in Serbia or Croatia.
30 Wachtel, Making a Nation, 131.
31 For more on Yugoslavia in World War II, see Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 201-232.
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Serbs living in its territories. There were two resistance movements against the Nazi occupation
in Yugoslavia during World War II: the predominantly Serbian anti-communist Chetnik
Movement, loyal to King Petar II and to the government in exile, under the leadership of Draža
Mihajlović, and the multiethnic, though heavily Serb, Partisans organized by the Communist
Party of Yugoslavia and led by Tito. The Partisans waged a successful guerilla war against the
German Nazis, Serbian Chetniks, Italian Fascists, Croat Ustashe (which included Bosnian
Muslims), Albanian Ballists, and others.32 The memory of World War II in Yugoslavia was a
convoluted mess of contradictory perceptions of freedom fighters and aggressors, proud heroes
and cowering enemy collaborators, trauma of genocide and stigma of being “genocidal”—with
all labels applied to all ethnicities to some degree. Tito’s Partisans, however, were unqualified
moral and actual winners who, “having fought or resisted the enemy on native soil […]
developed great pride in the state which emerged from their sacrifices.”33 Yugoslav authorities
had to carefully balance the sense of entitlement and expectations of privilege by those who
fought in the Partisan forces with the burden of the stigma attached to enemy collaborators.
Following the war, Yugoslavia gradually made progress towards another essential aspect
of the Yugoslav Dream: making the workers owners of firms that employ them, and in charge of
all matters pertaining to production. Yugoslavia had a Soviet-style centrally planned economy
until the 1950s when it adopted a more market oriented and less bureaucratic approach. The
management of state companies was, at least on paper if not entirely in practice, given to the
workers. Workers made contributions toward the budget; wages partly depended on the
32 Although they initially supported the royalist Chetniks, the Allies eventually realized that, although
ideologically “problematic,” Tito’s Partisans were a more consolidated force whose guerilla tactics were very
effective in the fight against the Nazis.
33 Sharon Zukin, Beyond Marx and Tito: Theory and Practice in Yugoslav Socialism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), 86.
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performance in the market and were distributed according to workers’ desires. Capital assets
ceased to be the property of the state and became the ownership of the enterprises (and, in
theory, of their workers).34 Yugoslavia moved towards market socialism in the 1960s when more
reforms were implemented. The country began opening up to the Western economies, and
further decentralized both politically and economically by giving more power to the republics as
well as to businesses. Businesses were encouraged to self-finance; state subsidies were reduced;
profit distribution was managed within individual enterprises with less oversight. Symptomatic
of difficulties involving balancing socialism and market economy, banks became powerful
institutions in Yugoslavia, in charge of almost all of investment (formerly the domain of the state
through its investment funds). Perhaps most egregiously, the managerial technocratic strata came
to possess a great deal of power while the workers became alienated from the process of running
the businesses.35
More change followed with constitutional reforms of 1971, which aimed to “establish the
supremacy of the self-management doctrine over that of state socialism.”36 Yugoslavia’s
balancing act, however, remained precarious. Gradually, the state lost jurisdiction over economic
development and it had no funds to invest anyway as they had been transferred to the banks. In
effect, “republics and autonomous provinces were made responsible for their own economic
development.”37 Regional differences were amplified—parts of the country better equipped to
34 For more details, see Paul Phillips and Bogomil Ferfila, The Rise and Fall of the Third Way: Yugoslavia
1945-1991 (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1992), 35-41.
35 The changes can be seen as in alignment with the socialist doctrine of reducing the state bureaucratic
apparatus, but they also resulted in poor economic performance, the creation of a specialized managerial class, and
reduction of input from the workers into how businesses were run.
36 Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 43.
37 Ibid.
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transition into new modes of economic development saw an increase in the living standards;
poorer regions could only watch in resentment and hope to rise to that level one day. The 1974
Constitution fully implemented the worker self-management system. Workers were organized
into units of “associated labour […] aimed at bringing management of both labour and the means
of production (social capital) under the direct control of the workers.”38 The logic of the market,
however, threatened equality and unions had to aggressively deal with the problem.39 Social
property came to belong to “each and every citizen of Yugoslavia.”40 The political and economic
system were redesigned to give agency to units of citizen organization at grass roots level—to
democratize the society—giving as much power as possible to the working class. This was
“direct democracy,” but it was rife with problems as, arguably, Yugoslavia was not equipped to
handle such “radical reform.”41 As opportunistic politicians (at all levels) continued to work hard
on perpetuating the myth of their own indispensability as the overseers of production, the
economy declined, and waves of dissatisfaction, apathy and resentment swept the country.
European Economic Community’s protectionism stifled trade with Western Europe and although
the economic downturn that followed was partly a result of the global economic turmoil, “the
real measure of the emerging crisis was the decline of labour productivity.”42
38 Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 46.
39 Especially, the income inequality “between workers in the production sphere” and workers in “public
services,” which became a problem because those “in the production sphere derived income from the economically
determined market, [and] those in public services from politically determined budgets.” Ibid., 47.
40 Ibid., 48.
41 Ibid., 49.
42 For more, see Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 50-56
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In the 1970s, Yugoslavia began to experience the first serious effects of the global
economic crisis. Yugoslavia’s “borrowing binge sustained the rapid growth of the economy
through the 1970s,” but inflation and cost of living rose as the 1980s crisis loomed.43 The crisis
was severely exacerbated by the country’s inability to repay the high-interest loans from the IMF
on whose insistence Yugoslavia implemented strict austerity measures. It became obvious that
Yugoslavia had not, after all, escaped outside meddling in its affairs. It was not a coincidence
that the 1970s saw the commitment to Yugoslavism severely tested. As the inflation set in,
regional disparity in economic development became glaring and a source of resentment and
rivalry.44 Hawkish politicians on almost all sides played up ethnic animosities and eroded one of
the fundamentals of the Yugoslav Dream: “Brotherhood and Unity.” As the heroic myths of the
Partisan struggle of World War II faded into irrelevance, narrow nationalist interests prevailed.
The anti-reform forces of unitarization and those of decentralization and liberalization clashed.
Croats and Slovenes ostensibly wanted economic and political decentralization. Their often
openly nationalist rhetoric, however, seemed to be aimed not just at Serbian politicians who were
against further reforms but at Serbs in general. Serbia had its own “liberals” who wanted a more
market-oriented economy and a toning down of Serbia’s own nationalist rhetoric. Tito’s death in
1980 shook up the Yugoslav society to its core and seemed a fitting conclusion to the last decade
in which Yugoslavia experienced any semblance of stability. The ethnic divisions became deeper
in the 1980s as Yugoslav peoples became increasingly obsessed with historical injustices and
43 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 322.
44 This statistic alone illustrates the scale of disparity: “In the late 1980s, Slovenia’s per capita social
product was over seven times that of Kosovo’s; over triple that of Macedonia or Bosnia; and more than double that
of Serbia.” Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 86.
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traumas; the economy remained in shambles, unemployment on the rise, corruption, and abuses
of power rampant. As the 1980s progressed, there seemed to be little left of Yugoslavia.
In retrospect, it seems clear that the economic crisis and the reduction in standard of
living meant the end of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Dream was firmly affixed to the country’s
consumer culture, and the almost Western lifestyles that Yugoslav economy provided for a time.
Arguably, the government went on a “borrowing binge” and encouraged rampant consumerism
to validate itself—in order to create the illusion of being able to provide what other socialist
governments could not. Yugoslavs traveled, built weekend homes in the mountains or on the
Adriatic coast, indulged in goods imported from the West, followed the latest global trends in
music, cinema, and fashion. Although Yugoslavia was not exactly class-free, these perks spread
across the spectrum of the society, and were available to most. To spend a week or two on the
Adriatic coast every summer was not a privilege but the right of every working class family.45
Yugoslavs’ ability to afford Western goods, better housing and health care, spend disposable
income on travel (freely, with hardly any restrictions), and on items considered luxuries
45 For more on the culture of working class tourism in Yugoslavia, see Igor Duda, “Workers into Tourists:
Entitlements, Desires, and the Realities,” in Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism (1950s-
1980s), eds. Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 33-68. This, at
least in the eyes of the Yugoslavs, made their brand of socialism special “precisely because it did not fit easily into
the socialist matrix of industry.” Karin Taylor and Hannes Grandits, “Tourism and the Making of Socialist
Yugoslavia,” in Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism (1950s-1980s), eds. Hannes Grandits
and Karin Taylor (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 11. Shopping trips across the border,
especially to Italy, Austria, Greece and Turkey, were common. Yugoslavs could enter many Western countries
without a visa because they were unlikely to seek political or economic asylum there. In that sense, the Yugoslav
passport was a major part of the Yugoslav identity—and sense of “exceptionalism”—precisely because the citizens
of other communist countries could not freely travel. For more on the cross-border shopping culture, see Maja
Mikula, “Highways of Desire: Cross-Border Shopping Trips in Former Yugoslavia, 1960s-1980s,” in Yugoslavia’s
Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism (1950s-1980s), eds. Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor (Budapest:
Central European University Press, 2010), 210-237. Yet, tourism inevitably put on display Yugoslavia’s class
differences. Those who were better off (the managerial class, and even those working in “public services” rather
than in “production sphere”) often spent their holidays in destinations outside of the country. This pattern made it
apparent that Yugoslav “socialism had produced social strata with notable differences in income, education,
occupation, and levels of social security and lifestyle.” Taylor and Grandits, “Tourism and the Making of Socialist
Yugoslavia,” 18.
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elsewhere in the communist world, was what made Yugoslavs different (at least in our
imaginations) from the Poles, Romanians, or Bulgarians.
Yugoslavia was different from other European socialist countries in another respect: it
had a multiethnic society with a history of ethnic discord. As historians Hannes Grandits and
Karin Taylor observe, Yugoslav government seemed to understand that ethnic harmony could be
maintained “through the peaceful coexistence of contended workers relaxing at the beach.
Holidays and tourism could be utilized to create a new Yugoslav awareness among the
population and thus transcend the national, political, and religious enmities so viciously played
out during the Second World War.”46 As historian Patrick Patterson only somewhat flippantly
notes, this rampant Western-style consumerism and comfortable lifestyles—distinct features of
the joint state rather than of Croatia, Slovenia, or Macedonia—may have been precisely what
kept Yugoslavia’s multi-ethnic fabric together: “Yugoslavia’s remarkable culture of
consumption […] the shared celebration and pursuit of abundance was what made the venture, at
least for a time, so successful.”47 Yugoslav identity came to be defined by that “abundance”—the
unique balance of socialism and Western consumer culture. Journalist and novelist Slavenka
Drakulić points out:
I have to admit that for me, as for many of my friends born after World War II, being
Croat has no special meaning. Not only was I educated to believe that the whole territory
of Yugoslavia was my homeland, but because we could travel freely abroad (which
people of the Eastern-bloc countries couldn’t), I almost believed that borders, as well as
nationalities, existed only in people’s heads. Moreover, the youth culture of 1968 brought
us even closer to the world through rock music, demonstrations, movies, books and the
46 Taylor and Grandits, “Tourism and the Making of Socialist Yugoslavia,” 6.
47 Patrick Hyder Patterson, Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), xvii. Patterson’s book provides an in-depth account of various aspects of
Yugoslavia’s consumer culture.
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English language. We had so much in common with the West that in fact we mentally
belonged there.48
Once the country entered a serious economic crisis, and the “abundance” was gone—Yugoslavia
started to drift away from both socialism and from Western Europe—the borders reappeared and
the country unraveled along ethnic lines. Soon, as the last of the Yugoslav Dream died,
Yugoslavia’s second incarnation, too, ceased to exist.
48 Slavenka Drakulić, The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1993), 50.
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Chapter 1
Black Waves on Red Shores: A New Yugoslav Cinema for a New Yugoslavia
In our country, only a democracy which continually makes progress can clarify class
conflicts and diminish class differences.
— Milovan Djilas, Anatomy of a Moral
Out of the New and Into the Black
The most politically engaged tradition in the Yugoslav cinema of the 1960s is found in
the Black Wave. This bleakly pessimistic tendency in Yugoslav cinema emerged primarily in
Serbia, but a handful of filmmakers from Croatia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina made films
that fall into the category. Several interrelated developments in the social, political and
intellectual life in Yugoslavia are typically associated with the Black Wave: democratic deficit,
especially the difficulties associated with practical application of the workers’ self-management
system which was meant to guarantee a functional participatory democracy for workers at all
levels, the emergence and entrenchment of the New Class, the 1968 student demonstrations
which voiced objections to the abuses of power by the New Class elites who were rendering the
post-war generation both politically and economically perspectiveless, and the activities of the
Praxis School philosophers who called for a thorough democratization of the Yugoslav society.
Black Wave commented on, and indeed documented, Yugoslavia’s decline: the failure of the
workers’ self–management system, the mismanagement of the economy by petty bureaucrats,
and the attendant unemployment and housing crises, the emergence of class division, and post-
war generations’ disillusionment with Yugoslavia, especially the perception that the country was
becoming less democratic. In the decade or so (roughly from 1963 to 1973) during which they
were active, Black Wave filmmakers offered astute assessments of life in the socialist Yugoslavia
and their output forms an extraordinary outburst of socially aware and fearlessly political
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filmmaking. Black Wave was political activism through cinema. The films routinely alluded to
the erosion of participatory democracy and suggested that Yugoslav Dream was but an illusion
for most citizens. Black Wave introduced into the public sphere those concerns which could
generally not be openly voiced in the political arena and so transgressed the boundaries of the
politically acceptable in the 1960s Yugoslavia.49 Deemed a dangerous ideological challenge,
Black Wave was gradually suppressed by the Yugoslav government.
Black Wave had a philosophical equivalent in the Praxis School. Praxis philosophers tried
to steer Yugoslavia away from dogmatic interpretations of Marxism, unfaithful to the spirit of
the theory; they offered a constructive ideological critique of the Yugoslav system, especially of
the unacknowledged class division and of the rampant alienation of the workers; they asked for a
reconceptualization of the Yugoslav socialism rooted in authentic Marxist humanism.50 Praxis
49 I want to clarify here that Black Wave films were not necessarily anti-communist. The filmmakers did not
pine for Western “freedoms” but rather denounced erosion of democracy under the management of the anti-
intellectual, conservative, self-glorifying war generation. That they were able to make films critical of the system
and did not idealize the West, were both likely due to the fact that Black Wave emerged “in the era of ‘mature
Titoism,’ a time when the Yugoslav model was more open, more successful and more communicative than other
state models of socialism.” Dominika Prejdová, “People from the Fringes of Society are the Spiritus Movens of Life
in the Balkans: An Interview with Želimir Žilnik,” in Želimir Žilnik: For an Idea—Against Status Quo, ed. Branislav
Dimitrijević (Novi Sad: Playground Produkcija, 2009), 207. For more on the thematic concerns of the Black Wave,
see Greg DeCuir, Yugoslav Black Wave: Polemical Cinema from 1963-72 in the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Film Center Serbia, 2011).
50 Praxis philosophers denounced the Soviet system because it enabled the state rule over the proletariat
(when it should have been the other way around), and because the transfer of private property to the state gave rise
to a huge bureaucracy. In fairness, to criticize the Soviets was politically safe, but they also harshly criticized the
Yugoslav system and its leadership. As one of its most prominent members, Mihailo Marković, points out, by the
early 1960s “Praxis philosophers established that both forms of economic and political alienation still existed in
Yugoslav society, that the working class was still exploited—this time by the new elites: bureaucracy and
technocracy; that the market economy will inevitably reproduce capital-labor relations; that self-management exists
only at the micro-level in enterprises and local communities and organizations, and that consequently its further
development requires a gradual withering away of professional politics and the formation of workers’ councils at the
regional, republican, and federal level; that the basic precondition for a really participatory democracy was at first a
radical democratization and, later, the withering away, of the Party.” Mihailo Marković, “Marxist Philosophy in
Yugoslavia: The Praxis Group,” in Mihailo Marković and Robert S. Cohen, Yugoslavia: The Rise and Fall of
Socialist Humanism (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), 26. Tolerated for over a decade, the Praxis School was
suppressed in the early 1970s, after Yugoslavia underwent a crisis borne out of the push for greater decentralization
by both Serbian and Croat politicians—something that, especially in the case of the latter, Yugoslav authorities
perceived as driven by nationalism (and as an attempt to break up the country). The authorities cracked down on the
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philosophers argued for a true participatory democracy as opposed to an illusion of one. They
supported “workers’ self-management as the sole form of social organization capable of
resolving the contradictions inherent in both bourgeois and existing socialist societies and as
most consonant with Marx’s vision of a ‘free association of producers.’”51 They, however, also
asserted that “without a frank, critical, Marxist evaluation—whatever its conclusions—of the
practice of self-management in Yugoslavia, this revolutionary principle of social organization
would represent nothing more than an empty ideological justification for a new system of class
oppression.”52 In this they echoed the sentiments expressed in 1957 by Milovan Djilas who
suggested that a political bureaucracy he termed the New Class had emerged which regarded
political power as capital property—as the means to gain financially. This New Class managed
state property, and regulated wages, economic development, and even sports and culture. As any
ruling class would, it shamelessly went about trying to convince everyone “that the establishment
of its power would result in happiness and freedom for all men.”53 Like Djilas and the Praxis
School, Black Wave films suggested that Yugoslav democracy, especially its flagship feature, the
self-management system, amounts to little more than an illusion. In Black Wave films, those who
believe in the fairness of the system and play by the rules, end up at the bottom of the social
hierarchy. The films tended to focus on outsiders and losers—those who were not experiencing
the prosperity integral to the Yugoslav Dream—and, in turn, hinted that Yugoslavia was a class-
based society. The films expose “the depravity of the working and peasant classes, who socialist
Praxis School philosophers, closing their journals and removing many from their university posts, until the
movement completely dissipated in the mid-1970s.
51 Gerson S. Sher, Praxis: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1977), 157.
52 Ibid., 158.
53 Milovan Djilas, The New Class (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1957), 38.
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ideologues, at least in their proclamations, designated as embodiments of progressive values and
agents of social transformation, all the while doing nothing to improve their working and living
conditions.”54
Black Wave also mirrored and paralleled the dissenting voices of the student
demonstrations of 1968. Both pointed to a generational divide in which the post-war generation,
eager for change, was pitted against the conservative and immutable war generation. Yugoslav
authorities laid part of the blame on the Praxis School philosophers when in June of 1968, the
capital of Yugoslavia was hit by street and university campus demonstrations during which
thousands of students demanded changes. Economic reforms implemented in the mid-1960s
caused unemployment rates to grow rapidly—a development “remedied” by the state via
agreements relaxing travel and employment restrictions with Western countries like Germany,
allowing Yugoslavs to look for work outside of the country.55 Since employment was guaranteed
by the constitution, the students pointed the finger at those running the country as the source of
the problem. The economic crisis brought about a political one. The students took over the
University of Belgrade and christened it “The Red University of Karl Marx.” They frequently
clashed with the police on the streets of Belgrade while chanting slogans against the “Red
Bourgeoisie” that was mismanaging the country. The chaos on the streets of Belgrade lasted
seven days until Tito addressed the students on TV, promised changes and suggested that not
even he is beyond reproach.
54 Tatjana Aleksić, The Sacrificed Body: Balkan Community Building and the Fear of Freedom (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 113.
55 For details, see William Zimmerman, Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of
Yugoslavia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 76.
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Although Yugoslav artists were to create works supportive of socialism, the government
lacked a cohesive policy towards dissenting voices such as those of Black Wave filmmakers who
offered a bleak view of the Yugoslav reality.56 Student demonstrations shook up the country’s
political establishment and helped put all forms of dissent, including in the arts, under scrutiny.
The crackdown on the forces of decentralization among the “liberals” within the republican
leaderships of Serbia and Croatia also created a climate that led to the eventual suppression of
Black Wave in the early 1970s, with many films scrutinized by the censors and unofficially
banned, and directors of controversial films ostracized both socially and professionally.57 If a
56 The break with Stalin resulted in a relaxation of the rules guiding cinema. It was understood, however,
though nowhere explicitly defined that Tito, self-management, World War II, and the Army were topics to be
handled with extreme caution. To depict the social and political reality of Yugoslavia in negative terms was enough
for a film to come under scrutiny and criticism, but even the most “problematic” films were usually screened at least
once.
57 Director Želimir Žilnik suggests, perhaps somewhat overstating the severity of the methods and of the
consequences of suppression of Black Wave films: “In our present circumstances it is almost impossible to
understand the scope and gravity of that ideological campaign. The entire party, state and police, around ten
thousand people, were engaged in excluding, persecuting, ‘criticising’ and disabling those people who were
stigmatised as ‘ideological enemies’. Under state socialism, such a form of exorcism was a very important tool of
‘discipline.’ It is interesting to note that in Yugoslavia, which had in any case a more open system, an undefined
policy of self-management and free travelling abroad, the Party did not exclude the campaigns and ‘cleansing’
agendas typical of Stalinist models. The destruction of the New Wave and the change of its name to Black Wave is
an obvious example of an wide-ranging, effective and self-destructive course of action. The most creative phase of
our domestic cinema was brought to a standstill. Directors like Makavejev, Petrović, Pavlović and many others were
not given new projects. Because of his film Plastic Jesus, Lazar Stojanović was sentenced to two years in prison.
They banned all my films that had been made until then: five documentaries and Early Works. And my film
Freedom or Cartoons, which was in the editing process, was also banned. I remember the social security office
sending me a notice that since my films were not shown publicly I was to be stripped off the status of a film-
maker—which was the basis for my insurance. So, you see, they were successful administrative measures. When the
most interesting, internationally acclaimed auteurs went abroad, their cinema language deteriorated and they
practically never again made films of the quality they used to. I was still young then, not yet thirty, and I decided:
I'm not going to let those parasites break me.” Prejdová, “People from the Fringes of Society,” 208. Yet, only one
Black Wave film, the omnibus, The City (Rakonjac/Pavlović/Babac, 1963), was ever officially banned (it was, in
fact, the only Yugoslav film ever banned). Paradoxically, The City was far less daring than some of the films to
come later, suggesting a great deal of confusion existed as to just what type of subject matter was off limits. For
more on The City and its ban, see Bogdan Tirnanić, Crni Talas (Belgrade: Filmski centar Srbije, 2008), 30-48. It is
worth noting that, as film scholar David Cook points out, the “counteroffensive [against Black Wave] was led by
centrists rather than reactionaries,” and was not nearly as harsh as the one led against the Czech New Wave
filmmakers around the same time. Cook, A History of Narrative Film, 750. Curiously, the actors who appeared in
Black Wave films seemed to suffer no consequences for their participation, and their careers often involved
appearances in establishment-friendly films—sometimes simultaneously with the “problematic” ones.
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filmmaker did not heed the “advice” to self-censor and alter the film, it would typically be
screened once (so as to eliminate the perception of there being a ban) and then disappear from
circulation.58 Some of the more radical Black Wave filmmakers, the “anarcho-liberals” as they
were termed were dealt with somewhat more methodically and more harshly.59 Some were
pressured into taking a break from filmmaking while others left the country. The term Black
Wave took hold, having been first applied in a 1969 article in Belgrade newspaper, Borba, which
described the films as aberrations that stood separately from the rest of society and as borderline
criminal imitations of Western trends, especially in their emphasis on themes of alienation. The
crackdown prompted public debates and polemics about the responsibility and value of
engagement of artists in social and political sphere, with some arguing for complete artistic
freedom of filmmakers who had a duty to point out the negative, while others decried what they
deemed a reactionary collision of Black Wave with socialist values.60
58 Several Black Wave filmmakers recall with irony that although producers would sometimes ask for films
to be reedited in order for the offensive content to be removed or, alternatively, distributors were advised to not
handle problematic films, it was film professionals themselves who effectively censored the films. Like all workers,
film professionals self-managed and discussed their “products” in workers’ council meetings, during which they
applied self-critique, a process rarely taken seriously by those involved. They also formed censorship boards, which
typically consisted of renowned artists, filmmakers and otherwise, whose discussions of problematic films were, in
theory if not always in practice, a matter of public record. Just how informal and loose this system was is suggested
by anecdotes involving films coming under scrutiny only after receiving negative comments from functionaries who
had seen them, causing their subordinates to remove the films from circulation in order to please their bosses.
Zabranjeni bez zabrane, directed by Tucaković and Nikodijević, 2007.
59 Director Lazar Stojanović is one of those who paid a rather high price for their dissent despite the
“confusion,” most likely because the film’s release coincided with the peak in the activities of the “liberals.” Not
only was his 1971 film, Plastic Jesus, unofficially banned but Stojanović was imprisoned on an “unrelated” charge
for three years. He recounts how easily he came across the raw footage of Tito’s speech which dealt with 1968
student demonstrations, and which included the Yugoslav leader appearing rather uncomfortable and confused. That
Stojanović used the footage—the main reason why the film got scrutinized and its director imprisoned—is
unsurprising but that he obtained it so easily does suggest a rather lax attitude towards possible sources of
embarrassment for even the most sacred Yugoslav public figure. Zabranjeni bez zabrane, directed by Tucaković and
Nikodijević, 2007.
60 The Borba article elicited a fierce response from director Aleksandar Petrović (whose films were not
even particularly controversial). For details, see Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 72. For the Borba article and for
insight into the ideological debates that followed, see Aleksandar Petrović, Novi Film II (1965-1970: Crni Film
(Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1988), 271-354. For a brief overview of the suppression of Black Wave and of the
ideological debates about the role of the film artist in Yugoslavia, see Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 78-83.
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The Many Shades of Black
Writing in 1957, Milovan Djilas points out some hard truths about the Yugoslav system:
although the state was meant to wither away and democracy to flourish, the “reverse happened”;
the promise that the standard of living would go up and “the differences between cities and
villages, between intellectual and physical labor, would slowly disappear” has been betrayed as
the “differences have increased,” and “the standard of living had failed to rise in proportion to
the rate of industrialization” 61 Black Wave films routinely called attention to this disconnect
between the promises of a democratic and prosperous society, free of class divisions and all
forms of exploitation, and the reality that Yugoslavia had ceased to progress towards
communism and was now ruled by a class of bureaucrats with no intention of relinquishing their
control of the country to the people. In this chapter, I discuss four Black Wave films, Živojin
Pavlović’s When I am Dead and Gone (1967) and Ambush (1969), and WR: Mysteries of the
Organism (Makavejev, 1971) and Early Works (Žilnik, 1969) which all suggested that the
country’s rulers were not authentic communists but only masqueraded as such. These four films
not only pointed to this performativity of the elites, but reflected back into the public sphere the
disillusionment of the citizens and so displaced the official representations of Yugoslav reality.
My intent in analyzing the films is not to deride Yugoslavia’s socialist system but to examine
how the Yugoslav society of the 1960s was seen by its more political filmmakers. While
considering the aesthetic and narrative strategies used by these four films, I also identify
developments in the Yugoslav social and political life that directly correspond to the films’
critiques. By virtue of attempting to show the ugly truths about the Yugoslav society,
downplayed by the political establishment, the four films warrant consideration from a single
61 Djilas, The New Class, 37.
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point of view, that of the revelatory capability of their depictions of the Yugoslav society. My
analysis is therefore loosely structured around different traditions and strategies of realism
employed by the films and utilizes critical tools and discourses pertaining to the ability of cinema
to not only mirror reality but to evoke intellectual and visceral responses of the audiences to their
social and political environment.
In both When I’m Dead and Gone and Ambush, Pavlović depicts a cutthroat environment,
full of filth and poverty, and populated with uncouth, manipulative, malicious, rapacious
characters with unrestrained appetites for corruption, violence and sex. Pavlović’s unsentimental
albeit minimally dramatized frankness alone qualifies as naturalism in the literary tradition of
Émile Zola. Pavlović’s forsaken “heroes,” however, are not mere witnesses to human misery
caused by some vaguely defined universal failing of human nature. Though Pavlović’s naïve,
childlike characters seem doomed from the start, unable to successfully manage their conflicts
with their environments, their tragic fates and, in turn, Pavlović’s fatalism have concrete roots
and causes in the society’s social and political upheavals. Pavlović’s approach can therefore be
more precisely described as being in the literary realist tradition championed by Georg Lukács
which depicts individuals caught in the historically specific circumstances and whose
experiences provide a picture of the totality of their social and political environment.62
Pavlović’s characters’ subjective experiences put into focus the objective reality: the state
mechanisms which have led to hardships of both the characters and of the viewers.
62 See Georg Lukács, “Realism in the Balance,” in Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukács, Bertolt Brecht, Walter
Benjamin, and Theodor Adorno, Aesthetics and Politics (1977; repr., London: Verso, 2007), 28-59. Lukács is, of
course, discussing the capitalist context in which literary realism illuminates the conditions produced by capitalism
and therefore possesses revolutionary potential to overturn capitalism. Pavlović is working within a society arrested
in a revolutionary transition, and alerts the viewer to the conditions that transition has spawned, and to precisely why
the society’s progress towards communism has been stunted.
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Makavejev’s and Žilnik’s approaches in WR and Early Works respectively can be broadly
described as cinematic equivalents of Brechtian modernism which puts into focus the
“constructedness” of the films themselves; rather than being eased into an illusion of reality
inherent to the cinematic medium, the audience is reminded that the medium cannot but
disseminate ideology. In the tradition of Brecht’s Epic Theatre “innovations,” WR and Early
Works dispense with conventional drama entirely, reject cause-effect logic and instead rely
heavily on montage; they offer a fragmented viewer experience through discontinuity editing and
jumbled chronology, and have the characters directly address the audience and pose questions to
be pondered. 63 Like Brecht’s Epic Theatre, Makavejev’s and Žilnik’s avant-garde
experimentation disrupts traditional realism. It keeps the audience at arm’s length by rejecting
naturalistic acting, by rejecting authenticity that corresponds to real life situations and thus
inhibiting psychological realism, spectator identification, and, in turn, emotional involvement.
The characters tend to stand for a particular social class and its attendant problems and serve to
identify those problems to the viewer so they can be considered and analyzed. The strategies
employed by Makavejev and Žilnik, however, are not anti-realist but rather, like Brecht’s Epic
Theatre, aim to broaden the concept of realism to include direct interventions into the political
sphere—they employ dialectical maneuvering that engages with iconography and mythology of
the dominant ideology and aims to make the spectator aware of precisely how the elites have
mismanaged the country.64
63 For more on the “innovations,” see Bertolt Brecht, “The Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre,” in Brecht
On Theatre: the Development of an Aesthetic, ed. John Willett (1964; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 37.
64 For Brecht, realism meant “laying bare society’s causal network/showing up the dominant viewpoint as
the viewpoint of the dominators/writing from the standpoint of the class which has prepared the broadest solutions
for the most pressing problems afflicting human society/emphasizing the dynamics of development/concrete and so
as to encourage abstraction.” Bertolt Brecht, “The Popular and the Realistic,” in Brecht On Theatre: the
Development of an Aesthetic, ed. John Willett (1964; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 109.
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Živojin Pavlović suggested that Black Wave “doesn’t intend to sparkle, but to torture. It
doesn’t want to seduce, but rather to burden our ethical, political and state conformism, by
impertinently portraying the fate of its heroes.”65 When I’m Dead and Gone does not romanticize
non-conformism, but neither does it focus on the dreary details of life in the gutter. Instead, it
directly points to unemployment—caused by economic reforms—as the source of Jimmy’s
misery. As the expert on Balkan affairs Susan Woodward points out, because the Yugoslav
society was built “around the concept of community through labor” and therefore “[t]o be
unemployed was to be excluded from full membership in society—a loss of full citizenship
rights, a second-class status, a disenfranchisement.”66 Paradoxically, Jimmy’s unemployment
implies both freedom and inequality. Jimmy’s predicament seems a perfect manifestation of
Erich Fromm’s distinction between “freedom from”—being free from external societal
structures, conventions, restrictions and bonds of authority—and “freedom to”—being able to
spontaneously pursue drives (sex, creative), to fulfill one’s intellectual potential, and to connect
with others.67 Jimmy is not a slave to the state and its institutions, but that “negative” freedom
comes at a price—inability to participate in the political life, stigmatization and eventual physical
65 Quoted in Kirn, Sekulić and Testen, “Prologue,” Surfing the Black, 5.
66 Susan L. Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: the Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4.
67 Fromm says of spontaneity: “Spontaneous activity is the one way in which man can overcome the terror
of aloneness without sacrificing the integrity of his self; for in the spontaneous realization of the self, man unites
himself anew with the world—with man, nature, and himself. Love is the foremost component of such spontaneity;
not love as the dissolution of the self in another person, not love as the possession of another person, but love as
spontaneous affirmation of others, as the union of the individual self. The dynamic quality of love lies in this very
polarity: that it springs from the need of overcoming separateness, that is leads to oneness—and yet that
individuality is not eliminated. Work is the other component; not work as a compulsive activity in order to escape
aloneness, not work as a relationship to nature which is partly one of dominating her, partly one of worship of and
enslavement by the very products of man's hands, but work as creation in which man becomes one with nature in the
act of creation. What holds true of love and work holds true of all spontaneous action, whether it be the realization
of sensuous pleasure or participation in the political life of the community. It affirms the individuality of the self and
at the same time it unites the self with man and nature. The basic dichotomy that is inherent in freedom—the birth of
individuality and the pain of aloneness—is dissolved on a higher plane by man's spontaneous action.” Erich Fromm,
Escape from Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1965), 287.
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removal from the society. Jimmy never finds affirmation via “positive” freedom either because
it, too, has become a state institution. Jimmy cannot find fulfillment in another’s love because in
the Yugoslavia of Dead and Gone, love is not given freely but only calculatedly—mainly in
exchange for financial security which only comes with employment. Jimmy cannot express his
individuality through creative work either because singing, too, has become a profession—rather
than a spontaneous form of expression—that caters to youth tastes, requires managers,
promotion, and a real talent.
Fromm suggests that “freedom from” in a society that has liberated itself from
authoritarian rule typically leads to another form of authoritarianism—and another set of
repressive institutions—precisely because this “negative” freedom is insufficient when it is not
accompanied by freedom of expression and individual liberty. Ultimately, the majority (the
middle class) finds “refuge” in being repressed yet again while maintaining a myth of liberty.
Like Dead and Gone, Ambush suggests that Yugoslavs are alienated both from each other and
from their state institutions. Like Jimmy, Ive of Ambush finds the limits of freedom when he
speaks out without reservations against moral and ideological corruption. Although he believes
in state institutions, like Jimmy, Ive stands in opposition to them because they do not allow
pursuit of “positive” freedom, they cannot be transcended and force Ive into a life of loneliness
and marginality. Ideological barriers do not allow Ive to find love; rather than being allowed to
go back to school now that the war is almost over, Ive is recruited to hunt down enemies of the
state. Ive cannot integrate into the society because his kind and docile nature is out of place in
the system in which mob hysteria is disguised as justice and cold-blooded pursuit of economic
interests stands for prosperity. Dismayed by the opportunism of witch-hunts targeting “enemy
collaborators” and by the mythmaking that accompanies them, Ive realizes that he is not free. He
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is promptly removed from the society because he is an obstacle to proliferation of official
mythology which falsely claims to guarantee “positive” freedom for all citizens.
Like Dead and Gone and Ambush, Makavejev’s WR suggests that Yugoslavia is a
repressive society that craves repression by ideologues who hide behind cynical dogma that
champions both “positive” and “negative” freedom. As Bogdan Tirnanić suggests, WR “is a
work that speaks about why the suppression of free thought is also a suppression of free love,
and vice versa, but also, within the same tendency, about the degree to which the liberation of the
supressed Eros can and must be the necessary precondition of any real spiritual liberation.”68
Makavejev mocks such myths by depicting communist leaders as sexually repressed
psychopaths, but ultimately asks the same question as Pavlović: Have socialist revolutions been
arrested in convulsive transitional moments where freedom is an illusion and communism
forever remains within reach but unattainable? If Pavlović’s approach can be described as
Lukácsian realism (more general picture of the political environment depicted, offering a view of
the totality of social conditions), Makavejev’s is certainly Brechtian (specific insight into the
mechanisms of oppression via articulation of the contradictions of the system).69 Although often
too cynical in tone to be taken didactically, WR engages the spectators in a refashioning of their
political environment. As film scholar Pavle Levi suggests, Makavejev “conceives of the viewer
of his films as precisely that individual whose complete freedom he is advocating.”70 Makavejev
employs Eisensteinian montage in order to offer a highly formalized dialectical insight into that
68 Tirnanić, Crni Talas, 115. (translation mine)
69 For a comparison of Lukács’ and Brecht’s approaches to realism, see Eugene Lunn, Marxism and
Modernism: an Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin, and Adorno (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984), 75-90.
70 Pavle Levi, Disintegration in Frames: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav
Cinema (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 31.
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environment. Because it breaks spatial and temporal continuity, and uses symbolic imagery
extraneous to the environment depicted, this approach can be described as the opposite of
Bazinian realism, but, critically, the rigidity of this formalist approach mirrors the constructed
nature of the social and political relationships depicted and suggests that if the former is
changeable so is the latter. 71
Žilnik’s approach is certainly anti-Bazinian as he routinely breaks up the continuity of the
filmic world as he engages in dialectical battles with the system for which he shows nothing but
cynical contempt. In keeping with Brecthtian distaste for emotional involvement, the four main
characters of Žilnik’s Early Works are not fleshed out individuals with emotions but caricatures
engaged in battles with themselves, the outcome of which is (and can only be) self-destruction.
Žilnik frequently employs cinematic versions of the Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt—non-realistic
costumes and props, stifled acting, out-of-sync dialogue and sound effects, discontinuity editing.
In this way, Žilnik disrupts realism, prevents spectator identification and so has the spectator at
all times “present” and capable of taking in the message: an explicit and unmistakable riposte to
the Yugoslav political establishment. Perhaps the most striking application of the effekt is the
entwining of the mission of the four protagonists to reach the workers and peasants with Žilnik’s
own mission to make the film. Žilnik can be heard giving direction to actors and crew and calling
them by their real names. His own “presence” suggests that Early Works is a documentary record
of itself and therefore a piece of activism that exists in the real world. This is perhaps what gives
71 Although, as Levi points out, Makavejev does assume his spectator’s Marxist, militant, radical 1960s
politics, and therefore narrows down the interpretive variety—both the film and the spectator are inside the same
ideology—his montage is in some respects almost Bazinian. Makavejev’s montage is not uncompromising, and
achieves something similar to what a deep focus/long take-oriented aesthetic does. As Levi puts it, even “an
Eisenstein-inspired technique may itself successfully give rise to a polyphony of perceptual and intellectual
reactions.” Levi, Disintegration, 33.
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the film its realist credentials: Early Works is an intervention, a direct involvement into the actual
existing political sphere.
Because he, as Pavle Levi suggests, “tends to avoid scene fragmentation,” prefers deep
focus photography and mobile framing—the Metzian “sequence shot” in which “an entire scene
[is] treated in a single shot”—Pavlović’s aesthetic approach can be described as Bazinian
realism, possessing the capacity to “lay bare for you [the world in] all its cruelty and its
ugliness.”72 Yet, as Levi argues, Pavlović’s “sequence shot” is so complex and so layered with
meaning as to be capable of staging a clash of symbols/ideas comparable to that found in
Eisenstein’s montage. Perhaps even more Eisensteinian is Pavlović’s tendency to interrupt a
sequence with an insert shot which although not independent of the rest of the sequence invokes
intellectual responses and, as Levi argues, forms the basis of Pavlović’s approach to realism: a
strategy “of confronting the viewer with the ‘drastic’ or ‘raw’ image—an image capable of
triggering a powerful visceral reaction, commonly a mixture of shock and disgust.”73 Pavlović’s
“drastic/raw” image and his montage-like “sequence shot” delimit the diegetic world. Arguably
then, Pavlović’s approach to realism is not simply one of mirroring the reality and mimicking
mechanisms of human perception but one of interruption of the viewing pleasure and therefore
one not all that far removed from Makavejev’s or Žilnik’s approaches.
“Some Revolution You Are!”: Ambush and When I am Dead and Gone
The climate of political change and economic reform—ideological realignment—of the
1960s informs both Ambush and When I am Dead and Gone and their depictions of Yugoslavia.
72 Pavle Levi, “When I’m Dead and Pale,” in The Cinema of the Balkans, ed. Dina Iordanova (New York:
Wallflower Press, 2006), 57. Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema, trans. Michael Taylor
(1974; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 124. André Bazin, What is Cinema? Vol. 1, trans. Hugh
Gray (1967; repr., Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 27.
73 Levi, Disintegration, 40.
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Both films seem to suggest that political liberalization and economic reforms resulted in a
cutthroat society in which citizens aggressively compete with one another in order to survive
while the elites continue to hoodwink the masses and enrich themselves. Ambush is set shortly
before the end of World War II in the area close to the Syrmian Front, northwest of Belgrade,
where the Nazis are desperately trying to repel the Red Army and Yugoslav Partisans’ push
westward. Ambush focuses on Ive, an idealistic eighteen year old Partisan and his struggles to
navigate the confusion of Yugoslavia’s uneasy transition into socialism. As the remaining
Chetnik bands are hunted down and ideologically unfit civilians are rounded up, Ive’s belief in
the revolution is challenged by the brutality with which those judged to be enemy collaborators
are dealt. Ive is dismayed by the fear the revolution inspires and enmity it, in turn, produces
among his comrades and among the local population. Everyone around Ive is driven by greed
and ever-ready for ideological posturing in order to secure privileges. Ive must face the fact that
the light of the revolution does not shine but only dimly shimmers—hypocrisy and lack of
empathy are the norm, and mere conformism impossible to distinguish from genuine belief in the
revolution. Once Ive realizes that the revolution’s most ardent ideologues are petty revanchists
who spew slogans empty of substance, he is killed by an overeager Partisan patrol who execute
him on suspicion of being an enemy collaborator.
Although set 25 years in the past, Ambush is about the Yugoslavia of the late 1960s. The
film suggests that the supposedly all-inclusive Yugoslav system is unjust and that the elites who
would eventually be targeted by student demonstrations in 1968 never intended to honour the
principles of the revolution. Those who are timid lose out while those who are aggressive
benefit. This dynamic is embodied in the contrast between Ive whose naiveté and Otherness
signify the ordinary law-abiding citizen, and corrupt Department of National Security (Odjeljenje
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za zaštitu naroda, commonly known by the acronym OZNA) policemen Zeka and Jotić who
signify the political elites.74 Timid and unambitious Ive seems certain that the new state will look
after him. Because of this naiveté, Ive is taken for a fool by those around him. Ive’s good nature
is juxtaposed with the brutality, provincialism, cronyism, blind ambition, and lack of true belief
in the values of the revolution of those he encounters. Zeka, a small-time OZNA functionary is a
cynical, drunken, thieving brute with little regard for the ideals of the revolution. Rather than
being a mentor to orphaned Ive, Zeka pilfers the aid meant for the peasants and soldiers on the
frontline and uses it to pay for sexual services. Zeka’s boss Jotić, another failed father figure to
Ive, cunningly constructs the myth of his own heroism in order to advance within the political
ranks. When Ive suggests that Zeka’s thieving, womanizing and excessive drinking are
unsuitable for a communist building a new society, Zeka replies: “Communism, socialism—I
don’t care.” If Ive represents the naïve masses, Zeka and Jotić stand for those in power in
Yugoslavia who although unfamiliar with the theoretical nuances of the system know how to
manipulate it. They are what the revolution has amounted to: unscrupulous ambition hidden
behind posturing and trite revolutionary mythology. In this “new” Yugoslavia, one only need be
able to perform an allegiance to communism to advance, and even ordinary citizens mirror the
behaviour of the elites. Local peasants and community leaders align themselves with Jotić—and
disregard his criminal behaviour—in order to socially advance rather than because of genuine
belief in the new communist authorities. Eager to show their loyalty, the confused recruits from
the patrol that kills Ive are quick to suspect him of being a Chetnik and even quicker to abuse
74 Ive’s otherness is emphasized through his accent which makes him standout from the locals. His
nickname, Crow, is the product of a misunderstanding after the locals heard him imitate the sound seagulls (common
to Dalmatia, where he is from), but thought he sounded more like a crow (common to Serbia, where moved after his
father’s death). Although he jokingly claims that “seagulls are far superior to crows,” Ive can hardly make any sense
of the locals’ entanglements.
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their (petty) powers. The film suggests that Yugoslavia is not a progressive, modern, nurturing
society but one which requires sycophancy, ignorance, and brutality of its citizens. As Daniel
Goulding points out, in Ambush, it is the revolution that is “ambushed.”75
Unlike Ive, Jimmy of When I am Dead and Gone knows that the system is inherently
unjust and that he can expect no help from the state. Aptly nicknamed the Rowboat, the
unemployable petty thief with unrealistic dreams of achieving stardom as a singer drifts through
Western Serbia maintaining a fantasy of becoming rich and famous. In the mud of provincial
Serbia, Jimmy’s only option for survival is to live off of women desperate for company. Jimmy
and his companion Lilica, a con woman who fakes pregnancies in order to elicit sympathy and
take money from the “fathers,” are too busy surviving—dodging police as well as vigilante
justice—to be truly in love. Jimmy makes it to Belgrade where he is humiliated at a singing
competition. Out of options, he reunites with Lilica only to be shot inside an outhouse by the
man whom Lilica was blackmailing.
As Pavle Levi suggests, Pavlović’s “film offers a demythologizing portrayal of the
Yugoslav socialist everyday, a vision in sharp contrast to the official, state-sponsored stories of
general prosperity taking place under the sign of an enthusiastic collective commitment to the
communist goals.”76 Yugoslavia of Dead and Gone is desolate and inhospitable, its citizens,
driven to desperation by unemployment, are dishonest, grasping, self-righteous, hostile and
aggressive.77 These are, as the political and cultural scholar Gal Kirn suggests, the consequences
75 Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 74. The film’s cynicism about the Yugoslav system did not go unnoticed
by the authorities. For details on the initial critical reception for Ambush, see Tirnanić, Crni Talas, 83-94.
76 Levi, Disintegration, 45.
77 When I’m Dead and Gone takes place in a Serbian backwater similar to the setting of Ambush, but over
two decades later. Although there is no formal connection between the two films (and Dead and Gone was made
two years before), the film provides an insight into just what kind of society corrupt opportunists like Jotić have
built.
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of the 1960s market reform.78 Unemployment in the 1960s Yugoslavia was tolerated and dealt
with via employment bureaus located primarily near state firms, effectively acting as their cheap
labour suppliers.79 Jimmy’s odyssey takes him to such employment bureaus throughout the film.
The film begins with seasonal workers being let go from an agricultural establishment. When
Jimmy protests, the foreman exclaims: “I don’t run a cooperative here!”80 The foreman’s
assertion hints that although self-management system guarantees the workers a voice, the
country still has a very strict top-down organization—state properties have been taken over by
the bureaucratic elites who are managing the workers’ self-management system.81 The film
points to the contradiction inherent in the system: self-management guarantees input from the
workers, yet because in this market-oriented Yugoslavia unemployment is rampant, that
guarantee has little value. As Susan Woodward points out, Yugoslavia’s turn towards market
economy meant precisely this: “No charity, sympathy, or welfare for the unemployed was
appropriate, for it would only reduce the resources going to real accumulation and give monies to
people who were not contributing to real output.”82
Pavlović depicts a Yugoslavia torn by the disparity between the promises of prosperity
and the reality of hardship caused by experimentation with market socialism. When Jimmy tries
78 Kirn, “New Yugoslav Cinema,” 24.
79 Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 178. For detailed unemployment data, see Woodward, Socialist
Unemployment, 191-221.
80 The foreman’s use of the first person singular personal pronoun rather than the plural—“I” rather than
“we”—symbolically suggests that the control of the job market is in the hands of the managerial class which,
counter to the doctrine of the workers’ self-management, has assumed the privileges akin to those afforded by
Western-style private ownership.
81 As the historian Gerson Sher points out, the “introduction of workers’ self-management in Yugoslavia
can be described without exaggeration as a revolutionary departure,” but “this was a revolution from above.” Sher
Praxis, 154.
82 Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 177.
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to talk to Kidney, the foreman’s assistant, about a job, he gets a sobering advice: “Go as far away
from here as possible, you fool, or you are screwed.” Kidney (who is particularly bitter because
he was trained as an economist and now works as a personal assistant) alludes to the state’s
practice of encouraging the unemployed to look for work outside of the country. As Gal Kirn
points out, in Dead and Gone, Pavlović identifies “the beginning of the end of socialist
welfare.”83 Yugoslavs must compete for the few available jobs or leave. Freeloaders like Jimmy
are now in direct conflict with the state because they are not part of the workers’ self-
management system.84 For Jimmy, “freedom from” is a death sentence. While Kidney eventually
transforms himself and becomes a talent manager, Jimmy miserably fails in his attempts at
stardom and must be terminated from the society. Jimmy’s misadventures are emblematic of the
experiences of the post-war generation whose attitudes were not in alignment with those of their
parents. Pavle Levi suggests that Jimmy’s pessimistic outlook is that of the Yugoslav youth in
general, one of “intellectual and moral apathy, an attitude of resignation toward issues of
ideology, provoked by an all-out exhaustion of the grand narratives of human emancipation, be
they traditional (religion) or modern (Marxism).”85 Given the effects of the market reforms, for
the younger generation, “the struggle to make a buck,” was now more pressing than the “struggle
for socialism” anyway.86
83 Kirn, “New Yugoslav Cinema,” 42.
84 As Gal Kirn points out, Jimmy is “a stain on the symbolic order that cannot be integrated.” Kirn, “New
Yugoslav Cinema,” 41.
85 Levi, Disintegration, 37. Jimmy even subtly mocks the revolutionary mythology. When asked by the
official at an employment bureau why he does not go to school and rely on his parents, Jimmy answers that both his
parents are deceased and that he cannot go to school because as a child he was injured by a mine left from the war
which exploded and left him permanently dazed. Jimmy’s answer implies that the state’s perpetuation of the
revolutionary mythology is harming the younger generations.
86 Zukin, Beyond Marx and Tito, 27. The paradoxical combination of socialist and capitalist values sent a
contradictory message to the post war generation and frustrated the true believers in socialism, especially the
staunch anti-reformers. The film presciently implies that the anti-reformers not only deeply resent the alterations to
60
Frontier Justice: If You Are Not With Us, Pretend
Ambush deals with the difficult subject of treatment by the state of those who at war’s
end were perceived as anti-communist or refused to abide by the rules of the agrarian reform and
nationalization campaign. The state cannot count on the loyalty of Serbian peasants who
supported the Chetnik movement and the Yugoslav government in exile, but must bribe them to
attain it. The film begins with a train carrying supplies to peasants, ironically provided by the
Allies trying to win over Tito and dissuade him from aligning Yugoslavia with the Soviets. Once
the supplies are loaded onto horse-drawn carriages, the convoy is raided by Chetnik forces.87 The
Western supplies frequently change owners who are ideologically disparate, summing up one of
the film’s main themes: existing on the periphery of ideologically acceptable. Ambush examines
Yugoslavia on the verge of liberation from the Nazis and making its uneasy but steady transition
into socialism based on the Soviet model.88 The film’s depiction of Yugoslavia energized by
enthusiasm for Stalin is made ironic by the spectator’s knowledge that this enthusiasm was
the economic and political systems but also the younger generations who, they deem, go too far in criticizing the
country’s socialist values. The police who chase Jimmy after he steals wallets from a group of seasonal labourers
eventually give up, but several pugnacious middle-aged citizens (who do not even know if the youth had actually
committed a crime) catch up with Jimmy and beat him furiously. The sequence foresees the young vs. old dynamic
of the 1968 student demonstrations (within which the calls for change by the youth losing hope in the future were
mistaken for lawlessness and dissent by the war generation who, ironically, equally frustrated by life in Yugoslavia,
vented their pent-up aggression on the demonstrators) as well as the crack down on the “liberals” of the early 1970s.
87 The subtle irony of depicting a Chetnik raid on a Partisan convoy is in the fact that the official
revolutionary lore always had the Partisans in the role of the righteous German convoy raiders, but in this case it is
the Chetniks who “play” the romantic guerrilla fighters. Unable to feature Chetniks, or their sympathizers, as
multidimensional, nuanced characters—as anything but despicable—Ambush stays away from in-depth
characterization of the Chentik guerillas, but often subtly hints at the fluidity of the roles of traitors (aggressors) and
liberators. A local functionary shows Ive a photo of her young Partisan sister taken after she was captured by the
Chetniks. Unlike in the official lore, which depicted them as greasy-bearded butchers, the Chetniks in the photo
greatly resemble the Partisans in their appearance.
88 At first, Yugoslavia aimed to emulate most aspects of the Soviet system. OZNA was formed as
Yugoslavia’s answer to KGB; industrial resources were nationalized; private property was confiscated; land was
redistributed; economy was planned Soviet-style.
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temporary—that Titoism replaced Stalinism just a few years later and that the fine differences
between the Yugoslav and Soviet models would come to define Yugoslav socialism.89
Through its depiction of post-war Yugoslavia as an apt Soviet pupil, Ambush alludes to
the contemporary conflict between the staunch communist conservatives and the forces of
liberalization advocating opening up to the West. In the film, Yugoslav communists seem to be
eagerly playing catch up with the Soviets to whose ideal they aspire. Ive, a skilled musician, is
hired to help the local orchestra learn how to play Russian revolutionary songs, but when he is
unable to get the orchestra to play in tune, Zeka puts on a record with Russian revolutionary
songs and exclaims: “Now you will hear real music.” The orchestra’s failed attempts to sound as
authentic as a Soviet record is a reference to the conservatives’ attempts to return Yugoslavia to
the more dogmatic, even Stalinist path. That the film stages this 1960s conflict in the very early
post-war Yugoslavia is appropriate because that is precisely where the roots of the conflict lie.
Yugoslavia’s Stalinist path was unsettled by various forms of Western aid delivered to the
Yugoslav Partisans during and immediately after the war. In the film, the foreign supplies stolen
from the Partisans in the Chetnik raid symbolize this Western method of tempting Tito to
distance himself from Stalin. That in Ambush the supplies become a sought-after currency that
easily crosses ideological barriers and causes discord is appropriate because that is precisely
89 Immediately following the war, Yugoslavia was ahead of most communist countries in mirroring the
Soviet system, but efforts to establish joint ventures failed after the split with Soviet Union, which soon sent
Yugoslavia on the path to liberalization and decentralization in social and political spheres as well as economically.
Some of post-war Yugoslavia’s rather independent ambitions became a sticking point with the Soviets who,
arguably, aimed to slow down Yugoslavia’s industrialization and make the country’s economy dependent on the
Soviet-based industries. David A. Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt (New York: Routledge,
2011), 17. For insight on how the relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union deteriorated following the
war, see Milovan Djilas, Fall of the New Class: A History of Communism’s Self-Destruction, trans. John Loud (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1998), 48-105.
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what Western aid to Yugoslavia was meant to do.90 This practice of “aiding” Yugoslavia in order
to make it less communist remained part of the Western Yugoslav policy and polarized the
political dynamic of the 1960s and 1970s Yugoslavia. It encouraged the liberal forces which saw
opening up to the West as the most attractive path for Yugoslavia to take, and caused resentment
of the conservatives who saw the West, if not as an outright enemy, then at least as ideologically
irreconcilable with Yugoslav socialism.
In the film, the supplies never reach the peasants who are then even asked to contribute to
the state coffers. Alluding to the enrichment of the New Class on account of the masses, the film
depicts the post-war propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the peasants of the importance of
sharing the crops with the state. At a speech given by a local politician, some peasants are
sceptical because they feel they are being robbed. When the dissenters are quickly apprehended,
Ive pleads with his comrades to reconsider such harsh treatment of peasants who simply objected
to what they see as unfair, but he is met with accusations of factionism. Mirroring the pseudo-
revolutionary babble of the New Class justifying its usurpation of the state property, the
resistance to nationalization of private property is characterized as counterrevolutionary activity.
Tellingly, the supplies are shamelessly hoarded by Zeka who uses the goods to pay for sex with a
90 When Ive and Zeka confiscate from the local priest—and a suspected Chetnik sympathizer—a saddle bag
full of canned food from the raided convoy, Zeka greets the priest with “God help you, Father.” The traditional
Serbian greeting—associated with Serbian nationalists, “old” Yugoslavia, and with the Chetnik movement—meant
to provoke the priest also implies that ideological fluidity is regulated—and changes of allegiance motivated—by
the ebb and flow of the struggle for survival (or, seen more cynically, by temptations of material gain). That the
foreign aid changes hands between the Partisans and Chetniks is a subtle reference to the inability of the Allies to
decide which Yugoslav anti-Nazi resistance movement to support—Tito’s communist Partisans or the royalist, and
staunchly anti-communist, Chetniks of Draža Mihailović. Arguably, the Chetniks were difficult for an outsider to
assess. They came from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, and from the noble tradition of fighters
against Ottoman occupation, and formed a volunteer force in the Serbian army (before Yugoslavia was established).
During World War II, some Chetniks collaborated with the Nazis, but the overwhelming majority fought against
them. Among the latter group, some were staunchly anti-communist while others sympathized with Tito’s Partisans.
The royalist Draža Mihailović worked closely with the Yugoslav government in exile and with the British
government who at first recognized him—rather than Tito—as the leader of the resistance in Yugoslavia. For more
on the Chetnik-Partisan dynamics in World War II, see Fred Singleton, A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples
(1985; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 187-190.
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young local woman.91 Zeka’s thieving and lack of any real ideological conviction is an allusion
to the drive of the New Class to accumulate and maintain privileges on the pretense of being the
guardians of the system while having no real allegiance to the socialism.
In Ambush, the country’s identity is systematically altered to suit the new ideology. In
Ive’s Serbian literature class, the teacher points out the no longer acceptable imagery found in
pre-war Serbian poetry when the class is interrupted by an announcement that the war is over and
“liberation is at hand.” All that is “old” and therefore ideologically unacceptable is canceled out
by “liberation” delivered by the Partisans. In order to prove that his own allegiance is with the
“new” ideology, Ive is tasked with preventing some “bourgeois” teenagers from attending the
dance party organized by the “Anti-fascist youths.” Ive reluctantly calls out the names of those
who are unwelcome due to their families’ former political associations. When one of the youths
fights back, he is quickly taken away and ideologically unsuitable music is replaced with
revolutionary songs. The film’s setting near the Syrmian Front is a particularly incisive allusion
to the state’s dilemma of what to do with the ideologically unsuitable every time there are
reforms or shifts in policy. The Syrmian Front is alleged to have served as a mechanism for
disposal of the perceived enemies of the state. With the country on the verge of liberation,
Yugoslavia’s authorities needed to eliminate those Serbs who had not supported the Partisans as
well as the bourgeois vestiges of the “old” Yugoslavia. The young urban elite, especially from
Belgrade, with only basic training were sent to the front to almost certainly die. This was a
convenient way of eliminating the ideologically problematic but otherwise innocent individuals
91 The film subtly notes the origin of the aid, and of the conflict it produces, when Zeka and the woman
read the English language inscriptions on the packages phonetically—the way one would read Serbo-Croatian
writing—to a comical effect.
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without resorting to executions and potentially tarnishing the positive image of the revolution.92
Exposed to the dangers of life on or near the frontline, the film’s ideological misfits (including
eventually Ive himself) conveniently disappear into the fog of war. The film’s liminal, “frontier”
setting—between free and occupied territory, between capitalism and socialism—is an allusion
to the pesky appearance of ideologically unfit whenever reforms took place in post-war
Yugoslavia. (The shift away from Stalinism produced persecution of perceived Stalinists; those
who went too far in their liberal leanings like Milovan Djilas were ostracised from political life;
the liberalization and shift to market socialism (ironically, a kind of return to capitalism) caused
a backlash against hardline anti-reformers like Aleksandar Ranković.)
Writing in 1957, Djilas describes the New Class as one that “instinctively feels that
national goods are, in fact, its property.”93 He suggests that because it could not make what it
was doing lawful, yet it would not stop doing it, the New Class protected its privileges by
initiating reforms whenever it became patently obvious that it was operating under a set of
contradictions—unlawfully usurping power and “treating national property as its own.”94
Ambush points to the irony that private property previously belonging to the bourgeoisie (such as
it was in a mostly peasant country like Yugoslavia) and nationalized following the war simply
changed hands and became private property of new elite class. Through its depiction of the
process of nationalization of property immediately following World War II, Ambush makes a
not-so-veiled reference to the New Class which a couple of decades later was monopolizing the
92 For details, see Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia
(London: Hurst Publishers Ltd., 2008), 258. In the film, those about to be sent for “execution” at the front are
ghostly presences in the background. As Ive and Milica kiss for the first time, behind them are visible recruits going
through a series of perfunctory exercises before heading to the front.
93 Djilas, The New Class, 65.
94 Ibid., 68.
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control of that property. Milica’s father Dušan Smalajković who benefited financially during the
war is now seen as an enemy collaborator. The naïve Ive assures Milica that if “he is a good
man, you have nothing to worry about.” Unlike Ive, Milica realizes that in this new Yugoslavia
justice is about eliminating those seen as ideologically incompatible with the new system and
then acquiring their property. Smalajković’s trial is conducted in an environment openly hostile
to the accused and interrupted by chants like “Down with the bourgeoisie and kulaks!” The irony
of the self-righteous, pseudo-revolutionary sloganeering at the trial would have been rather
obvious in the late 1960s when the control over state property had been fully usurped by the
elites who aggressively protected their parasitic existence. “In the name of the people,”
Smalajković is jailed for five years and all his property is nationalized.95 His house is
immediately raided and furniture burned in the street by the crowd singing Russian revolutionary
songs as Ive walks away in disgust. The film’s depiction of the process of dismantling of the
“old” Yugoslavia is a metaphor for the reforms of the 1960s, when under the pretense of renewal
and improvement, the New Class simply re-solidified its privileged status.
Reforms and Other Myths
In Dead and Gone, the milieu of destitute travelling musicians functions as a
metaphorical microcosm for the larger Yugoslav context in which disillusionment threatens to
erupt into unrest. Instead of rebelling and fighting for their rights, the disadvantaged musicians
apply “reforms.” While looking for their next gig, Jimmy, his female “sponsor” Duška, and
Duška’s former bandmate Moša come across a group of gypsy musicians and their entourage at a
95 Smalajković defends himself by saying that he was simply doing his job, but the court finds him guilty of
having bought a house with profits earned from cooperation with the occupation forces. Subtly insinuating an
infringement by the state on citizens’ rights, in the verdict, the phrasing of the prison sentence delivered is: “The
civil rights are removed for five years.”
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local tavern.96 The musicians have no money to order drinks and the waiter kicks them out
because the establishment is under new management and the new boss “has had enough of
musicians and whores.” Ironically, the “new management” is Vule, himself a former travelling
musician, now “a famous radio singer,” who patronisingly encourages the musicians to try and
become “someone.” The tavern, of course, symbolizes Yugoslavia under “new management”—
following the reforms. Vule’s paternalistic attitude towards his former friends symbolizes the
corrupt influence of the trappings of power the New Class enjoys. Reforms are meaningless
because now that he is a part of the New Class, Vule works to maintain it. In fact, the life in this
“reformed” tavern has gotten worse—no one gets a free drink because the tavern is now run in
the spirit of capitalist competition rather than solidarity. The musicians decide to organize
themselves and form a self-management style collective, but their meeting outside the tavern
disintegrates into empty speeches reminiscent of the rhetoric often heard from the New Class
elites. Jimmy sings (horribly) for the gathered musicians before one of them, mimicking
speeches glorifying war heroes and shock workers, puts forth a ludicrous proposal that Jimmy
“be declared the best singer in Western Serbia.” Perhaps realizing the farcical absurdity of this
undeserved honour, Jimmy leaves while muttering to himself: “To hell with all of you.” Jimmy
rejects the self-management system and so experiences the paradox of the Yugoslav socialist
state: although the system is not equipped to look after the disadvantaged individuals, attempts at
being independent from the system are doomed to fail.
96 They find Moša hitchhiking after being left on the side of the road by his last band. In a macabre
reference to self-immolation as a desperate act of political protest—commemorating Thích Quảng Đức, the
Vietnamese monk who set himself on fire in 1963 to protest the treatment of Buddhists by Vietnamese authorities,
and anticipating the Czech student Jan Palach who did the same in 1969 after Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—
Moša pours gasoline on himself and threatens to light the match, if Duška and Jimmy do not take him on the road
with them. They agree, but his threat almost comes to fruition when dimwitted Jimmy lights a cigarette as soon as
Moša gets into the car.
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Almost everywhere Jimmy goes, unrest is brewing because the state is unable to provide
employment for its citizens. The film predicts the 1968 demonstrations against those who
mismanaged the country while hiding behind war and revolutionary mythology. Jimmy signs up
for menial work at an employment bureau (“For only two nights until the worker returns from
sick leave,” he is told) that is comically disorganized and unwelcoming: the foreman tells Jimmy
to “watch out for whores” on account of diseases before taking him to the dorm where two men
sleep in single beds in appalling conditions. Almost immediately after Jimmy’s arrival, the
workers rebel and attack the foreman, shouting: “Kill him!” The opportunistic Jimmy does not
care what the workers are rebelling against and uses the commotion to steal his dorm mates’
wallets. Jimmy barely escapes with his life and meets up with Lilica at a scrapyard. When Lilica
complains that she is hungry, Jimmy facetiously replies: “Our comrades had to go without food
during the war. You can too.” The reference to World War II is an allusion to the implicit
meaning of the New Class rhetoric: the problems of today do not compare to the sacrifices of the
war generation—those born after the war should learn to appreciate what they do have.97
Ambush, too, suggests that some of the war “heroes” have exaggerated their
achievements and use their reputations to gain political clout and, in turn, material possessions.
One of the thematic threads that runs through Ambush is Ive’s gradual realization that stories of
wartime heroism are exercises in mythmaking. The film begins with a Soviet newsreel
celebrating Stalin and the might of the Red Army being shown to a captive Yugoslav audience.
The wide-eyed Ive watches the film transfixed, not realizing that cults of personality based on
lies are about to spring up all around him. Jotić is determined to make himself into a war hero,
97 Jimmy’s callousness towards Lilica seems integrated into his inability to believe in the promise of a just
socialist society; he is adrift because he is unable to connect to individuals or to ideals. As Yugoslav film historian
Petar Volk points out, Jimmy is “devoid of all feelings, and, in turn, not burdened by illusions. Such a life means he
is s stranger to himself.” Volk, Istorija jugoslovenskog filma, 215. (translation mine)
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but in order to do that he must stage a daring raid on the Chetnik compound in which someone
must die for dramatic purposes and a witness must survive in order to tell others of Jotić’s
heroism. Jotić, Zeka and Ive form a posse and pursue the horse mounted Chetniks in a jeep.98
Restaging the mythical Partisan raids they had likely only heard about, the trio attacks the
Chetniks hiding in a monastery. A cunning OZNA man, Jotić asks Zeka to sneak up and throw a
hand grenade inside. Ironically, Zeka shows some real bravery—he gets most of the Chetniks to
surrender, but is wounded in the process. Jotić unceremoniously executes all of the surrendered
Chetniks except one who must carry the wounded Zeka away to safety while Jotić and Ive go
looking for Marko, the escaped leader of the Chetnik band. They find him already dead from
unknown causes. As this outcome does not make for a heroic story, Jotić shoots Marko to make
it look like he had gunned him down in battle.
Almost instantly, the raid on Marko’s Chetniks becomes part of the local revolutionary
folklore. Jotić, Zeka and Ive are the heroes who had exterminated the last Chetnik band in the
area and in their honour a festive celebration is staged by the village elder Vidoje. As Vidoje
praises Jotić and villagers sing songs about his heroic deeds, Ive goes looking for Zeka who had
been left in the care of the villagers. Ive finds Zeka dead in a local house where no one had even
attempted to tend to his wounds. As drunken Vidoje once again tells the story of Jotić’s heroism,
Ive comes back and informs Jotić that Zeka is dead. Incensed by Jotić’s careless attitude, Ive
decides to disrupt the celebration: “Why do you let him tell lies? Tell them you shot Marko when
he was already dead.” Unmoved by Ive’s appeals and encouraged by Vidoje’s continued praise,
Jotić ignores Ive who walks away in disgust. Ive is almost instantly punished for his
98 This posse is comically ragtag. Ive is armed only with a handgun; the jeep breaks down and the three are
forced to hop on a train; realizing just how inadequately prepared they are, Jotić jumps off the train to gather more
men while Zeka and Ive continue on bicycles.
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unwillingness to participate in revolutionary mythmaking.99 Just outside of the village he is met
by a partisan patrol who are suspicious of the stranger. Exasperated Ive exclaims, “Fucking
peasants! Some revolution you are!” before he is shot dead.
No True Love
Both Dead and Gone and Ambush point to the alienation and absence of genuine love and
affection among the citizens who are struggling to survive while navigating institutional
overregulation of almost every aspect of their lives. Erich Fromm suggests that through
spontaneous activity, an individual comes to regard him/herself and others as free. He argues:
“Love is the foremost component of such spontaneity; not love as the dissolution of the self in
another person, not love as the possession of another person, but love as spontaneous affirmation
of others, as the union of the individual self.”100 In Ambush, the state apparatus is a direct
obstacle to love. Ive finds himself under pressure by his peers for befriending Milica, the
daughter of a convicted enemy of the state. Local communist youth organization who
enthusiastically raided Smalajković’s house are suspicious of Ive because of his refusal to
participate in the destruction of property. In order to prove his loyalty, Ive is given a hammer and
sickle pendant and told: “Only when this is around Milica’s neck will you be one of us.” The
state attaches ideological stipulations to Ive’s love. Milica, however, is uninterested in the
modest and unambitious Ive. Since she comes from the politically problematic bourgeois
99 Ive’s realization that such self-serving myths are constructed to act as leverage by those with ambitions
to attain power is gradual. While looking for Zeka, Ive walks by a group of villagers who discuss what happened at
the monastery and mock the official story “as composed by Jotić,” subtly alluding to state officials who often
cynically utilized the war and its murky mythology to invent their own heroics—a sure way to obtain and/or
preserve privileges. Earlier, having witnessed the respect that comes with wartime heroism, Ive himself is tempted to
embellish his contribution to the war. He inflates the danger and the number of Chetniks who attacked the supply
convoy and neglects to explain that he survived the raid by hiding in the bushes. The lie backfires on Ive when the
suspicious listeners tease him by suggesting that Milica has been with someone else while he was busy chasing
Chetniks.
100 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 287.
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background, she must be pragmatic and associate herself with those who can keep her out of
harm’s way rather than with romantic fools like Ive. Milica realizes that in order to avoid
marginalization, one must be calculated even in matters of love. This interference by the state in
the matters of love produces neurosis and anxiety. Unlike Jimmy of Dead and Gone, Ive is
painfully shy and sexually repressed—a predicament that eventually causes Ive to violently lash
out. Unimpressed by the meek Ive, Milica starts an affair with her teacher. When Ive confronts
Milica, she facetiously replies: “So what? We are free people.” Angered by her response, Ive
slaps Milica who reminds Ive that he does not own her, and that, if he is convinced that “this” is
freedom, he should accept that Milica is free to associate herself with other comrades. Ive’s
frustration with his failure to make Milica into a genuine communist—the state’s precondition
for their love—produces a neurosis and alters Ive’s identity from deferential to
threatening.101Although the end of the war has brought “freedom from” capitalism and “old”
Yugoslavia, Ive and Milica have been confined by a new set of institutions which severely limit
individuality and spontaneity—their “freedom to.”
In Dead and Gone, too, love is interwoven with the state apparatus and given only out of
desperation or to in order to ensure survival. Jimmy is a manipulator (however dimwitted) who
uses his “provincial charm” to seduce the older women he meets in order to survive.102 In turn,
the women “adopt” him, smothering him with attention not out of genuine love but out of
necessity. One of Jimmy’s “sponsors,” Mica, is so desperate for any human contact that within
minutes of meeting Jimmy, she invites him to her bed and promises security: “I’ll take you with
101 Following his confrontation with Milica, the increasingly erratic and aggressive Ive becomes eager to
prove himself to the authorities and, although initially hesitant, now insists that he join the hunt for the remaining
Chetnik bands. Frustrated by a suspect’s refusal to give up the Chetnik band’s whereabouts, Ive beats the man to get
the information.
102 Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 130.
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me. I have an apartment.” Jimmy moves in with Mica who “keeps” him in an upstairs room and
treats him like a child—she gives him baths, feeds him marmalade, lights his cigarettes, and
tucks him in at night.103 Even Jimmy’s mother Koviljka who lives in a squalid shanty town and
works as a laundress has found a husband out of necessity.104 After Jimmy locates her on his
journey to Belgrade, she struggles to explain her decision to remarry: “I have to survive
somehow.” As if to one-up her, Jimmy tells his that his travel companion, Lilica, is his fiancée.
Koviljka’s reply, “Good—she looks healthy,” points to the cold logic of having to pair up with
one who will be an earner rather than a burden (which, of course, implies that Jimmy is doomed).
In the Yugoslavia of Dead and Gone, economic logic dictates that even family ties mean little.
Koviljka wishes the best for Jimmy, but cannot lend him money because she is saving for a new
credenza, and she cannot get Lilica a job at the laundry because “now everyone has their own
washing machine.” Her advice to Jimmy is to register with the employment bureau. Dismayed,
Jimmy silently walks away.
Marching in Different Directions: The Bad and the Ugly
Daniel Goulding suggests that Pavlović’s “was a scorched-earth policy, a demonic urge
to find in film the means to shake complacency, to purge away the dross of collective memory,
to confront unpleasant truths, and to explore relentlessly the dark corners of the soul and the
broken promises of the new socialist order.”105 Pavlović seems to approach his depictions of
“unpleasant truths” and “broken promises” in two ways. One approach can be broadly described
as naturalism whereby Pavlović exposes the viewer to aspects of everyday reality without overt
103 Perhaps Mica is ready to overlook Jimmy’s parasitic ways because the patriarchal, provincial mentality
dictates that she must have a man in her life lest she be considered “loose.”
104 The fate or whereabouts of Jimmy’s father are left undiscussed.
105 Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 73.
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sentimentality or judgment. Specifically, this entails showing the characters at their most
uncouth—when they are vulgar, indecent, desperate, afraid, vulnerable. 106 But Pavlović’s
camera does not smugly dwell on these “common” moments in order to make them seem
authentic. Pavlović’s approach is less fly-on-the-wall observation and more Vertovian “life
caught unawares” approach whereby the camera provokes the subject into acting (out)
“naturally.” These moments appear posed rather than “real” and although banal, they are
revelations. In the sequence in which Jimmy, encounters his mother’s new husband, Pavlović’s
camera takes a moment to observe the man through the window before Jimmy knocks on the
door. The brief image shows the man inside a decrepit shack, wearing a greasy undershirt,
entertaining a young boy with a crass limerick as the boy stares directly into the camera (and into
Lilica who is standing in the window and whose POV the viewer is getting). If there is realism in
the image, it is not to be found in its quotidian, unromanticised nature, but rather it lies in its
ability to metaphorize with ease the consequences of the country’s reforms and experiments with
market socialism. The portrait of the man as crude, unkempt, presumably unemployed—an
emasculated, failed breadwinner—is a portrait of the Yugoslav man.
Pavle Levi sees this tendency to utilize images suspended in diegesis to elicit a dialectical
response as akin to Eisensteinian montage. While Eisenstein used extraneous images that were
typically not of the diegetic world, Pavlović preserves the diegesis by utilizing “drastic/raw”
106 Pavlović’s own thoughts on how filmmakers should approach their job elucidates the logic behind his
aesthetics: “We must go into basements in which wage labourers sleep, into mess halls, into Catholic churches on
Saturday nights, and into village drinking holes; stop by medical schools where naked corpses float in
formaldehyde; and go into hospital pathology departments; and in cemeteries, unnoticed, bid goodbyes to the
deceased, together with their families and friends. We must record expressions on the faces of people when they
play music, when they mate, when they are in pain, when they settle in to read in the evening, when they are hungry.
Covertly, like a sniper, the film artist should point the camera lens at life’s bellybutton and let bursts of celluloid
gunfire riddle the body from all sides. Again, on the screen, the resurrection in all its unfalsified glory.” Quoted in
Dekalogija o materiji i smrti: Skica za portret Živojina Pavlovića, directed by Marko Novaković, 2013. (translation
mine)
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images that come from the diegetic world yet function to temporarily arrest the story progression
and ask to be considered independently.107 Levi suggests that just like Eisenstein’s montage
consists of aggressive, shocking images meant to evoke a visceral and intellectual response, so
does Pavlović’s “drastic/raw” approach.108 Levi points to the film’s final image, depicting Jimmy
slumped over, having been shot while defecating inside an outhouse as an example of
“drastic/raw” image, and points to the equivalence between its ability to disturb the diagesis and
Jimmy’s ability to disrupt the perception that the reforms have been successful. As Levi points
out, in “a system perpetually concerned with managing the appearance of productivity and social
prosperity,” Jimmy stands out and so parallels the “drastic/raw” image.109 It is precisely in this
sense—as ripples in what is supposed to be calm water—that “drastic/raw” images function to
alert the viewer to the imperfections in the Yugoslav system, and can therefore be said to
contribute to the film’s large picture, comprehensive Lukácsian realism.
This is only one example of how Pavlović employs the banal—often automatically taken
as realistic—as a metaphor—rather than as a true-to-life depiction—to sum up the societal ills.
As director Slobodan Šijan points out, a persistent characteristic of Pavlović’s aesthetic is that it
stresses “the beauty of the ugly.”110 In Dead and Gone, Pavlović depicts sex as an awkward and
unsightly display of sagging bodies writhing in dark shadows.111 Sex is not a pleasurable
107 Levi, Disintegration, 40-44.
108 Ibid., 40.
109 Ibid., 45.
110 Dekalogija o materiji i smrti, directed by Novaković, 2013. (translation mine)
111 One of his screenwriting students recalls an occasion when Pavlović, after carefully listening to a
student’s story pitch for a derivative horror film, bluntly asked: “These monsters of yours, do they fuck?” After the
blushing student admitted that “I guess they do,” Pavlović asked: “Well then, how do they fuck?” Dekalogija o
materiji i smrti, directed by Novaković, 2013. (translation mine)
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activity; it happens out of desperation rather than as an expression of love. Mica, the aging mail
sorter Jimmy encounters on a train while evading the conductor, begs Jimmy for sex while
flattering and reassuring him within the same breath: “You’re so handsome. I am healthy, I
swear on my mother’s grave.” Seduction and flirtation are absent because Mica’s desire
disregards the conventions of morality. This desire to connect with another human being is so
strong that it even disregards the anxiety over the future symbolized by the reference to the fear
of sexually transmitted diseases. The shot not only strikingly displays Mica’s pathetic longing for
human contact but, like the shot of Koviljka’s husband, also briefly interrupts the diegesis and
insists on being considered as a dialectically charged stand-alone unit. Owing to Mica’s
plainness and to her unexpected, disarming honesty as she, slumped on the bed, pleads for sex,
the shot is devastatingly “ugly” and therefore in the tradition of realism and even naturalism.
Yet, as Levi points out, Pavlović’s “drastic/raw” image, although Bazininan—“integrated into
the diegesis”—also functions to disturb what would otherwise be a straightforward
realism/naturalism.112 As Levi suggests, “Pavlović assigns to art the function of socially
destructive criticism” and exposes the clash between the irrational forces that maintain life and
the consciousness.113 Perhaps it is precisely this clash that Pavlović’s “drastic/raw” images
contain within them. What makes the shot of Mica “beautiful” and still contributes to its “ugly”
realism is its poetic ability to metaphorize the Yugoslav crisis: the alienation of the citizens from
one another caused by the gradual failure of the socialist system.
The other approach relies less on the “rawness” of the image and more on the montage-
like juxtaposition of two or more meaning-laden visual elements within a “sequence shot.” In
112 Levi, Disintegration, 44.
113 Ibid., 43.
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both Ambush and Dead and Gone Pavlović frequently packs the dialectical attack of
Eisenstenian montage into the Bazinian uninterrupted shot. In the sequence in which Jotić
recruits Ive for the Chetnik raid, Pavlović strikingly juxtaposes within a single shot Ive’s
innocence with Jotić’s criminality. The shot of Ive trying to catch up on his homework
effectively becomes two shots when Jotić appears to Ive as a ghostly reflection in the mirror in
front of him. A harbinger of death, Jotić severs Ive from his childhood and eventually from life.
In the sequence in which Ive finds Zeka dead, Pavlović juxtaposes in a single shot the pointless
deaths attendant the country’s transition into socialism with the rituals of glorification of those
responsible for the deaths. Pavlović’s camera pans from the chilling image of blood that had
poured out of Zeka’s mouth and congealed on the bed sheets to the window through which the
celebration of Jotić’s “heroism” can be seen. Both “montages” bluntly point to just how
distasteful revolutionary mythology is given the deliberateness and callousness with which
sacrificial lambs like Ive and Zeka were disposed of in the process of its fabrication.114
Jimmy’s only emotionally sincere moment in Dead and Gone comes in a “sequence
shot.” Standing in front of a low-flying Yugoslav flag aboard a ferry whose destination he does
not know, Jimmy asks his traveling companion: “Don’t you think I want a different life?” The
plea of a dream-chasing vagabond aboard the “Yugoslav” ferry whose itinerary is a mystery is
the plea of all who have been searching in vain for a better life promised by the state. Another
example is the sequence depicting Jimmy seeking employment at an agricultural establishment.
The shot depicts Jimmy as he answers the employment questionnaire form at the desk while in
the background a goat standing up on its hind legs munches on a piece of the wall, and a man
114 Arguably, the effect of the “montages” is as Brechtian (and as Eisensteinian) as anything found in Early
Works or WR as they “provoke in the viewer an internal dialogue” about the distortion of revolutionary ideals and
their replacement with dogma. Volk, Istorija jugoslovenskog filma, 216.
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brazenly gropes a woman who walks by him. In a single deep focus “sequence shot” that would
not be out of place in an absurdist comedy, Pavlović sums up the wretched social climate in the
country: the country is being torn down by incompetent politicians whose inability to deal with
the unemployment problem is causing the citizens to become increasingly aggressive towards
each other. Another “sequence shot” alludes to Jimmy’s mistaken belief that he is free and in
charge of his fate. While giving Jimmy singing lessons in a hotel room, Duška blows into a small
figurine of a man with paddle-like hands to make them rotate. Directly above her is a Swiss
cuckoo clock with a pendulum designed as a tiny figurine of man sitting on swing. The props
(especially the paddle-handed man—Jimmy is, after all nicknamed, the Rowboat) serve to
symbolically depict Jimmy as an individual who although he may have “freedom from,” does not
have “freedom to.” Instead, he moves “mechanically,” as dictated by mysterious external
forces—the elites who implemented the reforms rather than as a free individual. By facilitating
dialectical engagement, all three “sequence shots” offer insight into reality far beyond the
capacity of conventional realism/naturalism, limited to blunt depictions of sordid, filthy, or
vulgar aspects of life.
The most dialectically rich and thoroughly insightful “sequence shot” of the film appears
in the sequence that takes the viewer on a “short journey through Yugoslavia, cutting its way
through the whole society.”115 The sequence depicts a jubilant Jimmy after his rendition of the
Yugoslav rock standard, “Pred svaki izlazak u grad,” is met by a thunderous applause by the
army recruits.116 Following his performance, Jimmy walks by a large group of workers at the
115 Kirn, “New Yugoslav Cinema,” 24.
116 The film depicts the Yugoslav National Army as an assemblage of brainless, unsophisticated brutes,
incompatible with both the urban youth and the working class. The soldiers’ reaction to Jimmy’s performance is
juxtaposed with that of the young urban crowd who, after Jimmy makes it to Belgrade and performs the same song
at a talent show, boo him off the stage.
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moment when they are informing the local politicians that they are starting a “work stoppage
action.”117 One politician is upset that the crowd of workers has interrupted his conversation with
two young female workers (whose housing problem he has “solved” by inviting them to stay
with him). Cornered, he urges the workers to reconsider their decision to strike, asks that they
solve the issue during the workers’ council session, and pleads with them: “Why would you
strike? This is a workers’ state!” The “sequence shot” begins at the moment when the striking
workers remind the politician of a simple fact: “You created ‘political factories’ and now we
have to suffer because of it?” The workers seem to understand that phraseology about the
workers being in charge is, as Djilas puts it, just “general legal fiction.”118 It is significant that
the workers use the term “political factories.” The term was widely used to refer to unprofitable
factories run into the ground by managerial elites who typically blamed the workers for the
failures and compensated for the losses by reducing wages which, in turn, caused “work
stoppage action.” That the politician is so desperately fighting to dissuade the workers from
striking points to the efforts by the New Class to, once industrialization and increased production
secured its position, ensure its own longevity. In other words, the New Class was aware of itself
as a class and maintained itself by inflating the importance of its members’ skills in managing
the economy and by the “unity of belief and iron discipline” of those who belonged to it.119
117 Almost heretically, another workers exclaims, “Say it plainly. It’s a strike!” The term “work stoppage”
was less confrontational and therefore preferred in a socialist society which, at least formally, was open to the airing
of the workers’ grievances as it perfected the self-management system. A “strike” was something that happened
(likely illegally) in capitalist societies where the workers were exploited and disenfranchised. For finer points of this
distinction in Yugoslavia, see Duško Sekulić, “Štrajk ili obustava rada: jedan sociološki pristup,” Kulturni radnik:
organ Saveza kulturno-prosvjetnih društava Hrvatske 40, no. 6 (1987): 23-33.
118 Djilas, The New Class, 65.
119 Ibid., 38.
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Tellingly, at the precise moment when the marching workers dismiss the desperate efforts
of the New Class to appease them and hang onto its privileges, a group of soldiers marches by in
the direction opposite from that of the workers. In a graphic conflict reminiscent of Eisenstein’s
montage, the “sequence shot” alludes to a radical misalignment between the state, represented by
the soldiers, and the working class. Having emerged directly from Tito’s Partisan guerillas and
therefore possessing impeccable credentials, the Yugoslav National Army was perhaps the
state’s most valued asset and its most powerful facet. It could not be invoked in a negative
context in public discourse and its status as the protector of Yugoslav socialism was untouchable.
Pavlović daringly depicts it not only as having a provincial mindset and consisting of obedient
dimwits who clap when they are supposed to, but also as a threat to those who challenge the
state. The “sequence shot” seems to suggest that if discontent was to erupt into unrest, the
soldiers might march directly into the workers rather than by them. The “sequence shot” suggests
that although ostensibly empowered by the self-management system, the workers have no say in
how the economy is run at state or at local level; that in reality, this is a job reserved for the
highly specialized yet bungling managerial class. Perhaps most daringly, through its depiction of
the Yugoslav National Army, the shot also suggests that the state is symbolically out of step with
the people, and indeed in opposition to those who seek to hold accountable the politicians
responsible for mishandling the country’s economy.
Yugoslav(i)a in Praxis: Early Works and WR: Mysteries of the Organism
Surely the most Brechtian of all Black Wave films, Želimir Žilnik’s Early Works is a
fragmented treatise on the state of social and political affairs in Yugoslavia following the 1968
student demonstrations. Inspired by Marx, four young people travel through rural Serbia with a
mission of alerting the lumpen proletariat to its unfavourable economic conditions and to its
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alienation. In a nod to Marxist humanist movements like the Praxis School, which also found
inspiration in Marx’s more philosophical early writing, they set out to remind the workers and
peasants to put into practice the seemingly forgotten theoretical framework on which Yugoslav
socialism rested. During their mission, Marko, Dragiša, Kruno and Yugoslava encounter
defeatism and crushing economic and intellectual poverty; they find that empty stomachs make
for hostile and narrow minds, ill-equipped to consider the finer points of Yugoslavia’s path to
communism. Unable to win over the antagonistic population, the foursome fail in their quest.
Crucially, however, along the way, their own weaknesses and prejudices—elitism, sexism,
intellectual futility—are exposed. The sting of these realizations and the disappointment of
failure transform into a deadly aggression, and the three vain and insecure men turn onto
Yugoslava, their sole female companion. They kill her in order to conceal their failure and
alleviate the shame of defeat. Yugoslava’s murder is, of course, a metaphorical death of the
Yugoslav socialist ideals. It serves to graphically underscore the film’s objective to alert the
viewer to the systematic concealment of the disconnect between what Yugoslavia was meant to
be—a socialist country no longer bogged down by class struggle, forging a path towards
communism via self-management—and what it was in reality—a society ruled by an elite class
of bureaucrats focused on maintaining their own privileged status.
Makavejev’s WR also assesses the status of Yugoslavia’s socialist project following the
student protests against the country’s “Red Bourgeoisie,” using some decidedly Brechtian
techniques. Employing a documentary overview of Wilhelm Reich’s life and his theories of
psychosexual development and totalitarianism, the film juxtaposes sexually liberated culture of
the capitalist West which seemingly prohibits nothing, and Yugoslav society which strives to
become sexually liberated and politically liberal. Through a tragicomic love story between
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Milena, an overbearing Yugoslav “revolutionary,” seemingly ever-ready to start a sexual
revolution, and Vladimir Ilych, a soft-spoken but sexually repressed and controlling Soviet
dancer, the film suggests that Yugoslav socialism has been arrested in a moment far from its
logical outcome—it has little chance of ever culminating in communism. As per Reich,
repression of sexual desires is unhealthy and results in tyrannical leaders and repressive societies.
Surely then, the film asserts in jest, abstinence is counterrevolutionary, because, like the sexual
act, a revolution must eventually come to a (satisfying) conclusion. WR suggests that maintaining
the appearance of revolutionary progress in perpetuum is a pointless exercise in self-discipline.
This exercise amounts to a denial of pleasure, of spontaneity, and of self-expression, all of which
ultimately produces neurotic authoritarians who must vent their built-up energy via murderous
aggression. WR suggests that Yugoslavia’s never-ending journey towards an even better future is
a ruse without culmination used to justify a repressive society.
Completely eschewing traditional realism, WR and Early Works rely on the tools of
Brecht’s Epic Theatre to depict Yugoslav reality. They provide insight into their social and
political environment; they make the spectator carefully and objectively consider their arguments
and inquiries rather than gloss over them by distancing the spectator from the depiction; they
make the spectator see him/herself in their representations; they make him/her understand that
their social and political conditions are alterable; they feature characters which are iconic,
exemplary of a particular societal problem or emblematic of a social class; although narrative,
they are fragmented; they rely on montage.120 Both films can also be said to espouse the
intellectual traditions of Marxist humanism of the Praxis School as they go about revealing to the
Yugoslav spectator the social and political conditions in which he/she exists: the economic
120 For details, see Brecht, “The Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre,” 37.
81
consequences of dabbling in market socialism, class division, manipulation of the masses by the
corrupt political elites who exploit the mythology of World War II in order to stay in power.
“There is no going back!”: (Re)starting a Revolution
Integral part of the context and background of both WR and Early Works were the 1968
student demonstrations in Belgrade which saw 40,000 students demand explanations for the
country’s economic problems and openly call out the New Class. In the 1960s, Yugoslavia
attempted to open up more towards the West through partial integration into Western economy, a
process which demanded austerity measures and had a negative impact on the standard of living.
Furthermore, the workers’ self-management system which envisioned the workers in control of
production of goods was not functioning as designed. The factories attempting to implement the
system were often referred to as “political factories” because they were conceived by idealistic
communist politicians without regard for the rules of market which, paradoxically, now had to be
respected. Economic reforms that followed produced unemployment which the state “alleviated”
by encouraging workers to find employment in Western Europe, especially Germany where the
Yugoslavs mostly did degrading menial labour. The students took over the University of
Belgrade, clashed with the police in the streets until Tito himself appeased them in a TV address.
Informed by the Marxist humanist thought of the Praxis School and the spirit of the
student demonstrations which occurred simultaneously with youth unrest in the West, WR mocks
Yugoslavia’s lack of progress towards communism with acidic wit. The film critiques the state
by mocking the presumed macho virility of its authoritarians and by establishing a cause-effect
relationship between repressed sexuality and institutional repression. Far from looking at the
West as a beacon of freedom, Makavejev is suspicious of the ability of Western-style liberties,
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especially sexual revolution, to result in genuinely free individuals.121 In the film, the myth of
freedom is an integral part of sexual revolution and its commodification. As Jackie Curtis, the
transgendered Andy Warhol collaborator, and his/her boyfriend stroll down Times Square of the
pre-Giuliani era, when sex, along with just about anything else, could be purchased there, the
film’s soundtrack plays radio commercial jingles. Jackie’s gender-crossing identity and
unrepressed sexuality are only “at home” against the background of over-commercialized Times
Square. 122 Discussing the film, scholar James Roy MacBean observes that owing to the
“permissiveness and hedonism cultivated by advertising” in capitalist societies, sex is a
compulsively sought after commodity like any other.123 Rather than a symptom of liberty, open
sexuality is a symptom (and a tool) of repression.
In the tradition of Brecht’s Epic Theatre, and perhaps half-mocking the technique,
Makavejev stages crude and rather obvious montages that further analogize sex and repression in
the contexts of both capitalist West and communist East. In the Eisensteinian intellectual
montage sequence which begins with Lenin’s ballet-dancing alter ego, Vladimir, being freed
from the dresser where he was put by the sex-starved shock worker Radmilović, Makavejev
121 As Pavle Levi suggests, in WR, “McCarthyism, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Leninism, Stalinism,
and their legacy are all seen as symptoms of the political neuroses caused by unresolved sexual issues.
Achievements of the more liberated American counterculture are not simply taken for granted either but are
reproached with a dose of equivocation. They are sympathetically endorsed yet at the same time questioned about
the limits of their political subversiveness and their ability to fully escape the grip of consumerism and commodity
fetishism.” Levi, Disintegration, 24.
122 Yet, while Jackie parades confidently, the passersby nervously stiffen up at the sight of his/her gender
transgression. As Makavejev points out, Jackie’s in-betweenness feels like aggression to someone who is “well-
defended with his own armor—physical and psychical, clothes and social status” because “[t]here’s obviously some
little cracks happening in that armor. They don’t know how to control their own system, and so they react with
anger.” Edgardo Cozarinsky and Carlos Clarens, “Dusan Makavejev Interview,” Film Comment 11, no. 3 (1975):
49.
123 Macbean goes on to add: “The old Puritan morality which was necessary to a society dominated by
scarcity has given way to a new, more permissive but equally repressive morality geared to serve the needs of the
consumer society.” James Roy Macbean, "Sex and Politics: Wilhelm Reich, World Revolution, and Makavejev's
WR," Film Quarterly 25, no. 3 (1972): 8.
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utilizes inserts from Mikhail Chiaureli’s film about Stalin, The Vow (1946). First, Stalin is
depicted entering a large hall with his advisors; Makavejev then cuts to a red plastic cast of
Screw magazine editor Jim Buckley’s penis being taken out of the molding by the artist Nancy
Godfrey; the next cut is back to Stalin, but this time the footage is tinted red—the same shade as
the replica of the pornographer’s penis. The connection Makavejev makes between the capitalist
West and communist East is farcical but also deliberate and uncompromisingly clear. Red and
erect, Stalin announces: “We have completed the first phase of communism.” The allusion to
Stalin’s claims that the Soviet system was to evolve until it became truly communist and the state
has withered away is ironic because, having the benefit of hindsight, the viewer knows that
Stalin had no intentions of facilitating the end of the state and that the Soviet system remained
arrested in a totalitarian moment—“the first phase of communism.” The allusion is unmistakably
to Yugoslav political elites who, although they purport to abhor Stalinism and pay lip service to
progress towards communism, employ similar delay tactics in order to maintain the state which
they are, of course, uniquely equipped to run. Like Jim Buckley’s penis, the progress has been
frozen. Lenin’s original intent has been stuffed into a dresser as crypto Stalinists keep delaying
the climax of the revolution. Far from placating the West, Makavejev’s montage implies that
there, too, complete freedom is an unattainable fetish. The arrested erection of the distressed
rather than gratified Jim Buckley suggests that freedom is a commodity, a piece of “art” to be
desired and, in any event, does not happen as a result of sexual permissiveness.
Makavejev compounds this point in another Eisensteinian/Brechtian (and, again,
derisive) montage which produces dialectical tension. For psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich, a
sexually unrepressed individual is unlikely to impose or accept authoritarianism of any kind.124
124 As postulated in Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, trans. Vincent R. Carfagno (1946;
repr., New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970).
84
Makavejev mocks Reich’s generalization and suggests that in practice, real world political
dynamics are hardly that uncomplicated. Milena, the film’s ditzy sex-starved “revolutionary,”
gives a rousing speech in the courtyard of her apartment building to the bemused tenants—the
masses—offering her views on sex and revolution: “Abstinence is unhealthy, inhuman, and
what’s worse, counterrevolutionary!”; “Between socialism and physical love there can be no
conflict!” She exclaims that free love—available in the West—is what the Yugoslav revolution
(and presumably communist revolutions everywhere) has been missing. Soon, Milena is pulled
into a bastardized version of the Kozara Dance (Kozaračko Kolo) by the elated “masses” and
sings: “Without fucking there is no life.” Makavejev’s next cut is to a pulsating mass of Chinese
communists euphorically saluting their leaders in the Tiananmen Square, performing, as Pavle
Levi puts it, “movement and arousal of enormous proportions.”125 The juxtaposition produces a
sarcastic comment on Reich’s assertions: too much fucking will only produce greater numbers of
those who want to be controlled by authoritarian leaders.
Makavejev’s approach to characterization is akin to the Brechtian Gestus technique—
repeated expressive and exaggerated interpretive gestures meant to embody the motivations and
psychology of the character which, in turn, places the character within his/her class or social
milieu.126 The Russian ballet dancer Vladimir Ilych is, of course, Vladimir Ilych Lenin; shock
worker Radmilović, who can barely suppress his sexual appetites, stands for the Yugoslav
working class who, incensed by injustice, can barely repress its rage. Milena’s character
encapsulates the failure of the Yugoslav socialist project—there is little substance behind
125 Levi Disintegration, 27.
126 For details, see Bertolt Brecht, “A Short Organum for the Theatre,” in Brecht On Theatre: the
Development of an Aesthetic, ed. John Willett (1964; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 195-196.
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sloganeering about revolution. When during her courtyard speech Milena exclaims, “There is no
going back!”, she, of course, means that there can be no deviation from the socialist path. It is
not, however, what Milena says but how she says it that Makavejev emphasizes. Mimicking
similar speeches routinely given by the communist elites, the pronouncement comes across as
insincere and rehearsed.127 The courtyard speech is only the apex of Milena’s intense
revolutionary posturing. Throughout the film, Milena’s energetic, commanding presence and her
insistence on offering her opinion on just about everything to just about everyone create a pattern
that suggests that Milena is over-performing her revolutionary identity. Milena’s erectness in
particular recalls an earlier sequence in which one of Wilhelm Reich’s disciples, Dr. Alexander
Lowen, explains how much body posture can reveal about a person. Milena’s posture then must
encapsulate the most vital aspect of her character. Bluntly pointing to Yugoslav political elites,
Milena’s overbearing, bullish behavior implies that those who shout the loudest and possess
inflexible attitudes are bound to intimidate others and take charge. Milena’s aggressive, single-
minded attitude, her erect stance suggest an uncompromising, dictatorial attitude. Milena, at least
in part, embodies the unchecked ambition of the New Class who sermonized about socialist
equality yet bullishly administered and maintained an inherently undemocratic system.128
In the spirit of Brechtian agitation, through Milena’s character, Makavejev disturbs the
conventional realism, but bluntly draws attention to the actual Yugoslav social and political
127 Milena’s didactic speech, especially as it builds to a crescendo, not only seems disingenuous but also
alludes to the perversion of the socialist system. Milena is rather calculated in her choice of lovers. She has traded
the motor oil-covered worker Radmilović, and so symbolically the lumpen proletariat for which he stands, for an
antiseptic New Class apparatchik who can turn her on sexually with his intellectual abilities—with more abstract
promises of future perfection—rather than with folksy charm and carnality.
128 As film scholar Herbert Eagle points out, Milena’s “style is demagoguery.” She “converts Reich’s
teachings into political slogans, and harangues the masses with reproaches about their sexual repression.” Herbert
Eagle, “Yugoslav Marxist Humanism and the Films of Dušan Makavejev,” in Politics, Art and Commitment in the
East European Cinema, ed. David W. Paul (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), 143.
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context and establishes a connection between the world of the film and that of the spectator.
Milena’s character is played by Milena Dravić, an iconic Yugoslav actress who played heroic
and chaste female Partisan fighters in war epics like Kozara (Bulajić, 1962). Dressed in a faux
Partisan uniform while giving a rousing speech, Milena is emblematic of popular representations
of World War II. Although often endearing, such representations, it was understood, were
propagandistic, meant to build up revolutionary mythology, validate the state, and, in turn,
entrench the elites in their positions. Makavejev’s wry choice to cast Milena Dravić is an
alienation technique—the Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt—employed in order to disrupt the
illusion inherent in the medium: to deny the spectator an emotional connection to the character
which allows the spectator to recognize the film as a construct rather than as “natural,” and to, in
turn, engage in a critical assessment and recognition of the film’s aims.129 That the mythological,
mild-mannered, heroic Partisan has now become a dippy loudmouth is a transformation that
Yugoslav viewers would have inevitably found both amusing and distracting. Dravić’s casting is
a cross-pollination between ideologically disparate works and therefore doused in irony, yet it is
also an example of type-casting as WR’s Milena is, after all, a version of Dravić’s wholesome
characters. Decked out in a Partisan uniform, WR’s Milena is an unhinged counterpart to the
restrained, virginal Partisans Dravić plays in her other films. Dravić’s presence then reminds the
viewer that WR is not a stand-alone film but, paradoxically, also part of the tradition which it
mocks. Most importantly, by alluding to the Partisan films through Milena’s character,
Makavejev once again asserts that revolutionary identity is a performance.130
129 For details, see Bertolt Brecht, “Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting,” in Brecht On Theatre: the
Development of an Aesthetic, ed. John Willett (1964; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 91-99.
130 Film scholar Raymond Durgnat points out that “Milena’s rabble-rousing outfit, with military jacket,
long legs and boots, echoes swinging London’s soldier-guerilla chic” Raymond Durgnat, WR—Mysteries of the
Organism (London: British Film Institute, 1999), 65.
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Žilnik’s Early Works, too, is focused on “investigating the communist pathology and the
specific Yugoslav ‘third way’ into socialism.”131 It does this by questioning the official narrative
of Yugoslavia’s progress via a cinéma vérité-like aesthetic approach which cannot but expose the
film’s own artificiality and contrivance while simultaneously affirming its ability to have a point
of view and therefore be a tool of political activism. As the title card at the very beginning of
Early Works suggests, this is “political theatre” meant to make its audience recognize the film’s
universe as a replica of their own—one in which the social and political conditions of its
“players” are also those of the spectators. Most importantly, those conditions are open to inquiry
and subject to change rather than immutable. Marina Gržinić calls this “new expressive realism”
and suggests that the film is “not a direct reflection of reality but rather of presupposed
documentary and ideological views about that reality.”132 The film is almost interactive in how it
informs the Yugoslav spectator that his/her society is not living up to the expectations and in its
design to place itself in active opposition to the state indoctrination machinery which functions to
obscure that fact.
The film’s opening montage introduces the “problem”: Yugoslava’s family, representing,
of course, Yugoslavia itself, and their living conditions. The montage which begins with
Yugoslava’s soaped up face greeting the spectators with “Good morning,” proceeds to show
Yugoslava’s father first knocking down an outhouse, and then standing over the open septic
tank; speaking directly to the spectator, Yugoslava’s younger sister explains that life today is no
different from life in the “old” Yugoslavia: “In school, we learn about healthy food that makes
people happy and able to work better, but we never get to eat such food. I sleep in the same bed
131 Marina Gržinić, “Early Works,” in The Cinema of the Balkans, ed. Dina Iordanova (New York:
Wallflower Press, 2006), 67.
132 Ibid., 71.
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as my sister, but that’s ok because she rarely sleeps at home.” That Early Works begins with a
morning greeting is appropriate because the film aims to wake up the spectator to the severity of
Yugoslavia’s crisis.133 The montage focuses on the reduction in the standard of living of the
Yugoslavs which, in turn, is responsible for the discontent sweeping the country. The film
immediately and fearlessly wades into very sensitive territory and so warns the spectator of its
own radical methods—that it is about to criticize what does not get criticized and about to
uncover what is typically repressed. Without hesitation, the film makes the most heretical claim
possible which is that this “new” socialist Yugoslavia is as unjust as the “old” capitalist one.
Yugoslava’s sister alludes to the country’s housing problem (”I sleep in the same bed as my
sister.”) and suggests that—unimaginably for a socialist country—some in Yugoslavia are facing
poverty. She implies that this predicament will provoke unrest and work stoppages because
without “healthy food” there are no happy people who can “work better.” Coming just a year
after the student demonstration of 1968, and at a time when work stoppages were becoming
common, this is not just innocuous banter. The knocking down of the outhouse used by
Yugoslava’s family to expose the septic tank symbolically suggests that the film will be vulgar
and that viewing it will be a challenging exercise which, although unpalatable, must be done.
Early Works employs slogans and imagery that directly allude to student demonstrations.
In reference to the protesting students’ attempts to make it clear that they were against dogmatic
authoritarian politicians, for a more democratic socialist Yugoslavia, and decidedly not interested
in destabilizing the country, a title card appears that alludes to this qualification: “Democracy-
Yes. Break up-No.” The foursome of Early Works, however, seem to be readying for action
more radical than that taken by the 1968 demonstrators. They practice attacking barricades,
133 Compounding and broadening the inference, “good morning” is also a common sarcastic response to a
statement of the patently obvious.
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prepare Molotov cocktails, and perfect their throwing techniques. In a series of disjointed
montages, the film sums up for the Yugoslav spectator (who may have already forgotten) the
reasons which prompted the 1968 demonstrations and are now prompting Yugoslava and her
cohorts to prepare for violent confrontation with some undefined enemy. With a heavy dose of
irony, the four “demonstrators” whistle the tune and recite the verses from the International;
implying that Yugoslavs are unable to make up their minds whether to rebel or be obedient
subjects, Kruno is lead around in chains while announcing, “I am the people. Lead me,” and then
shouting, “Down with Red Bourgeoisie!” Yugoslava’s father is shown falling into the septic tank
he had exposed earlier and then announcing: “It reeks of trouble.” He is then shown arriving
home drunk, exploding into rage, and beating Yugoslava and her mother. The actions of
Yugoslava’s father here represent both the potential for violent unrest among the working class
far more disruptive than the student demonstrations and the attitudes of the politicians who abuse
their privileges. This is when Yugoslava realizes that “in this house exist feudal laws” and leaves
home seemingly for good in order to inspire change. The montages sum up for the spectator the
recent events and outline the attendant issues the film itself will be addressing.
In an homage to France, the country whose student demonstrations inspired similar
movements across Europe and even in socialist countries, the foursome travels the countryside in
a Citroen Dyane as they try to locate the forgotten ideals of the revolution.134 They drive through
villages, announcing that the peasants will be ruined because they are stuck in their peasant
ways, and that peasants and workers must unite. This appeal to the peasants is significant
because it addresses a glaring omission of both the student demonstrations and of Yugoslav
socialism. Although the 1968 student demonstrators expressed solidarity with the workers’
134 Marina Gržinić sees Early Works as “a socialist Easy Rider.” Gržinić, “Early Works,” 70.
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unions, the peasants’ voices remained underrepresented. Sociologist Bogdan Denitch points out
that “even though they contributed heavily to the economic development of the country,” the
peasants were underprivileged because “there is no specific organization for the articulation of
peasant interests as a whole, analogous to the trade unions.”135 Tellingly, this is where the
foursome’s progress comes to a halt. They push the Citroen up a hill, but the car keeps rolling
back. The solution is to get a peasant to help and use a horse to take the car uphill like a carriage
while the patronizing “revolutionaries” show disdain for the man who is helping them by
jokingly shouting: “To Berlin!” The film seems to suggest that because the Yugoslav society is
blatantly unjust and its democracy not inclusive, any progress, like the Citroen, gets rolled back.
It is, of course, fittingly ironic that it is the peasants who do the hard work and get the Citroen
moving, but the film suggests, the peasants are bound to sooner or later lash out on account of
being exploited and disregarded. When the Citroen gets stuck in the mud later on, the three men
are beaten and Yugoslava gang raped by local peasants.
The foursome try to rationalize the failure of their mission among the peasants. Delicate,
thin-skinned, and befuddled by the lack of respect, they “lose their grounding.”136 Yugoslava
angrily announces that she is “happy that there will be no peasants in communism.” Others
agree: “For a pig farmer, revolution is over as soon as he becomes a bureaucrat” because “you
can’t expect him to pursue revolution when he is content to be out of the pig pen.” Although
meant as an insult to peasants, the pig farmer analogy also very precisely sums up Djilas’
assessment of the New Class as bureaucrats from peasant backgrounds who, having come to
135 Bogdan Denitch, The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1976), 19.
136 Volk, Istorija jugoslovenskog filma, 393. (translation mine)
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power, found they had achieved their maximum potential and therefore made no further effort to
advance the country towards communism for fear of losing their current class status. The film
suggest that this de facto acceptance of the class system went counter to the main fiction of the
Yugoslav system—denial of the existence of social stratification. Tatjana Aleksić suggest that
“Žilnik’s peasants and proletarians are so stupefied by hard labor and poverty that they seem
utterly incapable of comprehending the idea of their own class and individual emancipation.”137
The four “revolutionaries” also struggle to comprehend this notion that Yugoslavia is a class
society and that they, too, belong to a social class. Yugoslava points to the irony of having the
luxury of time to visit the workers and peasants because “we didn’t have to work 8 hours a day.
We were unable to help them because we were just observers.” Kruno, however, argues that “it
is not about helping, but about sharing the fate of the majority whose conditions we cannot
change anyway.” Unlike Yugoslava, the three men seem disinclined to re-evaluate their ability to
inspire change in others as well as their own positionality and blame the peasants for being
incorrigible.
The four press on and refocus their efforts onto the working class. They find themselves
employed at a foundry where Marko, Dragiša and Kruno cannot even hear each other over the
noise of the machinery and Yugoslava passes out from the heat of the furnaces. The deafening
noise hints to both the spectator and to the “revolutionaries” that the workers voices, ironically,
remain unheard in a “workers’ state.” When Kruno tries to agitate and speak to the workers as
they leave the foundry, no one is willing to listen. The workers do not have the inclination to
organize because they are exhausted after a day’s work. When Marko smugly admonishes them
by saying, “Whoever does not rebel against this, deserves his fate,” Dragiša reminds him to not
137 Aleksić, The Sacrificed Body, 112.
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“play dumb. You know how many there are out there waiting to replace anyone who leaves.” It
is also for fear of losing what they have—what their class does provide—that Yugoslav workers
seem willing to accept their treatment by the state. The four stay at a workers’ dorm, once a
palatial house now a barely standing ruin which, of course, stands for Yugoslavia itself.
Yugoslava is outraged at the workers’ apathy towards their living conditions and, before finally
abandoning the quest to enlighten the workers, she berates them: “In an earl’s castle, you live
like pigs. As if revolution was about plugging up the sewers and enjoying one’s own stench.”
Once again, Yugoslava’s remark points to the inability of the four “revolutionaries” to see just
how difficult it is for the workers to identify their class status let alone be able to improve their
conditions. The dilapidated dorm—the nightmare that the fantasy of the workers’ self-
management has become—delimits the field of vision for the working class. The New Class
bureaucrats rather than the workers themselves are in charge of the production process and, in
turn, of the workers’ fates. As Djilas points out, “self-management, like decentralization,
becomes another property of the new class, to be managed, dispensed with, and distorted in its
own interest.”138
Arguably, Early Works was “radically disaffiliated from mainstream assumptions about
socialist reality” and its avant-garde aesthetic equally as radical for the conservative Yugoslav
establishment unaccustomed to public displays that methodically and deliberately tested the
ideological and aesthetic foundations of the system.139 The film possesses a brash drive to expose
138 Zukin Beyond Marx and Tito, 6-7.
139 Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 75. Early Works clearly struck a nerve with authorities. According to the
director, it was deemed “anarcho-liberal” and containing worrisome “Maoist deviations.” Pavle Levi and Želimir
Žilnik, “Europe's Internal Exiles: Sound, Image, and Performance of Identity in Želimir Žilnik's Films,” in Ethnic
Europe: Mobility, Identity, and Conflict in a Globalized World, ed. Roland Hsu (Stanford: Stanford Univesrity
Press, 2010), 116. The film was to be officially banned for “disturbing the Yugoslav public,” but Žilnik cleverly
defended himself and the film in court by placating the system and claiming that Yugoslav society was far stronger
than those seeking to ban the film realize, and that the film therefore cannot undermine it. As recalled by the
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the failures of the Yugoslav socialist system. Yet, it is not a dismissal of socialism, but rather “a
critical enrichment of the socialist discourse.”140 Discussing the need for the medium of film to
abandon the vulgarity of heroes and “human interest” stories which would, in turn, uncouple it
from both “the bourgeois novel” and from capitalism, Brecht suggests that “film demands
external action and not introspective psychology”; when it “dissolves everything into processes,”
film, like capitalism, is revealed for what it truly is.141 In the spirit of Brecht, Early Works
exposes its own artificial construct and even the process of its own making: sound and image are
often out of sync; images are upturned. The film “proper” is interrupted by brief glimpses of the
process of its making that show Žilnik, his crew and actors as they make the film the viewer is
watching: Žilnik can be heard giving instructions to the actors and addressing them by their real
names; he shouts revolutionary slogans in order to get the peasants to respond more
enthusiastically. As Branislav Dimitrijević points out, there is a marked “lack of distinction
between the ‘acted’ and ‘spontaneous.’”142 These moments take the viewer “out” of the film and
eliminate any possibility of being fooled by the inherent illusion of cinema. More importantly,
they constitute a chronicle of the film’s own production. Rather than facilitating a seamless entry
filmmaker in Zabranjeni bez zabrane, directed by Tucaković and Nikodijević, 2007. Although it was not technically
banned, and even received the Golden Bear at the Berlin International Film Festival in 1969, the film had to wait for
its Yugoslav theatrical premiere until 1982. (Notably, that same year, a brief analysis of the film was included in a
textbook on the history of contemporary Yugoslav cinema. See Petar Volk, Savremeni jugoslovenski film (Beograd:
Univerzitet umetnosti, 1982), 289-293.) For more on the attempt to ban the film in the court, and on the film’s initial
critical reception, see Tirnanić, Crni Talas, 66-82. For insight into production models employed by Žilnik (and by
other Black Wave filmmakers), see Gal Kirn, Dubravka Sekulić and Žiga Testen, “Those who Make Revolutions
Only Halfway Dig their Own Graves,” in Surfing the Black: Yugoslav Black Wave Cinema and Its Transgressive
Moments, eds. Gal Kirn, Dubravka Sekulić and Žiga Testen (Maastricht: Jan van Eyck Academie, 2012), 57-77.
140 Branislav Dimitrijević, “Behind Scepticism Lies the Fire of a Revolutionary!,” in Želimir Žilnik: For an
Idea—Against Status Quo, ed. Branislav Dimitrijević (Novi Sad: Playground Produkcija, 2009), 141.
141 Bertolt Brecht, “The Film, the Novel, and the Epic Theatre,” in Brecht On Theatre: the Development of
an Aesthetic, ed. John Willett (1964; repr., New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 50.
142 Dimitrijević, “Behind Scepticism,” 138.
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into a fantasy, the film reveals the process of its own production and shows that filmmaking is
work like any other, performed by workers like all others and, arguably, even organized in the
spirit of self-management. In fact, as Pavle Levi suggests, Early Works is “a direct immersion of
the filmmaking apparatus into the sphere of social production.”143 Žilnik makes the viewer aware
that this is a film with a perspective and a mission, an approach which implicitly constitutes a
critique of dominant ideological assumptions: while the communist elites hide the flaws of the
system behind an airtight ideological seal, Žilnik’s film is permeable and openly declares that all
perspectives, including its own, can be manipulated.144 As per Brecht’s recipe, Early Works
“dissolves” itself in its own “processes.” The film then “functions as a form of praxis” precisely
because it is committed “to a total demystification of the processes of production in all their
manifestations: film production and sociopolitical activity alike.”145 This is cinema “as a mode of
play” with a clear goal to be accomplished, and even if the problem has not been resolved (the
workers and peasants have not been enlightened and made aware of their true conditions), “the
making of the film will still have constituted a worthy exercise in social activism.”146
The Body of Revolution
The status of women in a society that nominally proclaims equality yet remains deeply
patriarchal becomes a reference point for the film’s critique of Yugoslav socialism. Yugoslava
leaves home in search of true revolution because she can no longer stand her violent father’s
authoritarian ways, but eventually realizes why her father is violent: “He is miserable when he
gets home after work.” The workers’ frustration with being at the bottom of the class hierarchy
143 Levi and Žilnik, “Europe's Internal Exiles,” 117.
144 Dimitrijević, “Behind Scepticism,” 139.
145 Levi and Žilnik, “Europe's Internal Exiles,” 114.
146 Ibid., 117.
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in a state which they supposedly rule is transmuted into aggression towards their loved ones.
Žilnik spells out a cause-effect relationship between the system’s unjust treatment of the workers
by the elites with violence against women. Žilnik surely knew that an argument for women’s
rights could not be dismissed in a country which claims to be progressive on gender relations, so
he cleverly depicts women as an underprivileged class to allude to the puzzling fact of existence
of a class system in a supposedly class-free society. During a sexual education workshop
specifically aimed at women at a Serbian village, Yugoslava stresses that the most efficient
method of contraception would be a change of mentality among the men. She suggests that
progressive intellectuals have already thoroughly addressed the status of women in the society
and stresses that in a marriage, the man “must stop acting like the woman’s owner and women
must not be exploited like the proletariat.” She provocatively asserts: “Our technological
revolution will liberate women. In any case, women are stronger than men and will rule the men
in a decade or two.” At that very moment, Žilnik’s own voice exclaims, “Long Live March 8, the
International Women’s Day!” to which the crowd replies: “Long Live!” Žilnik alludes to the fact
that the working class is at the bottom of the social and political hierarchy in Yugoslavia when it
should be at the top. The ironic proclamations in support of the Women’s Day and the promise
that women “will rule the men” are as hollow as the promise that the proletariat will one day be
in power. Žilnik uses the issue of women’s reproductive rights in a patriarchal society where men
feel entitled to women’s bodies as an analogy to suggest that in Yugoslavia equality may exist in
principle but in practice it does not: the women—proletariat—are exploited by the men—the
New Class—who enjoy their privileges with impunity.
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Early Works consistently employs the theme of male aggression aimed at the female
body.147 Throughout the film, Dragiša, Marko and Kruno “remedy” their inadequacies as
revolutionaries by macho posturing, and, whenever challenged by Yugoslava, they resort to
sexual aggression towards her. Žilnik’s depiction of the three men as unintelligent, ineffectual
and seemingly entitled to abuse Yugoslava alludes to the empty posturing of Yugoslav
communist ideologues, their inadequacy as leaders, their abuses of power, and especially their
sense of entitlement to state property. Naked Dragiša turns the pages of Marx’s Early Works
using a revolver as he becomes inappropriately forthright in his interest in Yugoslava’s sexual
habits: “Have you ever screwed until you could screw no more? How many times in one night?
With you, I could do it seven times in a row.” When challenged by Yugoslava about his sexual
prowess, Dragiša mock shoots Yugoslava as she pleads with him through tears to not “joke
around.” The “shooting” foreshadows Yugoslava’s death at the end of the film and alludes to the
pervasive threat of violence by the elites against those who challenge their privileged class
status. The men’s possessiveness, their impulse to dominate and subjugate Yugoslava, their
sexual aggression towards her metaphorize the elites who routinely abuse their powers. Dragiša,
Marko and Kruno—the New Class in the making—are obstacles to Yugoslava’s and so
symbolically to Yugoslavia’s emancipation.
In Early Works (as in most Black Wave films), “pervasive misogyny assumes the
meaning of a powerful metaphor for all forms of atavism that block social development.”148 In
another Brechtian move, Žilnik cleverly takes advantage of the former Miss Yugoslavia, Milja
147 It should be noted that it is not just the female, but also the male body that is abused in multiple ways.
Arguably, as film critic Goran Gocić suggests, “the protagonists’ investment in their adventure takes place solely on
the level of the body.” Quoted in Levi and Žilnik, “Europe's Internal Exiles,” 119.
148 Aleksić, The Sacrificed Body, 114.
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Vujanović’s status as a sex symbol when he cast her in the role of Yugoslava. Invoking the
notion of body politic, Žilnik describes the film as being “about the beauty of homeland and the
beauty of female body.”149 Since Vujanović, in a sense, really was Yugoslavia, her victimization
and maltreatment in Early Works graphically represents the breakdown of the country as a
community with shared humanist values. The peasants of Early Works turn on their would-be
emancipators because they have been severely neglected by the state and cannot be pushed to
enlightenment overnight by bogus revolutionaries. Tatjana Aleksić points out that the foursome
“are not resistant to backwardness, primitivism, and distrust of the very people whose liberation
they have set out to promote. Getting closer to nature, free love, and uninhibited existence, the
protagonists realize their own inhibitions and unpreparedness for a life without structure and
regulations.”150 The peasants are a mirror; their aggression a manifestation of the heretofore
hidden but constitutive element of the psyche of the three men which soon comes on display in
their own conduct. Rattled by the realization of their own “backwardness” and “primitivism—of
their inability to press on with revolution—the three men abandon lofty goals and begin to
aggressively satisfy their more base desires. Symbolizing the sense of entitlement and abuses of
power by the New Class, the main object of their desire/aggression is Yugoslav(i)a’s body.
Freud suggests that a “man will show a sentimental enthusiasm for women whom he
deeply respects but who do not excite him to sexual activities, and he will only be potent with
other women whom he does not ‘love’ and thinks little of or even despises.”151 Yugoslava’s
outspoken nature which displays her intellectual superiority functions to ruin the men’s
149 Quoted in Tirnanić, Crni Talas, 66. (translation mine)
150 Aleksić, The Sacrificed Body, 111.
151 Sigmund Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” in Civilization, Society and Religion:
Group Psychology, Civilization and Its Discontents and Other Works, trans. James Strachey, ed. Albert Dickson
(London: Penguin Books, 1985), 142.
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perception of her as a sex object. In a rare moment of unguarded tenderness, Marko shows that
he can be sexually excited by a woman who is intellectual and whom he “respects.” When he and
Yugoslava engage in foreplay in the shower of the workers’ dorm, she explains to him that
satisfying a healthy sexual desire is a requirement for a healthy socialist society. Yugoslava
reminds Marko that he has Engels to thank that he is about to get “lucky.” Without Engels’
affirmation of the importance of physical love among the proletariat without regard for the
oppressive bourgeois institution of marriage that sanctions patriarchy and inequality, she would
not be willing to have sex with him. Tellingly, the two are soon interrupted by Dragiša and
Kruno and must stop. Invoking Djilas assertion about the “unity of belief and iron discipline”
with which the New Class maintained itself, Marko’s transgression—respecting the woman—is
seen by Dragiša and Kruno as a deviation that cannot be tolerated. Having failed to protect
Yugoslava from peasant rapists whose aggression was a result of frustration with the state,
Dragiša, Marko and Kruno have a chance to reform (and perhaps reignite the revolution), but,
like the New Class, they look out only after one another and cannot get let go of their exclusive
privilege to own and abuse Yugoslav(i)a. The three men are reconstituted into a pack—a distinct
class—who can now jointly take Yugoslav(i)a’s body.
As Tatjana Aleksić points out, this “brotherhood of men abandons both ideals and love
and thus conspires to sacrifice their only chance of liberation.”152 When Marko, Dragiša and
Kruno come to visit Yugoslava who has returned home following the failure of the mission, she
is no longer interested in associating with them: “Gone with the wind, boys.” Stung by the
rejection, Marko explains the real reason why they have visited her: “We want to see if you can
take all three of us at the same time.” When Yugoslava mocks them by saying, “You have never
152 Aleksić, The Sacrificed Body, 112.
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brought anything to its conclusion,” Marko pulls out a revolver and shoots her dead. The three
men cover Yugoslava’s body with a red communist flag, throw a Molotov cocktail on it and
watch silently as flames shoot up in the air. They walk away from the scene following the title
card with a quote from a leader of the French Revolution, Louis Antoine de Saint-Just: “Those
who make revolution halfway, only dig their own graves.” Implicitly conceding “failure” at its
own conclusion, the film analogizes the sexual act without a climax with perils of not fully
completing revolutionary changes to sociopolitical institutions. By situating this analogy as its
central conceptual thread, the film includes gender in its critique of dominant ideological
attitudes. Early Works cleverly aims to humiliate the political elites by questioning both their
sexual and political prowess—by depicting them as vain, thin skinned dilettantes who blame
others for their ineffectuality, as men who can only restore their egos with sexual aggression
towards women.
In WR, Makavejev also analogizes abuse of power by rigid authoritarians with aggression
towards the female body. Milena, representing Yugoslavia as an enthusiastic communist upstart,
is entranced by Vladimir Ilych, an iteration of Lenin and therefore an authority on all matters
communist. Unfortunately for her, Milena sexuality is inextricably connected to revolution: she
appears to be sexually stimulated by Vladimir’s bona fide communist credentials and her sexual
energy seems to fuel her revolutionary enthusiasm. For Milena, as for Yugoslava, sexual desire
and revolutionary zeal do go naturally together. As Milena joyfully spouts revolutionary slogans
and lays out her ideas about sexual liberation, Vladimir is increasingly confused and
uncomfortable and patronizes Milena as if she were an overly enthusiastic pupil. Milena’s desire
to desire freely and now symbolizes true revolution.153 Conversely, Vladimir represents the
153 Discussing WR, film scholar Constantine Parvulescu points out that “Fascistoid revolutions are
revolutions without joy, fixated on the future, and repressive when it comes to the pleasure of the moment. For
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repressive state forces that manage everything including, and perhaps especially, their subjects’
desire. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue: “If desire is repressed, it is because every
position of desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the established order
of a society […] and no society can tolerate a position of real desire without its structures of
exploitation, servitude, and hierarchy being compromised.”154 When, at the end of the film,
Milena places her hand on Vladimir’s crotch in order to soothe his anger, he responds violently
because he cannot allow “real desire.” His response is brutal: he kills Milena by severing her
head with an ice skate. Only in her death—her severed head speaking to the viewer from the
morgue slab in another Brechtian moment—does Milena recognize “Vladimir’s incurable
rigidity and authoritarianism.”155 Only in her death does she see Vladimir for what he truly is: “a
genuine red fascist.”
Like Early Works, WR employs gender inequality and patriarchy as powerful metaphors
for socialism stunted: the class system, the abuses of power by the rigid authoritarians.
Vladimir’s denial of desire, his patronizing and paternalistic attitude towards Milena who wants
to be his equal suggest that he is not willing to be free and therefore is not an authentic
communist. When challenged by another’s display of desire, Vladimir violently lashes out,
symbolically suggesting that the state does not allow genuine freedom. Like Early Works, WR
makes the female body into a graphic casualty of the system guided by the fragility of the male
Reichians, the revolution is always in the present. It is a radical embrace of the present as present. Joy cannot be
deferred. Any form of deferral, any road or path to joy, already implies distortion, perversion, alienation.”
Constantine Parvulescu, “Betrayed Promises: Politics and Sexual Revolution in the Films of Márta Mészáros, Miloš
Forman, and Dušan Makavejev,” Camera Obscura 24, no. 2 (2009): 97.
154 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972; repr.,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1983), 116.
155 Levi, Disintegration, 26.
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ego. Milena dies a gruesome death—her body is destroyed—because Vladimir cannot accept that
she can possess the capacity to desire independently. As Tatjana Aleksić points out, both Milena
and Yugoslava “pay dearly for their involvement with the revolutionary project and for
witnessing the men’s repressed sexual urges, underperformance, or impotence in bed and in
matters of revolution and politics.”156 In both WR and Early Works, feminist emancipation
unsettles the men and results in aggression towards the female body.
Conclusion
Black Wave boldly challenged the Yugoslav establishment to free itself of shallow
dogmatism and move towards a more democratic society. The films openly mocked the inchoate
quasi-Marxist posturing of the state functionaries and elites, badly mismanaging the country’s
economy, by pointing to the system’s glaring contradictions. While they did not necessarily
argue for abandonment of socialism, Black Wave filmmakers explicitly or implicitly called for
Yugoslavia to be restructured into a functioning socialist democracy. Black Wave films openly
dealt with topics like corruption, cronyism, unemployment and increasing reduction in the
standard of living. They were critical of the failure of the state to effectively apply the self-
management system and especially of the communist establishment’s undemocratic grip on
power and so offered representations which were in sync with the country’s reality. Black Wave
films were suppressed at the urging of the conservatives uneasy with student demonstrations of
June 1968, followed by the “liberal” movements in Croatia and Serbia of the late 1960s and early
1970s.157 The knee-jerk reaction to the demands for decentralization and greater democracy
156 Aleksić, The Sacrificed Body, 119.
157 And who, having seen the violent reaction of the Soviets to Alexander Dubček and the Prague Spring in
1968, likely feared that similar blowback awaited Yugoslavia if “liberalism” went too far.
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extended into the sphere of art and culture, including cinema, and ushered in an era of what
Žilnik called “new dogmatism.”158 This meant dealing harshly with ideological misfits in culture,
arts, education, and media. As far as film was concerned, this meant professional isolation,
intimidation, and suppression (although not outright banning) of the most radical films and
directors for their alleged negativity and defeatism. Many Black Wave films were condemned as
“anarcho-liberal,” but the very fact that Black Wave was allowed to happen suggests that the
state was not heavily invested in suppressing all forms of challenges issued to it.
Black Wave was not an aesthetically or ideological uniform movement. It emerged
spontaneously as part of the broader push for decentralization, democratization and economic
liberalization—a push away from dogmatism and towards Marxist humanism. Black Wave
filmmakers chose to openly comment on the social and political life in Yugoslavia. They tested
the boundaries of what was acceptable to say in Yugoslavia’s public sphere—to what extent the
state could be challenged—and so served as a barometer of freedom. Black Wave films were
artistic articulations of the stinging criticism of the Yugoslav political establishment offered by
Milovan Djilas and the Praxis School philosophers. Like Djilas, Black Wave filmmakers asked
that Yugoslavia be what it was meant to be—a country without class divisions. Like Djilas, they
suggested that Yugoslav political elites were uninterested in allowing this to happen because
they were enjoying the benefits of being the class in charge. The Praxis School and Black Wave
can be seen as analogous in that they both “(in)directly criticized the role of the Party in the
Yugoslav society.”159 Although the self-management system by definition contained a promise
158 Zabranjeni bez zabrane, directed by Tucaković and Nikodijević, 2007.
159 Despite the obvious similarities, some, like Gal Kirn, although acknowledging it, find the connection
between Black Wave and Praxis rather tenuous, and reject the “humanist hypothesis.” Kirn, “New Yugoslav
Cinema,” 21. Želimir Žilnik himself argues that many Black Wave filmmakers were “more influenced by Camus and
Sartre, who we found much more in sync with reality, than by ‘the humanism imposed from above’ of some
Marxists [like Marcuse, Habermas, Bloch, Bauman], as we wanted to speak about reality itself, not its promise.”
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of a more democratic Yugoslavia and seemed to constitute a step towards the ultimate goal of
communism, a prosperous, democratic, and just society seemed to remain in the realm of theory.
Party leaders spouted obtuse quasi-Marxist slogans, but in practice, they did little to actually
employ a functioning workers’ self-management system. This disparity between the promises—
couched in slogans and passages from theoretical works—and their practical application is
precisely what many Black Wave films dared to point out. Žilnik’s Early Works specifically
questions whether the “classics of Marxism” are applicable to a political environment run by
corrupt elites or if they end being just “ideological chatter.”160 In Early Works, the lack of insight
by peasants and workers into Yugoslavia’s political dynamic, the absence of awareness of their
true position in the societal hierarchy, and their inability to better their position is perhaps best
metaphorized by the mud through which they have to trudge daily. As cultural and art historian
Anna Schober points out, progress is prevented by the mud which stands for the paroxysms of
provincialism.161 Black Wave filmmakers saw the establishment as consisting of authoritarian,
uncultured apparatchiks whose provincial backgrounds perhaps even predisposed them to create
a distinct social class and perform a communist version of bourgeois elitism while their
mythological wartime sacrifices gave them the license to abuse power with impunity.
Perhaps the last film in the spirit of the Black Wave, Makavejev’s WR, too, openly mocks
the Yugoslav system and depicts it as run by intellectually shallow, sexually frustrated tyrannical
men whose insecurities drive them to murderous aggression. Like Žilnik’s film, WR was
Kirn, Sekulić, and Testen, “Those who Make Revolutions,” 71. Žilnik also insists that Praxis philosophers never
offered support to the persecuted Black Wave filmmakers. Kirn, Sekulić, and Testen, “Those who Make
Revolutions,” 89.
160 Kirn, Sekulić, and Testen, “Those who Make Revolutions,” 71.
161 Anna Schober, The Cinema Makers: Public Life and the Exhibition of Difference in South-Eastern and
Central Europe Since the 1960s (Bristol: Intellect, 2013), 116.
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internationally acclaimed, went undistributed in Yugoslavia, and was a subject of heated public
debates.162 Bogdan Tirnanić suggests that WR deals with a particular form of alienation, “the
mechanical separation of the basic bodily urges from the intellectual sphere,” and “asks the
question why the social structures which to us may not appear to be totalitarian focus so much
energy on supressing personal freedoms and on making sure they do not escape its control.”163
Sometimes oversimplifying and never taking itself too seriously (perhaps to its detriment), the
film finds “inspiration” in Wilhelm Reich’s writing and, like Reich, does not hesitate to
“diagnose” all tyrants—communist or otherwise—as sexually repressed fascists who are
“frightened by pleasure and liberated bodies,” who are “fixated on the future” and who find a
replacement for joy “in political ambitions and in talk about ideals, the building of a new and
better world.”164 Their oppressive authority, in turn, produces more authoritarian rulers as well as
more submissive masses.165 Hinting at a possibility of a catastrophic outcome to Yugoslavia’s
rebellion against the Soviet Union (as in Czechoslovakia), WR’s Milena dies at the hands of
ballet dancer whose mild manners conceal an intense rage and who cannot bear a woman who
freely expresses her sexual desire—desire for freedom—even if she is in awe of him.
162 For details, see Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 142, and Tirnanić, Crni Talas, 120-133.
163 Tirnanić, Crni Talas, 115. (translation mine)
164 Parvulescu, “Betrayed Promises,” 97.
165 Reich’s suggestion that the masses tend to be willing to be subjugated is a kind of ghostly presence in
WR which almost takes on the properties of the Freudian uncanny in that it reveals something profound to the
Yugoslav spectators about themselves. It bears stressing here, as Deleuze and Guattari do, that “Reich is at his
profoundest as a thinker when he refuses to accept ignorance or illusion on the part of the masses as an explanation
of fascism, and demands an explanation that will take their desires into account, an explanation formulated in terms
of desire: no, the masses were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they wanted
fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for.” Deleuze and Guattari,
Anti-Oedipus, 29.
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More radical Black Wave filmmakers like Žilnik aimed not just to pin point the
improprieties of the New Class or the shortcomings of the system but to—in the spirit of Bertolt
Brecht—educate and engage the viewer intellectually with the intricacies of his/her political
environment and to, in turn, affect change. In Early Works, the journey into provincial Serbia—
literally and symbolically inward—reveals a staggering ignorance among the masses. The
journey “uncovers relations untouched by the promise of the new socialist consciousness:
brutality and violence permeating the relationships of man to man and customarily perpetuated
against women.”166 Žilnik points out that he and other filmmakers like him aimed “to radically
change the structure of filmmaking in the country, to engage in an open polemic with the state’s
authoritarian ideological dogma and its propaganda machinery.”167 The act of making Early
Works is a form of social activism—a mission aimed at solving a problem. Branislav
Dimitrijević suggests that Žilnik’s approach to filmmaking is in the “spirit of activism, of
interventionism, of severing ties with formal conventions of ‘professional’ cinematography, and
of the unambiguously leftist political attitudes combining ironic criticism with enthusiastic
activism.”168 Žilnik utilizes cinema to affect the political environment and uses it as a
revolutionary tool—to transform the society.
Like Makavejev’s and Žilnik’s, Pavlović’s depictions of the human condition in Ambush
and When I’m Dead and Gone teeter between “life as a biological phenomenon” and
“consciousness.”169 Unlike Makavejev and Žilnik, Pavlović did not see traditional realism as
offensive. Though admittedly harsh and pessimistic, his view is never so cynical or derisive to be
166 Aleksić, The Sacrificed Body, 111.
167 Levi and Žilnik, “Europe's Internal Exiles,” 113.
168 Dimitrijević, “Behind Scepticism,” 137-138.
169 Levi, Disintegration, 43.
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declared thoroughly anti-humanist. Pavlović’s focus on the demoralizing effects on the
individual of being excluded from the system—the effects of the market reforms and of rapid
industrialization of the country—fall in the tradition of social realism. Pavlović’s films rely on
drama, emotion, and poignancy to depict the alienation and disillusionment of the Yugoslav
individual, while Žilnik and Makavejev offer Brechtian pamphlet-like commentaries on the
mechanisms by which the Yugoslavs had given up their freedoms. Pavlović’s characters are
realistic and integrated into the totality of the reality represented on screen and so encourage
spectator identification. Makavejev and Žilnik call attention to the fact that their characters are
played by actors—that they exist in a constructed reality—and so insist on a critical engagement
with the text rather than spectator identification. Žilnik’s and Makavejev’s films are populated by
characters emblematic in the Brechtian sense—meant to represent a particular social class and its
ideological trappings. The characters are depicted with a comically heavy handed symbolism and
speak in slogans and witticisms in order to (in the spirit of one-upmanship) engage with official
state propaganda.
Pavlović relies not on such Brechtian devices but on glimpses into the misery of
characters whose Aristotelian tragic flaw is the notion they can go against the prevalent currents.
Anywhere he goes, Jimmy—a lazy dreamer—disrupts the status quo. He is a victim of the
system’s paradoxes. He cannot survive outside of the self-management system, but the system
would not have Jimmy and eventually disposes of him. Ive of Ambush is equally—and equally
paradoxically—unfit for the Yugoslav society only because he actually believes in it. Those who
hardly believe in socialism and aggressively exploit the system, benefit, while those like Ive are
marginalized. Fittingly, Ambush concludes with a kitschy celebration of Yugoslav socialism
overseen by crooked politicians while Ive, the one true believer in the revolution, is discarded. In
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Dead and Gone and Ambush Pavlović puts on display the poverty, hypocrisy, violence, and
corruption of the system and so makes the spectator understand what precisely causes his
characters’ tragic ends. Jimmy’s and Ive’s tragic destinies are perhaps more instructive than
Milena’s or Yugoslava’s (which are equally tragic) misadventures as to just what was wrong
with Yugoslavia. All four of these films, however, are exceptionally daring works which engage
with their social and political environment and elucidate aspects of Yugoslavia socialist
experiment. The films point to the replacement of freedom with dogmatic authoritarianism of the
state and to hardships experienced by the individual in periods of rapid transition from one set of
social institutions to another or during economic and political reforms. The films suggest that
“revolutionary” societal changes which are manifestly about political emancipation are also
periods of suppression of freedom and often hardly differ from what came before them.
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Chapter 2
The Road to Kinshasa: Working Class Heroes and Allegories of Decline
Did not my house use to stand here?
—Milutin, In the Name of the People
Staying Afloat: Yugoslavia in the Global Economy
The first considerable complication Yugoslavia had to face after World War II came in
the form of a disagreement with the Soviets in 1948. Although it maintained a Soviet-style
system early on, Yugoslavia quickly distanced itself from Stalin and his bullish policies.
Unhappy about Tito’s refusal to come under full Soviet control, Stalin accused Yugoslavia of
betraying socialist ideals and expelled it from the Cominform.170 As a result, Yugoslavia became
largely isolated from communist Europe and turned into a peculiar, Western-oriented socialist
country with a market economy that required at least partial integration into the near-global
capitalist economic system. The country’s strategy included development of economic ties with
the West, especially with the EC, but those ties remained limited and typically worked to
Yugoslavia’s disadvantage.171 EC’s approach of “keeping Yugoslavia afloat” was a politically
motivated strategy meant to entice Yugoslavia with near-Western standard of living—to
maintain its dissociation from the Soviet sphere of influence by making it into a “dependent
state.”172 Gradually, Yugoslavia came to be suspended between capitalism and socialism,
170 The organization that brought together Communist parties of Europe and cemented the Soviet Bloc into
a firm existence after World War II.
171 As political scientist Branislav Radeljić suggests, trade agreements between Yugoslavia and the EC
were protectionist and unfair to the Yugoslav side, often including clauses that allowed for agreements to be
suspended in case of any perceived “threat” from Yugoslav imports to EC members’ economies. Branislav Radeljić,
Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2012), 58-60.
172 Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 66, 44.
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between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with neither bloc daring to court or act aggressively
towards Yugoslavia for fear that such an action would prompt a reciprocal response from the
other side. Ironically, this balance of threats provided Yugoslavia with a sense of security and
predisposed it to become the founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement—its own bloc.
Highly respected in the so-called Third World for its anti-imperialist and internationalist policies,
Yugoslavia was valued by Western diplomats and often acted as a mediator in talks with Arab
states who abhorred the West, especially the United States. It was precisely this status as a
diplomatic link between East and West, and especially as a socialist country with only weak ties
to the Soviet Union that “enabled Yugoslavia to enjoy significant economic help from the
West.”173
Western economic assistance, however, proved to be a source of discord and came with
strings attached. Initially, it was through financial aid and loans that the US plied Yugoslavia
after 1948. In the 1960s, the country started borrowing from the IMF and World Bank in order to
develop infrastructure, but the funds were often mismanaged, agreements on allocation proved
difficult to arrive at, and some loans were never even used because of organizational and
procedural problems.174 Importantly, these funds were “conditional on the liberalization of the
foreign trade regime and price regulations, conditional on the all-round improvement of
investment project appraisal procedures.”175 The global recession brought on by the 1973 oil
crisis triggered a new wave of low interest IMF loans to countries dependent on oil imports.
When interests rates suddenly increased, as per dictat of the US Federal Reserve Board in 1979,
173 Duško Sekulić, “The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: the Case of Yugoslavia,”
Nations and Nationalism 3, no. 2 (1997): 176.
174 Dyker, Yugoslavia, 156-157.
175 Ibid., 158.
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these countries, Yugoslavia chief among them, found themselves unable to make payments. Any
further assistance was predicated on further economic reforms geared towards facilitating an
entry into global capitalist market economy.176 In order to stabilize the economy and manage the
shocking amount of foreign debt in the early 1980s, Yugoslavia resorted to more IMF and other
Western bank loans, acquired with great difficulty and with very unfavourable interest rates.177
Soon, Yugoslavia found itself pressured into austerity measures by the IMF and Western
diplomats which, in the language of economists, meant drastic reduction in consumption,
increase in exports, and reduction of imports. In practical terms this meant water and electricity
restrictions, rising prices of gas, food, and transportation, abandonment of essential social
services and infrastructure projects, decline in wages, layoffs at unprofitable firms, inflation, and,
most strikingly, shortages of food staples and other consumer goods.178 The omnipresent tug of
war between the forces of recentralization and decentralization found a new arena in the
processes of application of austerity measures. The austerity measures should have facilitated a
more centralized, easier to oversee economic system, but what happened was its further
formalization, including legislations which put debt repayment under republican jurisdiction (and
made for a very slow repayment pace) and paved the way for further decentralization.179 In 1987,
176 For details, see Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 47-81. The IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programs stipulated that
“indebted countries would only receive new loans on condition that they undertook a major ‘restructuring’ of their
entire economies, based on the slashing of public sector-funded national development projects and social welfare
measures. The aim was to open the entire world to the domination of the major industrial corporations and financial
institutions.” Not surprisingly, the beneficiaries of this strategy were to be found in the West: “It has been calculated
that between 1984 and 1990 ‘developing’ countries operating under SAPs transferred $178 billion to Western
commercial banks” Nick Beams, “IMF ‘Shock Therapy’ and the Recolonization of the Balkans,” World Socialist
Web Site (April 1999), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1999/04/imf-a17.html (accessed August 25, 2013).
177 Dyker, Yugoslavia, 122-124.
178 Ibid., 128-154.
179 Ibid., 114-122.
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Yugoslavia was for the first time unable to meet its payments to the IMF and World Bank;
disagreements over conditionality abounded until the relationship with the two financial entities
started to collapse. Yugoslavia’s sociopolitical picture became dismal: the middle class had all
but disappeared, white collar crime (embezzlement, nepotism, graft) became rampant,
nationalism and ethnic resentment started to boil over as inter-republican squabbles escalated,
people mocked formerly holy socialist values and flocked back to religion, federal government
became fragmented, divided between those advocating recentralization and those advocating
further liberalization, and barely able to make decisions because of differing opinions on how to
deal with the crisis.180
The hostilities between republics (and ethnic groups) worsened significantly during this
period owing in part to some paradoxical past and current EC economic policies. The EC, in
effect, prevented Yugoslavia from integrating into European economy as a single unit because it
preferred trade with the more developed republics, Slovenia and Croatia, and so gave those
republics an important leverage in internal Yugoslav rows pertaining to economy (as well as in
general). This approach not only worked counter to the austerity measures, which encouraged a
more centralized system, but also effectively welcomed parts of Yugoslavia into the European
economic as well as cultural and geographic corpus while keeping other parts out. Not
surprisingly, this dynamic facilitated internal discord. The EC’s approach seemed a
manifestation of Balkanism, a Western prejudice in some ways not unlike Orientalism, but
different because, as Maria Todorova points out, “while orientalism is dealing with a difference
between (imputed) types, balkanism treats the differences within one type.”181 Put differently,
180 For more on the economic reforms and austerity measures, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 47-81.
181 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 19.
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Balkanist prejudice located in Yugoslavia varying degrees of deviation from the Western ideal of
Europeanness, diagnosed a severe innate cultural regression in some parts, and placed those parts
in opposition to Western Europe—it imputed to those parts an inability to organize into an
efficiently functioning economy.182 Within this paradigm, Slovenia and Croatia tended to be seen
as less “Balkan” than the rest of the country. This polarization (civilized west vs. backward east)
was internalized in various ways by the Yugoslavs.183 While most admitted to some
“Balkanness,” all designated someone else as more Balkan and therefore more un-Western than
themselves. As the Yugoslav economic crisis worsened, this shading of the country in degrees of
“Balkanness” became more pronounced and greatly contributed to internal discord.
The conflict between the proponents of liberalization and proponents of recentralization,
a dynamic with a Balkanist and therefore an ethnic dimension, deepened regionally-based
economic divisions. From its inception, Yugoslavia was unevenly economically developed, with
the west—Slovenia and to a lesser extent Croatia—being more developed than the rest of the
country.184 Having taken advantage of some fortunate historical circumstances, Slovenia became
Yugoslavia’s most economically developed republic—and so gained an upper hand in political
182 As Andrew Hammond puts it, “[i]n creating a sense of distance between the two poles of Europe, the
balkanist would be seen to blame economic and social crises on innate factors rather than on its entrance into a
globalizing economy that had already left the Balkans far behind.” Hammond, “The Uses of Balkanism,” 617-618.
183 As Maria Todorova suggests, “a negative self-perception hovers over the Balkans next to a strongly
disapproving and disparaging outside perception” Todorova, Imagining the Balkans. 38.
184 For more on the regional imbalance in economic development, see Vesna Bojičić, “The Disintegration
of Yugoslavia: Causes and Consequences of Dynamic Inefficiency in Semi-command Economies,” in Yugoslavia
and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, eds. David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (London: Longman,
1996), 40-44. This imbalance was also one that once again divided Yugoslavia into former Ottoman and former
Habsburg lands by reaffirming the disparities, instituted while the future Yugoslav territories were under colonial
rule, in infrastructure, literacy, and agricultural development. For instance, the “patterns of rural organization” in
each empire were vastly different. Unlike the Ottoman, the Habsburg Empire left a legacy of cooperatives which
continued to benefit and protect the farmers. In the formerly Ottoman lands, once the economic crisis struck, the
farmers had to go deep in debt just to survive. For more, see Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, Regime Change in the
Yugoslav Successor States: Divergent Paths Towards a New Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2010), 51-52.
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matters—and a model to which to aspire, but the east never really caught up.185 Eager to retain
the privileged status and shed the burden of the less developed regions, the western republics
advocated continued decentralization of the political system and liberalization of economy;
perhaps hoping to benefit from the west’s prosperity, the eastern republics tended to advocate
recentralization. Slovenia and Croatia deeply resented the austerity measures which placed
restrictions on foreign trade (they preferred to deal with Western European markets rather than
with other Yugoslav republics). As the crisis deepened, the two republics fought ardently to
reduce the federal input into how their economies are run—they felt it unreasonable to be
expected to share their wealth with the rest of the country. Not surprisingly, polarization over the
federal budget and legislation took on an ethnic dimension and initiated a series of constitutional
crises. Yugoslavia’s republics seem to be disengaging from one another under the pressure of the
economic crisis. As Susan Woodward puts it, Yugoslavia’s “legitimating principles were eroding
at the popular level” as the politicians, “in their responses to the economic crisis and bargaining
over political elements of the economic reform, were picking apart the fundamental principles of
the constitutional order of multinational Yugoslavia.”186 The romantic socialist ideal of
“Brotherhood and Unity” was trumped by economically and politically realist concerns.
Yugoslavia’s founding myths and foundational principles seemed to be unraveling in the
grim 1980s. The very idea of the workers’ self-management, a concept that at the best of times
185 Susan Woodward stresses that Slovenia’s economic superiority had its roots in lucky historical
circumstances. Slovenia saw little fighting or destruction in World War II; its industry operated continuously as it
was solidly incorporated into the German one, and its territory was liberated by the Partisans early. Woodward,
Socialist Unemployment, 58. Woodward goes on to point out that Slovenia pursued “political self-government and
local initiative,” which went hand-in-hand with “regional economic self-sufficiency and thus autonomy in economic
policy.” Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 58-59. The destruction of both world wars was inflicted less on both
Slovenia and Croatia, a circumstance which greatly impacted later development, and provided for major advantages
relative to the rest of the country. See Boduszyński, Regime Change, 53. Also, Woodward Socialist Unemployment
60-61.
186 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 74.
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found scarce practical application, seemed a sham. Even those who turned a blind eye to the
system’s imperfections in the past no longer bothered to pretend. It was apparent to everyone that
it was not the workers or even their proxies, the workers’ councils, but professional managerial
teams who had full control over how business enterprises were run. Any potential for
transforming the idealistic self-management system into a true participatory democracy was
gone.187 Rather unsurprisingly, Yugoslavia’s experiment with market socialism also backfired. It
normalized economic practices that would otherwise be unacceptably capitalist, and underlined
class divisions by benefiting those with deeper pockets.188 The economic crisis gradually all but
disappeared the middle class, exposing the growing chasm between the standards of living of the
politicians/managerial class and the rest. The country that at the best of times seemed to be stuck
in a cycle of cosmetic reforms, continuously “perfecting” its socialist path and struggling to keep
up its balancing act between socialism and capitalism, was now devoid of identity and lacking a
common dream.
The Struggle Within: Cinema of Austerity
In the 1970s, Yugoslav filmmaking entered a period of stagnation. Fewer films were
produced in the 1970s than in the decade before, but more importantly, gone was the “thematic
boldness and cinematic experimentation” of the 1960s as genre films like Partisan war films,
comedies, and historical dramas filled the vacuum created by the demise of the Black Wave.189
Yet by the early 1980s, Yugoslav filmmaking experienced a kind of revival, perhaps precisely
187 For more, see Dyker, Yugoslavia, 38. For further insight, see Zukin, Beyond Marx and Tito, 48-75.
188 It resulted in “the sale of basic goods and services to those who could pay the most” instead of “the
availability of goods and services of high quality at low prices,” in “expansion in the form of monopolies,
corporations, and trusts” instead of “support for the innovation and the expansion of successful producers,” and in
“personal enrichment” instead of “reward for individual initiative and skill.” Zukin, Beyond Marx and Tito, 23.
189 Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 143.
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because of the alarming economic and constitutional crises which gave filmmakers thematic
fodder (and kept politicians too busy to focus on censoring provocative filmmakers). By the
1980s, Yugoslavia’s economic crisis was so severe it left the citizens stunned and struggling to
navigate the austerity measures imposed on the state by foreign lenders. The shocking loss of the
living standards and the resulting disillusionment with the state were impossible to ignore by any
socially aware filmmaker. Daniel Goulding rightly observes that 1980s Yugoslav filmmakers did
not “coalesce” around a set of “aesthetic tendencies or objectives,” but also suggests that they
explored overtly political themes rather broadly and concerned themselves primarily with
“making professionally well-crafted films with dramatically interesting story lines, which
communicate effectively with the contemporary audience.”190 I argue, however, that too many
filmmakers did engage in an open and direct confrontation with the state and produced works
which astutely examined its failures for the decade’s filmmaking to be dismissed as apolitical or
conformist.191 Although lacking the spirit of formal experimentation and the anti-conservative
drive which fueled the hip counter-culture youth appeal (now passé globally, anyway) of the
Black Wave, many 1980s films dealt specifically with aberrations of the Yugoslav socialist
system and in that respect stand on par with the films of the Black Wave. Put differently, these
films dealt with Yugoslav socio-economic realities somewhat more ambiguously and less
directly than the films of the Black Wave did.
This chapter is divided into two sections, each focusing on one particular tendency in the
Yugoslav cinema of the late 1970s and 1980s, and each represented by three films. The first
section focuses on three films depicting Yugoslavia’s economic decline and the resulting
190 Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 147.
191 Granted, this was much easier and less dangerous to do in the 1980s than it was in the 1960s.
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disillusionment of the citizens with the state. The films rely on the conventions of the science
fiction and horror film genres and employ the trope of disease to form allegorical depictions of a
deeply unsettled, dysfunctional, increasingly neurotic and volatile society. Pointing the
allegorical finger at Yugoslavia’s political elite for their mismanagement of the country, The Rat
Saviour (Krsto Papić, 1976) is a science fiction horror film about a destitute writer who discovers
that a race of conniving shapeshifters has infiltrated the society. The shapeshifters maintain
covert control of the society by spreading a disease that ensures the public’s deference to their
authority as they methodically drain the resources in order to maintain their opulent lifestyles.
Oppressively dreary medical horror film, Variola Vera (Goran Marković, 1982), deals with the
true story of the 1972 outbreak of smallpox, contained after a strict quarantine was implemented
at a Belgrade hospital at the urging of and with the assistance by the UN and WHO. The film,
however, employs its depiction of the outbreak containment as an allegory for the Yugoslav
economic crisis and the austerity measures implemented at the insistence of the IMF. An even
bleaker reality is depicted in Backbone (Vlatko Gilić, 1975), a funereal, understated
psychological horror/dystopian science fiction film about a strange epidemic which grips the city
of Belgrade, baffling the medical professionals. The mysterious disease which seems to induce in
the infected an emotionally overwhelming existential crisis, eventually driving them to suicide,
allegorizes the deep despair caused by the Yugoslav economic and political crises, especially the
fear of an unknown and uncertain future.
All three films are political allegories which offer nightmarish visions of a society in a
deep crisis. Employing the conventions and tropes of science fiction and/or horror genres, each
film captures some of the more intangible qualities of the country’s disposition during the
economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. The films find their register in dread, anxiety, tension,
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apprehension, panic, and dismay—the kinds of sentiments not conveyed by unemployment or
inflation statistics, but keenly felt by Yugoslav citizens. The unifying thread of my discussion is
the films’ evocation of the Freudian uncanny—the cognitive dissonance upon discovering the
inherent paradoxes of something previously deemed fully known—in their characters who
perceive that their society, although it still appears to be the same, is now in some difficult-to-
define way also fundamentally different. My discussion of how the films utilize the trope of
disease to convey this sentiment is ordered in a way that mirrors the progression of the Yugoslav
economic crisis. Under the heading of “Greed,” I discuss The Rat Saviour, focusing on how the
shapeshifters’ unscrupulous, shadowy conspiracy allegorizes the behavior—luxurious lifestyles
and irresponsible borrowing—of Yugoslav political elites. I pay special attention to the
shapeshifters’ mimicry/duality and to their ability to spread their ideology by infecting others as
allegorical depictions of the disparity between of the Yugoslav elites’ empty promises of future
prosperity for everyone and the consequences of going deeper into debt. Next, under the heading
of “Fear,” I discuss the urban nightmare of Backbone whose mysterious, sublime disease which
renders Belgraders paranoid, ridden with self-doubt, and pondering the paradoxes of human
nature and the absurdity of existence allegorically suggests that Yugoslavia is a society in
despair, debilitated by the fear of the future—of the inevitable consequences of the mounting
foreign debt. Finally, under the heading of “Quarantine,” I discuss Variola Vera whose depiction
of the smallpox outbreak, which not only necessitates an outside intervention, but also wakes up
old animosities among the hospital staff, stands for the devastating austerity measures and
symbolically suggests that the economic crisis has produced a society ostracized from the world
and on the verge of collapse. I argue that however oblique or ambiguous the films’ allegories,
they ultimately function as uniquely revelatory visions of Yugoslavia during the economic crisis.
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The second section is centered on depictions of the plight of the working class men and
women in a society in which they no longer have the mythical stature they once had. Živko
Nikolić’s drama, In the Name of the People (1987), revisits the most explosive and controversial
political scandal of the 1960s, the alleged surveillance of the country’s top politicians,
orchestrated by the head of the UDBA (Yugoslavia’s state security agency which emerged from
the post-war OZNA), Aleksandar Ranković. The film uses the affair as a backdrop for a story
less about Ranković or the 1960s and more about the ruinous state of the working class in the
1980s. In Nikolić’s film, the working class man is a devalued commodity, aimless, lacking an
identity, disrespected, and pushed around—a casualty of the machinations of the political elites.
The Dream about a Rose (Zoran Tadić, 1986), a moody crime film inspired by the American noir
tradition also depicts a hard working family man struggling to survive in a society in which the
value system seems to have shifted without anyone notifying the working class. A genre film
with a political message, The Dream about a Rose depicts a society in which shiftiness and
duplicity are essential survival skills, racketeering and extortion are common, and distinctions
between police and criminals increasingly blurred. Finally, the unclassifiable Rams and
Mammoths (Filip Robar Dorin, 1985), one of the few works from this decade that would be at
home within the Black Wave corpus of films (especially those of Dušan Makavejev), lays bare
the devastating consequences of the economic crisis on the working class. The film alludes to the
increasing disharmony within the Yugoslav federation—the tensions between the east and west
resulting from regional disparities in economic development—as it examines the xenophobia and
discrimination experienced in Slovenia by migrant workers from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I examine the films separately, focusing on their shared affinity for the subject of the
working class stunned by a complete failure of the self-management system, adrift in a country
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they no longer recognize, while also paying attention to the vastly divergent formal and stylistic
approaches of each of the films. I discuss Rams and Mammoths as a study of a variant of
Balkanism Milica Bakić-Hayden calls “nesting Orientalism,” which combines cinéma vérité and
direct cinema observational styles with Eisensteinian montage to provide an incisive
commentary on the harsh social and political environment navigated by the migrant workers. I
rely on Paul Schrader’s seminal essay, “Notes on Film Noir,” to discuss The Dream about a Rose
as a film which uproots elements of the quintessentially American genre—the ominousness of
the physical world at night, the fatalistic tendencies, the urban criminal milieu where violence
and gun play are routine—to offer an astute commentary about the erosion of the status of the
working class as one of the pillars of the Yugoslav socialist state. Finally, I discuss In the Name
of the People as what Natalie Zemon Davis terms “a distillation of historical experience” which
relies not on strict historical accuracy but rather reinvents the past in order to interpret the
sociopolitical disposition of the era.192 I focus on how the film’s microcosm, especially the ways
characterization, symbolism, and analogy function to exposit a bitter historical truth: the workers
have always been and remain dispensable parts of an inherently dehumanizing Kafkaesque
system. The unifying thread in my discussions of these three formally and stylistically disparate,
but thematically complementary films is the examination of how they depict the stupefying
shock of Yugoslavia’s transition into a state unrecognizable to its working class.
In their assessment of the Yugoslavia of the late 1970s and 1980s, particularly the
disastrous consequences of the country’s foray into the global economy, all six films display a
consistent theme: the loss of the connotative meaning of Yugoslavia. The economic and political
crises seemed to dissolve the last of that mythical, comforting socialist Yugoslav identity that
192 Natalie Zemon Davis, “’Any Resemblance to Persons Living or Dead’: Film and the Challenge of
Authenticity,” in The History on Film Reader, ed. Marnie Hughes-Warrington (London: Routledge, 2009), 22.
120
was once synonymous with a just society. The six films discussed here depict Yugoslavs as
deeply unsettled by the economic crisis, resentful of austerity measures, frustrated and angry at
the continued mismanagement of the country by the political elites, and anxious because they are
facing an uncertain future. In examining the cracks in the veneer of Yugoslav socialism, the six
films expose an unpleasant truth: once on the path towards a just, progressive, humanist society,
the country is now an alienating and chauvinistic one with naïve believers in the socialist ideals
looking on as criminals, especially those within the state bureaucracy, thrive and the Yugoslav
Dream dies amidst the agony of the economic crisis and austerity measures.
The Disease of Greed: The Rat Saviour
Set in an unnamed Mitteleuropean city plagued by poverty and unemployment in the
early 20th century, Krsto Papić’s The Rat Saviour is a disquieting allegory about Yugoslavia’s
1970s descent into debt and deeper into economic crisis. Papić’s fantasy horror follows Ivan
Gajski, a destitute aspiring writer who assists Professor Bošković in his efforts to produce a
serum effective against the race of rat-like shapeshifters who have covertly taken control of the
society. Led by the eponymous Saviour, who is also the city’s mayor, the shapeshifters appear
upstanding citizens, but ruthlessly exploit others and secretly maintain luxurious lifestyles. They
multiply and spread their influence by biting unsuspecting victims who then spawn obedient
decoys. Following the Professor’s death, Ivan manages to administer the serum to the Saviour
who, with his dying breath, promises to return in the future. The sociopolitical dynamics of the
film’s restive city run by an expanding elite class driven by greed form an allegory for the
Yugoslav society of the 1970s whose own politicians reveled in the privileges that accompanied
power while plunging the country already in decline deeper into debt. Symbolizing the disparity
between the promises of prosperity and the reality of debt crisis, Ivan finds himself estranged
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from his environment when he realizes that most of his fellow citizens are shapeshifting decoys.
Ivan’s predicament is best described via Freud’s notion of the uncanny—the sense of dissonance,
dread and anxiety upon the discovery (or rediscovery) of the foreignness of something
previously deemed familiar and comforting.193 The film, however, invokes the uncanny in order
to implicate the viewers by suggesting that they, too, are living above their means thanks to
irresponsible borrowing. The glimpses of Zagreb landmarks like the St. Mark’s Church and
spoken references to the city’s famous Flower Square make familiar the film’s strange,
unidentifiable city and, in turn, conjure up an eerie sensation not unlike the uncanny. In implying
that the city is Zagreb—rather than some chimerical location—the film creates a vague
awareness in the viewer that its story is a wake-up call meant for him/her.
In the film’s most self-reflexive moment, Papić declares the ability of the film’s allegory
to mediate between the viewer and his/her sociopolitical environment. Hungry and desperate,
Ivan stops by the dilapidated office of a potential publisher to inquire about the status of his
manuscript titled The Epidemic. The publisher, unable to recall Ivan or his manuscript, tersely
asks: “Can’t you see what kind of situation we are in?” Ivan tries to freshen up the man’s
memory and summarizes the manuscript as “the novel about the disease that spreads rapidly
throughout the city and acts as a metaphor for rampant spread of bureaucracy.” Having recalled
the story, the publisher insists the manuscript will never get published because “the spread of the
epidemic is described unconvincingly.” Defending his approach, Ivan argues that his manuscript
is realistic in that it accurately allegorizes the society’s problems. Ironically, as he rejects Ivan’s
reasoning, the publisher is dictating a letter to his secretary—to be forwarded to some
bureaucratic body—detailing the deteriorating conditions of the building that houses his firm and
193 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in Literary Theory: An Anthology, trans. James Strachey, ed. Julie
Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 418-430.
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asking for emergency funds for repairs. A mise en abyme nestled inside of and echoing the
film’s themes, The Epidemic is a pointed allegory about the “situation” within its own fictional
context—a crumbling society whose resources are controlled and consumed by rapacious
shapeshifters. That fictional society is itself an allegory, utilized by The Rat Saviour to portray its
own context—Yugoslavia being mismanaged into economic ruin by its irresponsible leaders.
The film effectively instructs the viewer how to read it, and by legitimizing the approach taken in
The Epidemic, asserts that its own allegory is capable (perhaps better than traditional realism) of
distilling and astutely assessing its sociopolitical context.
The shapeshifters stand for the Yugoslav politicians who worked to enrich themselves
while maintaining the pretense that the state is not on the verge of economic collapse. The film
stresses the disparity between the impact of the growing economic crisis on the elites and on
ordinary people by juxtaposing Ivan’s troubles with the comfortable lifestyle of the
shapeshifters. Looking for a job, Ivan joins a crowd of people waiting outside an employment
bureau and clamoring: “We have nothing to eat!” Although some in the crowd insist that “this
can’t go on,” they are told there is no work and the police quickly disperse them.194 During a
speech in the city’s square, the mayor tries to appease the citizens and assures them that he is
working for their benefit and asks that they be patient because “after every rain, out comes the
sun.”195 It soon becomes clear that the mayor’s optimism is a ruse. When Ivan’s landlady kicks
194 Papić makes sure the viewer understands that unemployment is a long-standing problem in the film’s
allegorical city. When Ivan tries to reason with the bureau director, the man tersely responds: “I keep telling you
there is nothing. We’re in a crisis for God’s sake. Wait until things get better.”
195 The mayor wants the citizens to be hopeful, but also realistic because “we are in a great economic crisis
which encompasses not just our country but entire Europe.” The mayor’s speech replicates almost verbatim the
speeches by Yugoslav politicians who often used the word “crisis” ambiguously to imply that the country’s bleak
economic outlook is not their fault but rather a symptom of the broader European economic depression. Even the
less cynical viewer likely recognized the mayor’s speech as a reference to Yugoslav politicians’ efforts to evade
responsibility for the state of the economy and to appease the citizens.
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him out of his room for failing to pay the rent, he is forced to sleep on a park bench. On his first
night in the park, Ivan is awoken by the sound of a waltz coming from a nearby building.
Perplexed, he rises and listens to the clinging of champagne glasses while observing through the
window blinds the silhouettes of the shapeshifters swaying to the music. The kindly park warden
takes Ivan to the abandoned Central Bank where he can sleep for a night or two without getting
arrested for vagrancy. Exploring the spooky building, Ivan comes across a hidden stockpile of
food and, hardly believing his luck, gorges on bread and sausages. Investigating further,
however, Ivan finds the shapeshifters, copulating, drinking, and feasting on delicacies in the
building’s banquet hall. The abandoned bank building containing a stockpile of food secretly
consumed by the shapeshifters symbolizes, of course, the ruinous Yugoslav economy and its last
resources being recklessly siphoned off by greedy politicians. The film symbolically suggests
that the economic crisis is getting progressively worse in part because the politicians drain the
financial reserves in order to enjoy lavish lifestyles while ordinary citizens truly suffer the
consequences of the crisis.
As Ivan observes from the shadows the bacchanalian celebration inside the abandoned
bank building, a mysterious figure enters to cheers of “Salute the Saviour!” Because he cannot
see the man’s face, Ivan does not realize he is looking at the city’s mayor, but he is terrified of
the speech given by the ominous figure. The Saviour assures his minions that they are a
specially-bred class which must always remember to behave without compassion or risk losing
their privileges and asserts that “our mission is becoming a reality…many are joining our
ranks…our enemies are disappearing.” The shapeshifters who enjoy privileges ordinary people
can only dream of seem partly modelled on the New Class described by Milovan Djilas in 1957
as a tightly-knit, bent on self-preservation, bureaucratic/managerial class which treated state
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property as its own and methodically curbed challenges to its privileged status.196 Djilas revisits
the subject in 1969 to suggest that the New Class had evolved into a “new new class,” a broader
and growing middle class consisting of well-educated professionals, “specialists of all kinds,”
who possess far greater consumer power than the rest of the citizens.197 More broadly then, the
constantly recruiting, well-heeled shapeshifters can be said to represent this rapidly expanding
middle class, no less bent on self-preservation, and willfully ignoring the economic crisis while
maintaining comfortable lifestyles. The disease the shapeshifters spread proliferates not just
greed and thirst for privileges, but also conformism and obedience and therefore allegorizes
particularly well the bonds that unite the “new new class.” Those infected seem to instantly
understand that no matter where they are in the hierarchy, the benefits of being a shapeshifter are
too attractive to refuse and must therefore be protected at all cost.
The film depicts the shapeshifters as difficult to identify, well integrated into the system
(their leader is a state official), aggressively protective of their status and interests (they patrol
the city in Gestapo-style Mercedes cars and vanish their enemies under the cover of night with
impunity), and actively expanding. That the shapeshifters’ disease is not exclusive but threatens
everyone in the anonymous yet strangely familiar city implies that a similar dynamic functions in
reality: all of Yugoslavia is frenziedly feeding on foreign loans, recklessly ignoring future
consequences. The Saviour, the film’s “daemonic agent” whose villainous, iconic persona holds
most of the film’s allegorical power, appears to be a simple public servant while orchestrating a
campaign of voracious consumption for his cohorts.198 The revelation of his duality—and that of
196 Djilas, The New Class, 62-69.
197 Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class, trans Dorian Cooke (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1969), 205.
198 For more on the notion of “daemonic agent,” see Angus Fletcher, Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic
Mode (1963; repr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 25-69.
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his minions—comprise the film’s “allegorical moment” which establishes the connection
between the film’s admittedly preposterous story and reality and so forces a startling recognition
of the film’s allegorical implications.199 After finally realizing that the mayor is the Saviour, Ivan
becomes determined to reveal the truth to others. Carrying several bottles of Professor
Bošković’s serum, he chases the mayor through the city streets. Every time he throws a bottle at
the mayor and misses, the spraying serum reveals the rat-like features—elongated two front
teeth, twitching noses, whiskers—of the passersby who happen to be shapeshifters. To the utter
amazement of their uninfected friends, the shapeshifters collapse and die writhing in agony. The
film’s “allegorical moment” crescendos when the Saviour suffers the same fate after Ivan finally
catches up with him. For the uninfected citizens witnessing the revelations of their friends’ and
neighbours’ true identities, the experience is somewhat like the uncanny—the familiar has
become alien. Arguably, however, the uncanny is experienced by the viewer as well because the
“allegorical moment” implies that he/she only need look around to see the truth: Yugoslavia is an
economically unsustainable society, propped up by foreign loans, and blindly barreling towards a
ruinous end.
Ultimately, the allegory of The Rat Saviour functions to unsettle and agitate the viewer. It
“translates” the sociopolitical environment via its ludicrous story about rat-like shapeshifters
who have covertly taken over the society to suggest to the viewer that the economic stability of
the country is a self-delusion. The depiction of the shapeshifters as a clandestine society which
199 I borrow the term “allegorical moment” from horror film scholar Adam Lowenstein who, in his discussion
of the Canadian Vietnam War-themed film, Deathdream (Bob Clark, 1974), describes the image of the main character,
Andy Brooks, a Vietnam vet, neither dead nor alive, trying to bury himself in a shallow grave, as an “allegorical
moment,” encapsulating the trauma of the Vietnam War uniquely effectively. He describes the image as one “where
film, spectator, and history compete and collaborate to produce forms of knowing not easily described by conventional
delineations of bodily space and historical time.” Adam Lowenstein, Shocking Representation: Historical Trauma,
National Cinema, and the Modern Horror Film (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 2.
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methodically drains the already suffering economy of a country deep in debt, may seem at first a
condemnation of Yugoslavia political elites, but the film’s critique is sweeping. The disease that
the shapeshifters spread by biting those they deem potentially like-minded stands for the general
disregard of the consequences of irresponsible borrowing. The film’s allegory aims to alert the
viewer that the country is being driven into economic ruin by likening his/her comfortable
middle class life to an orgy of unrestrained consumption. Ivan’s realization that the rapacious
shapeshifters are everywhere and deeply integrated into the society, suggests that the film’s
allegory applies to most of the society—the shapeshifters stand for all who are obliviously
enjoying the perks of the middle class life financed by foreign loans.
The Disease of Fear: Backbone
Best classified as dystopian science fiction, Vlatko Gilić’s Backbone begins with an
epigraph that describes the time as “a year which may come sooner than we dare to believe,” and
the place as “a city we built using our imagination” yet “never dared to accept as possible.”
Although the cryptic epigraph muddies the film’s historical specificity, the film’s setting—a
typical Belgrade block of flats—unambiguously positions the film as an allegory for
Yugoslavia’s bleak prospects in the 1970s. The film centers on Pavle, a microbiologist trying to
determine the source of the mysterious odour that pervades the city and appears to harbour a
disease that makes the citizens anxious and despondent, eventually driving them to suicide.
Using a makeshift lab inside his apartment, Pavle tries to identify the disease by finding
commonalities in the bloodwork of the suicide victims. Unsettled by the inescapable odour and
bewildered by rumours, his fellow tenants gradually turn on each other; they roam the building
aimlessly and, retreating into solipsistic despair, cling onto faint memories of better times.
Mystified by the strange disease and grief-stricken over the death of his lover, Pavle commits
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suicide at the end of the film. Populated by the antagonistic and paranoid tenants who suddenly
become unrecognizable to themselves and to each other, the building allegorizes Yugoslavia as it
mutated—under the strain of the economic crisis—into a community of alienated and hostile
citizens. As its epigraph hints, the film prophesizes the end of the Yugoslav socialist utopia, with
the sublime disease standing for the economic crisis which so demoralized the Yugoslav society
that it facilitated a swift substitution of the lofty ideals of socialist solidarity upon which the
country was built with angst, pessimism and self-interest.
Backbone depicts the mythology of wartime heroism—so often utilized to remind the
Yugoslavs to steadfastly pursue the socialist course out of respect for the sacrifices made in the
past—as devoid of its original meaning. Pavle’s apartment is decorated with iconic images of
two Yugoslav national heroes. The enlarged photographs show two Partisans moments before
their deaths: Stjepan Filipović, seconds before he was hanged by the Germans as he shouted,
”Death to Fascism! Freedom to the People!”, and Čedomir Ljubo Čupić, who calmly smiled and
proclaimed, “Long Live the Glorious Communist Party!” moments before he was executed by a
Chetnik firing squad. These apocryphal stories of defiance in the face of death were part of
Yugoslav socialist lore, related methodically to post-war generations as examples of unmatched
heroism to which they owed their freedom. As commodified artifacts of postmodern nostalgia
used as interior decoration, the photographs are implicitly post-socialist. As such, they provide
an ironic background to Pavle’s frantic struggle to identify the mysterious disease: his efforts are
futile—it is already too late. The dystopian context further strips the photographs of their original
mythology. Displayed on the wall of Pavle’s apartment, the photographs acquire an unintended
meaning—they simply depict two men seconds before their deaths—and therefore perform an
unintended function which is to foreshadow Pavle’s (and the country’s) demise. Ultimately, the
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photographs stress the irony of heroes (real or invented) dying with defiant gestures only for
Yugoslavia to fail because, as the film’s epigraph suggests, no one believed it truly “possible.”
The pervasive odour that overpowers Belgrade and brings with it an inexplicable dread
and eventually death by suicide, allegorizes the chief effect of the economic crisis on
Yugoslavia: loss of hope for the future and the resulting internal discord. Paralleling the anxiety
most Yugoslavs experienced in the 1970s upon realization that the country they thought
economically stable is alarmingly weak, Backbone depicts Pavle and his neighbours
experiencing extreme anxiety upon sensing the odour. Because its source is unknown, the odour
is an “empty signifier”—a sign without a signified and therefore without an agreed upon
symbolic value.200 Because they do not know from where it originates, the tenants speculate
frenziedly on the odour’s meaning, driving themselves to hysteria. That the authorities keep the
public in the dark about the source of the odour only exacerbates the tenants’ anxiety and makes
them suspicious of the state. The patronizing television announcements ask the citizens to “stay
at home and not open the windows,” to use air fresheners, and wait for the wind to take care of
the rest. Trapped in their flats, lacking any insight into the source and nature of the mysterious
odour, unsettled by wild rumours, the tenants experience the uncanny—they all seem to perceive
some intangible, but alarming change in themselves and in each other. Soon, they cease to be a
community and become a collection of individuals who view each other with suspicion. They
quickly grow aloof, cold-hearted, and aggressive. When one neighbour’s dog howls too loudly,
another one decides to “take care of the pooch,” and strangles it with apparent glee. Those
tenants looking for comfort find no sympathy. Pavle’s next door neighbour, Pepi, begs others to
200 Media scholar and semiotician Daniel Chandler points out: “Such signifiers mean different things to
different people: they may stand for many or even any signifieds; they may mean whatever their interpreters want
them to mean.” Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: The Basics, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 74.
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keep him company. Although Pavle reluctantly agrees to let him stay in his apartment, Pepi
leaves, sensing that he is not actually welcome, and commits suicide by jumping off his balcony.
Pepi’s unallayable fear mirrors the anxiety of many Yugoslavs in the 1970s, but the inability of
others to empathize with Pepi implies that the Yugoslav society is no longer one of solidarity and
comradeship but one of antagonism and self-interest. Pavle’s own indifference to Pepi is ironic
given his obsession with identifying the disease and finding its source. Had Pavle truly listened
to Pepi’s pleas for comfort, he would have seen what no lab test can show him: the disease is
simply a fear of an uncertain future.
Backbone utilizes the symbolism of the myth of the Garden of Eden to suggest that this
rejection of socialist solidarity—the substitution of community with individualism—is a grave
mistake likely to have catastrophic results. The mysterious odour triggers in Pavle a ghoulish
childhood memory of a man who had murdered his wife and burned her body in a furnace,
causing the neighbourhood to be overpowered by the smell of burning human flesh. The
association leads Pavle to speculate that the odour may be coming from the nearby crematorium.
The facility’s director, a mysterious elderly figure, brushes off Pavle’s pleas for the crematorium
to stop operating. When a body is rolled in on a gurney, the man dutifully writes down the tag
information into his log book and, as the body burns in the cremation oven, tells Pavle: “That is
what the earth will look like one day when the chariots of fire pass through.” As Pavle fidgets
nervously, the crematorium director assures Pavle that there is no cause for panic and cryptically
opines that fire merely purifies. As he reassures him, the crematorium director keeps handing
apples, one by one, to the perplexed Pavle who struggles to hold onto the fruit. The only
character in the film unaffected by the odour, the crematorium director is a personification of the
more authoritative, moralistic and fearsome aspects of the Christian mythology: the myth of the
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Garden of Eden and the interventionist, vindictive God whose punishment cannot be escaped. As
the body continues to burn in the cremation oven, the man overwhelms Pavle with “forbidden
fruit,” symbolically suggesting that sins have been committed and that sinners are being
“purified” by fire. Ironically then, the overpowering odour appears to be produced by the burning
bodies of the citizens themselves. Not just an “empty signifier,” but an indexical sign, the odour
is the result of ongoing administration of punishment for the sin of destroying the Yugoslav
socialist “paradise.” The odour instills fear in the remaining citizens and inspires more
antagonism and discord, symbolically suggesting that instead of an Edenic future, a perpetual
hell awaits Yugoslavia.
Vlatko Gilić’s Backbone suggests that the economic crisis of the 1970s had somehow
eroded the psychological integrity of the citizens and, in turn, fundamentally altered
Yugoslavia’s identity. That change might have been difficult to define, and to experience it
might have felt somewhat like the uncanny—a vague sense of dread that the country was now
somehow different. The strange odour creates a sense of dissonance and displacement among the
citizens of Belgrade precisely because they do not know what it means. The film’s allegory
employs this uncertainty, which quickly transforms into aggression, to suggest that as the hope
for a better future is being extinguished, the Yugoslav society is becoming less nurturing and
more cutthroat. Worse yet, by depicting the foundational myths of Yugoslav socialism as having
no meaning symbolically suggests that Yugoslavia is now hardly a socialist country. The
mutually causal odour and suicides symbolize the economic crisis—the comeuppance for
entering into the global capitalist economy, for mismanaging the country’s economy and going
deep into debt, and, in effect, betraying the most fundamental socialist principles. Ultimately, the
film’s apocalyptic allegory implies that the future of Yugoslavia is grim. By depicting Pavle and
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his neighbours as insular and hostile to each other, Backbone predicts the country’s gradual
transformation from a unified community into a collection of antagonistic sub-communities,
soon to be in conflict.
The Quarantine: Variola Vera
Goran Marković’s atmospheric horror, Variola Vera, takes place in a Belgrade hospital
quarantined during an outbreak of the smallpox (Variola Vera in Latin). As panicked state
authorities scramble to contain the disease by enlisting the help of the UN and WHO,
professional and interpersonal relationships among the hospital staff quickly deteriorate, sending
the hospital into chaos. Although the outbreak is ultimately contained and the quarantine lifted,
the film’s somewhat ambiguous ending implies that the disease has not been dealt with
thoroughly and therefore remains a dormant threat. Although based on a true event—the 1972
outbreak of the smallpox in parts of the country—Variola Vera functions as an allegorical
depiction of Yugoslavia severely destabilized by the economic crisis. The outbreak allegorizes
the seemingly uncontainable economic crisis while the quarantine stands for the austerity
measures—the punitive and corrective action implemented after Yugoslavia became unable to
make loan payments. The involvement of the UN and WHO represents the meddling into
Yugoslav economy by holders of the Yugoslav debt like the World Bank and IMF who insisted
on the austerity measures. Allegorizing the manner in which the austerity measures unsettled the
country—exacerbated the political and constitutional crises, and promoted internal discord—the
quarantine causes festering resentments, old rivalries and antagonisms among the hospital staff
to blow up into open hostility while shameless self-interest comes out in full display. Much like
Yugoslavia’s unity and stability were eroded by the debt crisis and the austerity measures, the
film’s quarantined hospital is brought to the verge of collapse by the outbreak of smallpox.
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Within the first few minutes, Variola Vera spells out its view that Yugoslavia is fractured
and dysfunctional, and its leadership to blame for first creating and then exacerbating the
economic crisis by attempting to alleviate it with short term fixes like unfavourable foreign
loans. Shortly before the outbreak begins, the hospital heating system keeps breaking down and
it is up to the overworked furnace maintenance worker, Mile, to fix it. The moment one leaky
radiator is patched, another one starts gushing steam, prompting Mile to angrily exclaim:
“Everything in this hospital has gone to hell!” The state of disrepair of the hospital which
symbolizes Yugoslavia’s own economic (and otherwise) fragility goes beyond leaky radiators to
include lackadaisical hospital staff not up to the task of dealing with a serious crisis. Because of a
bureaucratic error, the hospital is unprepared to receive the still undiagnosed patient zero,
Redžepi. The barely conscious Redžepi is left slumped over in a chair in the hospital lobby and is
soon roaming hospital hallways, spreading the disease. Once Redžepi is officially admitted, he
remains undiagnosed, causing the disease to spread even further. Dr. Grujić, a nonchalant
womanizer, is in no rush to examine the new patient when urged to do so by his female
colleague, Dr. Uskoković. The hospital director, Cole, eventually misdiagnoses Redžepi as
having had an allergic reaction to penicillin. Redžepi’s case of smallpox remains undiscovered
and untreated for far too long, making an outbreak inevitable. The film’s allegory suggests that
Yugoslavia, like the hospital, “has gone to hell”—the unprofessionalism that allows the disease
to spread stands for the incompetence of the Yugoslav leadership which ultimately led to the
austerity measures.
Once Redžepi is diagnosed, the authorities scramble to formulate a response to the
outbreak. The film’s depiction of this response is a thinly veiled allusion to the ability of the
political elites to eschew the effects of austerity measures while ordinary citizens suffered. As
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the Minister of Health announces that Redžepi does indeed have smallpox, he fidgets nervously
and wipes his hands as if to cleanse them of the disease (and of the whole unpleasant matter).
After getting promptly vaccinated, he and other politicians leave the emergency meeting in a
hurry in their luxury Mercedes cars. The young expert in charge, Jovanović, quickly orders the
hospital quarantined and establishes a full information blockade in order to prevent “panic”
which could play into the hands of “the enemies of the country and of our self-management
system.” The police and special medical personnel quickly move into the area and establish a
perimeter around the hospital; the patients, nurses and doctors are assured by the authorities that
there is no cause for concern. The film’s depiction of the quarantine implementation at the
hospital whose staff and patients are about to suffer through a prolonged isolation while those
outside remain unaffected analogizes the way ordinary Yugoslavs were appeased while being
“sacrificed” to austerity by the political elites who largely escaped its consequences.
The film’s depiction of the acrimony and, ironically, lack of compassion among the
hospital staff allegorizes the inter-republican and regional divisions inflamed by the austerity
measures as well as the callous and apathetic attitudes of citizens who had to aggressively
compete for the available resources. After the hospital is given an insufficient supply of Gamma
Globulin, an immune system-boasting vaccine, the hospital director, Cole, hoards the supply in
his office and injects himself (unnecessarily) repeatedly while leaving others, even children,
without.201 The fear of being infected eventually renders Cole so paranoid that he locks himself
in his office and refuses any contact with others. Cole’s selfishness is a reference to the
stockpiling and price gouging that resulted from shortages of basic staples during the austerity
years. Cole’s abdication of his responsibilities as a leader fosters disorder and confusion within
201 Cole is not the only one to display such behaviour. One of the nurses steals morphine from hospital
supplies in order to feed her own addiction.
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the hospital to allude to the inter-republican squabbles over how to deal with austerity measures
which severely destabilized the country and produced a series of constitutional crises. Marković
makes it clear that the Gamma Globulin vaccines are imported from abroad, making them a
symbol of foreign loans on which Yugoslavia depended, and so suggesting that those loans are
the catalyst for the discord. Leaderless, the hospital soon descends into chaos as old grudges
among the stuff turn into new animosities. Symbolizing the country’s gradual splintering, the
hospital becomes divided between those who have come into contact with the infected and those
who have not, with floors designated accordingly and cordoned off. By depicting the quarantined
hospital as brought to the brink of collapse by the smallpox outbreak, Variola Vera symbolically
suggests that the defeatism and discord that austerity measures generated are taking the country
towards its demise.
The tensions among the hospital staff allegorize the Yugoslav ongoing identity crisis
caused by the ultimately doomed efforts to reconcile the entry into global capitalist economy
with ideals of socialism. Not surprisingly, this identity crisis peaked in the 1980s when citizen
discontent over the austerity measures seemed to translate into a pervasive tendency to re-
examine and reassess the country’s foundational myths established in World War II. Marković
focuses on the friction between Cole and Dr. Ćirić which, the film hints, has gone on for
decades, but whose source has always remained a mystery. As Cole’s paranoia sets in, he clashes
with Dr. Ćirić who reveals that Cole has a history of dastardly behaviour: he collaborated with
the Nazis (under torture) during the war which resulted in deaths of many of Dr. Ćirić’s
comrades. When the womanizing Dr. Grujić succumbs to his own demons, he gets drunk and
stumbles around the hospital cynically singing old Partisan songs. He bangs on Cole’s office
door and refers to the cowardly hospital director as a “sado-Marxist.” Dr. Grujić’s droll label for
135
Cole symbolically sums up the country’s predicament: Yugoslavia was being “disciplined” by
the West through a painful and humiliating intervention into its economy. When Cole finally
comes out of his office to wash, he is almost lynched by the staff and patients who wheel him
through the hallways on a gurney in a scene straight out of a slapstick comedy routine. He is cast
out of the hospital and taken away by the police like a common criminal. The film depicts Cole
as an imposturous authority figure mocked for being too cowardly to deal with a serious crisis.
This depiction symbolically hints that even the myths of the glorious revolutionary struggle were
viewed with cynicism as a direct result of dissatisfaction with incompetent leadership which,
having led the country into an economic crisis, was losing its political credibility.
The involvement by the UN and WHO in the efforts to contain the outbreak symbolically
represents the inherently condescending “disciplining” of Yugoslavia by the World Bank and
IMF via the imposition of tough austerity measures. At the request of the Yugoslav authorities,
the UN and WHO send an expert epidemiologist to Belgrade who tellingly sees the outbreak as
an archaic outburst of the primitive: “smallpox has been eradicated; no one concerns themselves
with it anymore.” These words allude to the Western fear of and a presumption of backwardness
of socialist societies. Marković’s emphasis throughout the film on the meticulous procedure of
disposal of the bodies of the deceased symbolically suggests that the main purpose of the
austerity was to prevent a “diseased” socialist economy from spreading to the West. The bodies
are wrapped in disinfectant-soaked sheets, placed into coffins which are welded shut before
being taken away. As the bedsheets and other objects the infected have come into contact with
are burned after the quarantine is lifted, someone pulls out of the fire a flute—one of the few
possessions Redžepi had with him when he was admitted to the hospital. The film concludes
with Jovanović smugly taking in the praise from the WHO for his efforts in “stopping a
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dangerous disease on the very edge of Europe” while holding in his hands Redžepi’s flute. The
film’s ironic (and open) ending symbolically implies that despite its attempts at compliance,
Yugoslavia is unlikely to fulfill the Western directive to reform its economy. In Jovanović’s
hands, Redžepi’s flute becomes an ominous symbol of Yugoslavia’s uncertain future.
The harrowing allegory of Variola Vera mirrors the dynamics of Yugoslavia’s descent
into instability in the 1980s when the failed attempts to integrate into global capitalist economy,
necessitated in part by the bullish Western drive to reform Yugoslavia via austerity measures,
finally took its toll. The atmosphere of enmity inside the hospital alludes to the general
disillusionment and increasing internal divisions exacerbated by the austerity. The hellish
hospital quarantine allegorizes particularly pointedly the ineptitude of the Yugoslav leaders and
their disregard for the hardships experienced by ordinary citizens through the depiction of the
hospital’s inability to deal with the smallpox outbreak because of a lack of professionalism and
an absence of genuine concern for the well-being of the patients among the staff. Ultimately, the
film’s allegory indicts the Yugoslav leaders for failing to anticipate that the country’s inability to
repay high-interested loans would result in punitive measures which, in turn, would lead to a
drastic loss of the standard of living for most of the citizens, cause internal friction, and put the
country on the road towards its ultimate demise.202
Dispossessed: In the Name of the People
The Yugoslav self-management system was conceptualized shortly after Tito’s break
with Stalin as an answer to the question of why “Stalinism was bad and Yugoslavia was
202 Worth noting is the film’s “inadvertent” allusion to the looming Kosovo problem which worsened in
unison with the economic crisis. Patient zero, Redžepi, is a Kosovo Albanian who contracts smallpox while on a
pilgrimage to Mecca. Remarkable because it is entirely factual, this element of the film’s story could not more
pointedly hint at the Serbian anxieties and paranoia about what they perceived as an encroachment on their territory
by the Muslim Albanians.
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good.”203 It was to be an anti-bureaucratic framework within which “immediate producers,
through free association, would themselves make the decisions regarding production and
distribution.”204 Getting the workers “to take command of the ownership of production and to
become the real and not merely the proclaimed guide and monitor of the process of work,
production, and decision-making,” however, was easier said than done.205 Direct involvement of
the workers in the decision-making process was often hampered by their lack of in-depth
knowledge of the rather complicated system and, ironically, by the failure to follow the
collectivist spirit of the concept meant to curb narrow self-interest. The Yugoslav system also
allowed for the economy to be guided (to a degree) by the market forces and for managers to
have substantial control over how the factories were run. Personal accountability of workers and
managers for the financial liability of companies, however, was only vaguely defined and
consequently almost completely absent in practice.206 The difficulties with the self-management
system made it the subject of scorn by both the forces of economic liberalization and overall
decentralization who saw it as hopelessly inefficient and preferred a fully capitalist market
economy model, and by the conservative forces which advocated recentralization and even a
return to a Soviet-style state controlled economy. The 1966 fall of Aleksandar Ranković, the
head of the UDBA and an ardent supporter of centralization and planned economy, following
203 Djilas, The Unperfect Society, 220.
204 Ibid.
205 Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 105.
206 Firms were kept afloat by heavy borrowing; the managers were able to keep their positions secure
(avoid being sacked by the workers) simply by keeping the wages high. Any grossly underperforming company was
usually bailed out by the government. See Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 109.
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allegations of spying on several major political figures, seemed to signal that the liberal trends
were prevailing.207
This ongoing conflict between the liberal and conservative forces implied that the
opposition between Titoism and Stalinism remained, however obliquely, a feature of the
country’s political life. In the Name of the People employs this opposition—the dichotomy
between the Yugoslav and Soviet models, especially highlighted during the Ranković affair—as
it examines the lives of ordinary workers navigating the labyrinthine self-management system as
the political scandal unfolds far “above” them. The film takes place in a working class
community in Montenegro in 1966 and revolves around Milutin, the guileless and unambitious
personal driver for the manager of a prosperous factory. Milutin’s life turns into a Kafkaesque
nightmare when his boss, Todor, is falsely imprisoned by the crooked police chief Maksim,
causing Milutin to lose his job, his wife and his home. Once the Ranković affair breaks out, it
reverberates through the lower echelons of police structures and Maksim and his clique are
exposed. As if by magic, Milutin’s old life is restored, but he is driven to near madness when
everyone around him pretends nothing out of the ordinary had happened.
Nikolić’s film’s examines the Ranković affair from a distance of two decades yet offers a
comprehensive insight into the totality of the social and political climate surrounding the scandal
by depicting one man’s fate and experiences in the turmoil of a sudden ideological turn.
Discussing the “authenticity” of films dealing with historical topics, Natalie Zemon Davis
suggests that “the credibility and genuine historicity” of such films is often propped up not by
207 John Lampe notes the correlation when he points out that until 1966, “Rankovic’s security apparatus
could still exert central control that bears comparison to counterparts in the Soviet bloc,” but “the market mechanism
was being welcomed as Rankovic was abruptly forced out for abusing his special powers.” Lampe, Yugoslavia as
History, 265. Bogdan Denitch does as well when he makes the connection between Ranković’s sacking and the
process of decentralization: “The elimination of the political police as a force in the political system and economy
has been followed by attempts to reach a new equilibrium between the republics and the federal center.” Denitch,
The Legitimation, 129.
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detailed reconstruction of the past (actual locations, exact nuances of behaviour and iconography,
authentic period dress, everyday objects, furniture, or architecture) but by the ways sociopolitical
dynamics of the past are reconstructed via associations created through characterization,
symbolism or analogy.208 This is precisely the approach taken by Nikolić in his attempt to
capture the zeitgeist of the era. The apolitical, business-oriented Todor stands for the liberal
Yugoslav model while Maksim, who runs a private jail whose inmates are made to work as
labourers and who keeps under surveillance local officials whom he routinely blackmails, stands
for the conservative Soviet model. Milutin’s nightmarish experience then is indicative of the
insignificance of the working class, symbolically tossed around by the tug-of-war between the
liberal and conservative forces. Milutin’s docility and naiveté—his faith that the system will not
betray him—allude to the near-complete disenfranchisement of the Yugoslav working class
whose members remain unfamiliar with the finer points of the system and therefore unable to
take control of it and affect any change that would benefit them.
The microcosm of the small Montenegrin town stands for Yugoslavia as a society still
run by hardline authoritarians who curb reforms, routinely abuse their power, and care little
about the interests of the working class. The bullish behaviour and privileges enjoyed by Maksim
and his chief collaborator, the mayor, epitomize the grip on power by conservative hardliners
like Aleksandar Ranković.209 When Maksim and the mayor decide to go fishing on the local
lake, the entire area is blocked off by the police and locals are prevented from passing through
because they might “scare the fish.” Maksim’s and the mayor’s actions mirror not just
208 Zemon Davis, “’Any Resemblance to Persons Living or Dead’,” 17-20.
209 Makism’s abuses of power closely mirror those of Ranković. It was alleged that Ranković had installed
listening devices into telephones of many of the major figures in the Yugoslav leadership, that he worked to
discredit any politicians critical of the UDBA, that he controlled black market influx of goods into the country, that
he forced prisoners to work as free labourers building houses for the UDBA officials. See Glenny, The Balkans, 582.
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Ranković’s hardline policing methods, but also his opposition to liberalization of the economy.
When Todor is recognized for his effective management of the local factory at a special
ceremony, Maksim seethes with anger at the public acknowledgement of the success of the
liberal economic model. Alluding to the conservative resistance to the country’s gradual turn in
the 1960s towards a Western-style economy, the film shows how staunch hardliners react when
one enterprising individual—rather than the entire collective—is credited with bettering the
community.210
Upon hearing Todor promise to the community a prosperous future, Maksim mutters:
“Prosperity—the last thing I need.” As the children’s choir sings about the glory of work and
Todor announces his upcoming business trip to Kinshasa, “after which this city will turn a new
page,” Maksim and the mayor begin to plot Todor’s downfall. An anachronistic vestige of the
brief Stalinist era, Maksim is rightfully afraid of becoming obsolete. Maksim’s criminalization of
Todor’s “liberal” initiative is rooted in the fear that his hardline approach to policing that seeks
to eliminate both actual and imagined ideological enemies would become more difficult, if not
impossible to administer once “prosperity” and more liberal attitudes come.211 While Todor is in
Kinshasa, Maksim arrests Milutin at a local strip club on charges of deviance; as soon as Todor
returns from Kinshasa with a lucrative contract, Maksim arrests him as well on charges of
introducing Milutin to “foreign ways.” The phrasing of both charges is highly symbolic,
conveying the conservative view that liberal reforms are but imported deviations from socialism.
210 Todor’s success is a result of the kind of reform that tolerates individual managerial initiative—precisely
the kind of dynamic Ranković detested. Ranković routinely curbed “practical moves towards reform, resulting in the
continued stagnation of the economy,” and in erosion of the self-management system which sought new ways—
even those somewhat counter to its spirit—to increase productivity and benefit the workers. Glenny, The Balkans,
581.
211 Summarizing the conservatives’ fear of liberalization, Maksim only half-jokingly tells the mayor that if
it was up to him, there would be no pesky civilians at all, only the police.
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In the Name of the People suggest that the state oppression has rendered the working
class fractious, politically powerless, and, most strikingly, as susceptible to corruption as the
politicians. The film depicts the working class men and women living in near-poverty, divided,
and fearful of the state. The workers and their families live in decidedly “unsocialist” conditions
in a decrepit shanty town. The shanty town is frequently raided by Maksim and his associates
who arrest local men on fabricated charges and then coerce their wives into sex in exchange for
the men’s prison privileges. In the film’s opening sequence, as Maksim’s men enter the shanty
town, everyone scatters upon hearing the sound of the approaching motorcycles. The shanty
town—a microcosm of Yugoslavia’s working class—accepts the gross abuse of authority by
agents of the state. The working class has learned its “proper” place in the pecking order: rather
than self-managing, it submits to being managed. Maksim expertly keeps the shanty town
community internally divided. Everyone lives in fear of Maksim’s informants who possess
special privileges. Milutin’s wife, Mira, routinely cuts in line for the communal bathroom
without any objections from others because she is involved in Maksim’s blackmailing scheme
and also works to gather information about Todor through Milutin.212 The shrewd and pragmatic
Mira often chastises Milutin for refusing to himself become Maksim’s informant because she
understands that unscrupulous ambition is the only way to thrive.213 Even the priest dutifully
212 Mira’s privileges depend on being able to smooth-talk the wives of falsely arrested men into sleeping
with Maksim. When her neighbour Krstinja’s fiancé Radoje gets arrested, Mira promises to the girl that she would
“take care of it.” Mira sends Krstinja, still a virgin and therefore special, to Maksim who rapes her. Implying a
deeply ingrained culture of abuse of power, Maksim’s method of arrest-and-rape is condoned by his staff. Upon
hearing Krstinja’s screams coming from Maksim’s office, the policemen outside order prisoners to sing in order to
drown out the girl’s screams.
213 Once Maksim decides to frame Todor, he insists Milutin report to him on his boss’ activities, but the
ever-loyal Milutin still cannot bring himself to do it. Afraid of losing her privileges if her husband does not
cooperate with Maksim, Mira concocts a truth serum meant to make Milutin answer pointedly asked questions in his
sleep, but comically, and to Mira’s dismay, Milutin just mumbles incomprehensibly. Milutin’s virtues, of course,
contrast, and therefore serve to highlight, the culture of corruption and dishonesty that pervades the whole of the
society.
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passes information to Maksim as to who celebrates religious holidays and baptizes their children
in secret. The film implies that the working class—the supposed backbone of the Yugoslav
society—possesses no political agency because it is manipulated and tightly controlled by the
state which it implicitly fears.
Nikolić employs the motifs of family and home to suggest that rather than being in
control, the working class is at the mercy of “reforms” initiated by the state. The repercussions of
Todor’s demise quickly trickle down to Milutin. Todor’s wife, Marika, and their children end up
on the street and must move in with Milutin and Mira.214 Soon, Milutin has to switch jobs with
Gavrilo, the driver of the septic tank cleaning cistern known in the shanty town as the “shit
truck.” Gavrilo goads the dejected Milutin: “It is our time now.” The remark mockingly refers to
the kind of cadre changes initiated by ideological adjustments from above which often adversely
affected the working class. The moment Milutin’s white Mercedes is replaced with the “shit
truck,” Mira’s privileges disappear, too. She is laughed away when she tries to cut in line at the
communal bathroom. Having no use for her as Milutin’s wife, Maksim instructs Mira to move in
with Gavrilo in order to gather information on the new factory manager. (When Mira tearfully
pleads with Maksim, “Don’t I have a soul?”, he tersely tells her that even her soul works for the
state.) After Mira leaves to move in with Gavrilo, Milutin and Marika are kicked out of the house
by Maksim’s men. The two quickly build a new house, but Maksim sends a demolition crew to
take it down. Upon seeing the empty lot, Milutin can only ask his neighbour in disbelief: “Did
214 Nikolić emphasizes that class divide very much exists in a supposedly classless society. Although decent
people who seem to care for the community, Marika and Todor enjoy the benefits of being part of the managerial
class. Their domestic life differs sharply from that of the workers: Marika spends her time teaching their children to
play the piano while the maid does house work. In contrast, the workers’ children run around dirt roads, unwashed
and in rags. Marika and the children get a taste of precisely this predicament when their house is taken away and
they have to move in with Milutin and Mira. Nikolić shows just how deep the class divide is in the sequence in
which Marika has to use the communal shower where other workers’ wives cruelly laugh at her on account of the
irony inherent in the reversal of fortune she is experiencing.
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not my house use to stand here?” The demolition of Milutin’s house symbolically suggests that
socialist Yugoslavia—the “home” of the working class—has been dismantled.
The film’s third act explicitly refers to the fall of Ranković and implies the existence of a
culture of abuse of power within security structures, orchestrated by hardliners who simply
adapted to the “reforms.” Nikolić focuses on Maksim’s panicked reaction when the news breaks
that Ranković is being forced into retirement following an investigation into allegations of
widespread abuse of power, including wiretapping of state officials. Realizing that a purge is
about to take place that will sweep others in the security apparatus suspected of abusing their
powers, Maksim orders released all inmates held in his private jail, “even the husbands.”215 Once
again, everyone’s lives are turned upside down by “reforms,” yet the fear of authoritarian figures
is so pervasive that almost no one in the community is willing to confront Maksim and the
mayor. Having “forgotten” about the months he spent doing forced labour on Maksim’s pet
construction projects, Todor gets his job, his wife and his house back. His “amnesia” spares him
the public embarrassment, but it also exculpates the criminal duo and helps whitewash their
crimes. At a welcome back ceremony at the factory, Todor simply tells the gathered workers that
his long absence was caused by prolonged business negotiations in Kinshasa. Rushing to
accommodate Todor’s sudden return, Maksim’s men drag the confused interim factory manager
out of bed in the middle of the night and tell him that he is now “headed to Kinshasa.” Milutin,
too, gets his job, his wife and his house back—the white Mercedes and Mira magically reappear
in front of the house as if nothing unusual at all had happened.216 Milutin, however, cannot
215 As the investigation picks up steam, the mayor distances himself from Maksim once it is revealed that
he has been sleeping with Maksim’s wife, and that their romps have been captured on film—by Maksim’s own men.
This bit of poetic justice is a reference to the bombastic but never substantiated rumour that Ranković had bugged
Tito’s bedroom.
216 Even Krstinja and her fiancé Radoje are there, smiling as Mira reassures them: “Well, as you can see, I
have got you two back together as promised.”
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accept this “Edenic” ending and angrily insists that Todor admit he had been “in prison!” Todor,
however, insists he was “in Kinshasa!” Driven to the edge of sanity by this collective willful
amnesia, Milutin tries to strangle Todor and gets swiftly thrown out of the factory like a common
criminal. In the film’s final shot, Milutin walks away from the factory gates a ruined man. The
film’s devastatingly pessimistic ending, especially the farcical denial of justice and truth,
suggests a persistent and tacitly condoned culture of criminal abuse of power that made a
mockery of the workers’ self-management system.
Natalie Zemon Davis points out that a film can embody a historical period through
“personalities and relationships” that are “informed by” the “values and sensibilities” of the time
depicted.217 The film’s depiction of the sociopolitical climate of the 1960s Yugoslavia is
informed by precisely this method, yet it is germane not just to the 1960s but also to the film’s
present—more than two decades after the events portrayed. Although Maksim’s and the mayor’s
fear of Todor and his promises of “prosperity” analogizes the source of the conflict between the
conservatives and liberals that boiled over in 1966, In the Name of the People is less about the
Ranković affair itself and more about the continuing erosion of the most important aspect of the
Yugoslav Dream: the workers’ self-management system. The microcosm of the small-town
Montenegro in Nikolić’s film stands for Yugoslavia as a thoroughly undemocratic society in
which the corrupt political elites are the only agents of change. Only nominally in charge, the
working class men and women are casualties of the ideological “reforms” instituted by the elites.
By depicting Todor’s downfall and restoration as events outside of the control of the workers yet
with repercussions for many of them, the film suggests that the working class is situated at the
very bottom of the power hierarchy in a state supposedly governed by them. Ironically, the
217 Zemon Davis, “’Any Resemblance to Persons Living or Dead’,” 21.
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working class even mimics the behavior of the elites and maintains its own culture of corruption
and greed. Working class solidarity is curtailed by backstabbing and maliciousness borne out of
narrow minded self-interest and fear, ultimately preventing the working class from attaining
political agency and affirmation. At its conclusion, the film explicitly points to the officially
sanctioned disregard for justice which makes an incorruptible working man into a villain to be
coldly discarded by the system, suggesting that for the working class, the Yugoslav Dream is
little more than a nightmare of unfulfilled promises and wasted potential.
The Fourth Shift: The Dream About a Rose
Zoran Tadić’s The Dream About a Rose focuses on a foundry worker struggling to feed
his family in the glum city of Zagreb in the 1980s. While walking home from work late at night,
Valent comes across the immediate aftermath of a deal-gone-bad between smugglers of
uninspected meat and their accomplice, the local butcher named Laci. Observed from the
shadows by the butcher who had just gunned down two of the smugglers, Valent disappears into
the night with a bag of money he found lying in the street, initiating his own harrowing ordeal.
Pressured by the gangsters to deliver the money, Laci tries to tactfully approach the cautious
Valent, but when Laci is arrested, Valent becomes the sole target of the criminals determined to
recover the money. In the film’s both redemptive and apocalyptic ending, Valent kills the
gangsters after they threaten the safety of his family. Tadić’s combination of the stylistic idioms
of the American film noir of the 1940s and 1950s and the theme of the working man’s struggle
for survival in Yugoslavia of the 1980s forms a scathing critique of a society that has lost its
way. The post-World War II malaise, the spectral presence in and behind American film noir, is
replaced here with the late Yugoslav blues—the economic crisis exacerbating the pervasive
disillusionment in a dysfunctional society on the verge of collapse. Paul Schrader suggests that
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film noir tends to feature characters whose troubles stand for those faced by individuals
“returning to peacetime economy” to depict a society “less than worth fighting for.”218 Similarly,
in Tadić’s film, the travails of Valent and his family serve to depict a major change faced by the
working class: the disappearance of the special status it once (more-less) had. In Tadić’s Yugo
noir, the corruption of Yugoslavia’s socialist ideals has produced a nightmarish milieu in which
those meant to be the pillar of the society trudge on in near-poverty, anxious about the future.
Paul Schrader points out that an essential film noir theme is “a fear of the future,” usually
manifested through the main character’s alienation, insecurity, confused priorities, and self-
doubt.219 The Dream About a Rose conveys the same theme via its main character. Part of
Valent’s routine is to stop by the butcher shop late at night on his way home from work and to
masochistically ogle the cuts of meat he can no longer afford. This obsessive routine, focused on
the eponymous veal steak, “the Rose,” highlights Valent’s inability to provide for his family.220
Humbled by his circumstances, Valent is morose, abrupt, and cantankerous. “Prepare something
without meat,” he suggests curtly when his wife, Ljuba, is unable to plan the next meal. Valent’s
“solution” symbolically points to a future of hardship and deprivation. The family’s catastrophic
financial situation has substituted harmony with pervasive anxiety about the future. Schrader
suggests that the typical “noir hero dreads to look ahead, but instead tries to survive by the day,
and if unsuccessful at that, he retreats to the past.”221 Valent, too, is fearful of what lies ahead
218 Paul Schrader, “Notes on Film Noir,” in Film Noir Reader, 5th ed., eds. Alain Silver and James Ursini
(New York: Limelight Editions, 1999), 55.
219 Ibid., 58.
220 Like a proper noir character, Valent has a secret obsession; in a whimsical deviation from the film noir
trope, it is not with a femme fatale but with a cut of meat bearing a woman’s name. That Valent’s “dates” with Rose
are a nocturnal activity implies a degree shame associated with his obsession and, in turn, with his inability to be a
provider.
221 Schrader, “Notes on Film Noir,” 58.
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and seems to occasionally default to the past because he cannot see a dignified way forward.
When Ljuba tells him about a union drive to provide clothing at reduced prices to workers,
Valent is hesitant to pursue the opportunity because accepting assistance is likely to make him
feel ashamed and inadequate. Although hardly able to feed his family, Valent does not hesitate to
lend money to a co-worker in dire need. Valent’s desire to remain proud and generous even if at
the expense of his family’s well-being suggests that he has still not mentally crossed the chasm
between the prosperous past and impoverished present. Valent’s inability to adjust to the new
reality causes him to be confused about his priorities and to make irrational decisions. Alienated
from his family, Valent gradually steps into the archetypally noir, impossible-to-maintain state of
duality in which an honest man begins to contemplate crime.
The physical environment of film noir typically consists of shadowy streets and dingy
rooms with low ceilings where low-key lighting struggles to illuminate the main character as he
makes his wrong move and then descends into a nightmare.222 The urban nightmare of film noir
gets its stylistic counterpart in Rose: Valent routinely walks the Zagreb streets at night and lives
with his family in a dilapidated rented apartment where shadows and cigarette smoke obscure his
dour face. As Paul Schrader points out, film noir characters are “often hidden in the realistic
tableau of the city at night,” creating a “fatalistic, hopeless mood.”223 Valent’s walking route is a
maze of corridors lit only by shop windows and nothing except the sound of his own footsteps
distinguishes Valent from his surroundings. This darkness through which Valent walks
symbolizes the new set of sociopolitical conditions within which he cannot remain himself. As
most film noir characters must, Valent relinquishes control of his life to this overwhelming
222 For a succinct summary of the noir style, see Schrader, “Notes on Film Noir,” 57-58.
223 Ibid. 57.
148
darkness which breeds criminality. As shots ring out in the night, a pistol—presumably discarded
by Laci—slides out from the shadows and comes to a halt right in front of Valent. The pistol and
the bag of money bait Valent and facilitate his descent into the nightmare. The moment he
disappears into the darkness with both, Valent enters that harrowing state of duality typical of
film noir characters: he is now an honest man and a criminal, innocent and guilty. Haunted by
nightmares, Valent becomes increasingly paranoid. Schrader suggests that the stylistic
exaggeration of film noir is utilized to depict inner turmoil and unstable psychological states, by
“directing unnatural and expressionistic lighting onto realistic settings.”224 Tadić externalizes
Valent’s torment through typically film noir distortion of his everyday surroundings. Mysterious
dark shadows seem to follow Valent and even the friendly neighbourhood policemen are now
menacing figures lurking in the night. Valent’s guilt and paranoia transform the ordinary into
menacing. His Zagreb neighbourhood becomes so antagonistic and oppressive that Valent starts
carrying the pistol he found at the scene of the killings.
Defining the genre’s fatalistic mood in a single sentence, Al, the miserable protagonist of
Edgar G. Ulmer’s Detour (1945), asserts: “Someday fate, or some mysterious force, can put the
finger on you or me for no reason at all.” Although Al’s troubles with the law can ostensibly be
blamed on fate or bad luck, Ulmer’s film—like most noirs—implies, however obliquely, that the
hero’s misfortune is a result of some fundamental flaw of the society. Tadić is specific as to why
Valent finds himself in the downward spiral of crime. Valent comes across the abandoned bag of
money not by mere chance but because he must walk the streets at night—when criminals
operate and honest people sleep—on his way home from the “fourth shift.” As he explains to the
policeman who questions him about his nocturnal activities a few nights after the incident, the
224 Schrader, “Notes on Film Noir,” 56.
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work at the foundry is so hard that the men are unable to last eight hours—they can only manage
six and so must work in four six-hour shifts rather than in three eight-hour shifts. Valent’s
explanation implies that the Yugoslav socialist system is a travesty if a man who works that hard
still cannot provide for his family. The failures of the state necessitate that Valent work extra
hard and, in turn, facilitate his involvement in crime. The darkness finds Valent, not the other
way around. Facing an uncertain future, Valent gives in to the lure of easy money. In Rose, the
working class turns to crime because it has been betrayed by the socialist system.
In film noir, criminal guilt tends to be unstable and shifts from person to person until it
settles on the vulnerable, naïve, unlucky, but usually innocent man.225 Similarly, in Rose, the
culpability for the murders of two smugglers and for the disappearance of the money becomes a
matter of perspective. A few days after the incident, Valent walks into Laci’s shop to purchase
meat—something his meager pay has not allowed him to do in a long time. Fearing the
smugglers’ reprisal, Laci sees an opportunity to discreetly approach Valent and cryptically asks
whether they had met before “under some unfortunate circumstances.” Valent is genuinely
puzzled by Laci’s question, yet, as if to admit guilt, changes his order and spends even more
money. As he gets more concerned for his own safety, Laci’s approaches become less cryptic
until he finally shows up at Velent’s door. Holding a bagful of “free of charge” meat as a token
of good will, Laci begins to spell it out: “You know we are accomplices of sorts…I speak for the
people to whom the money belongs.” Although he interrupts Laci and angrily dismisses his
attempts to reach out— “I’m not sure about you, but I’m an honest man!”—Valent finally
realizes that the butcher knows what happened that night. Critically, however, Laci proposes a
225 Filmmakers Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol discuss a variation of this trope, which they term
“exchange of guilt,” in the context of Hitchcock’s films in Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol, Hitchcock: The First
Forty-Four Films, trans. Stanley Hochman (1957; repr., Brighton: Roundhouse Publishing, 1992), 95.
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different perspective which implies that the culpability for the nightmare they are both
experiencing rests with neither of the two men. Laci tells Valent that the two of them are ”on the
same side” and assures him: “Those who are behind all this should be blamed. Those far away
from you and me.” Pointing to “The Valley of Flowers,” the local bar from which the smugglers
operate, Laci adds: “And far from those in there.” Laci’s stress on “those far away”
unmistakeably refers to the state itself, and “all this,” to the catastrophic economic conditions in
which working men must resort to crime to survive. Laci suggests that there should be solidarity
between foundry workers and butchers in opposition to the degenerated socialist state, and
implies that even gangsters are just symptoms of a broader societal dysfunction for which the
state itself is culpable.226 In Rose, the fluid nature of guilt serves as a metaphor for the radical
changes in the Yugoslav society which obscure distinctions between right and wrong. What is
ultimately criminal then is the state’s betrayal of socialist ideals which has produced a new
Yugoslav reality in which gangsters thrive while honest men work “the fourth shift.”
This abominable inversion of socialist values eventually drives Valent to violently lash
out at the gangsters in the film’s apocalyptic ending. First, he gets drunk with a friend at “The
Valley of Flowers” and loudly denounces the gangsters, sitting nearby, who “see more money at
the poker table in one night than both of us have seen in our lives!” The gangsters promptly
throw the stumbling-drunk Valent out into the cold night. The next day, defiant Valent goes to
Laci’s shop and buys five pounds of veal steak, causing other customers to stare in shock at his
ability to afford such a purchase. That evening, the family dinner is a feast; the kids gorge, Ljuba
grins, and Valent observes them all as he puffs on a cigarette. Irritated by his insolence, the
226 The corruption of socialist ideals is further implied when Valent recognizes the police inspector
investigating the murders as a regular at “The Valley of Flowers,” where he cavorts with the smugglers. As is typical
for the world of film noir, no clear-cut distinction separates those who break the law and those who serve it.
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gangsters take Valent to “The Valley of Flowers” where they rough him up and threaten to hurt
his family if does not give the money back. In a fit of rage, Valent shoots the gangsters with the
pistol Laci slid in front of his feet the night their paths crossed and silently walks away.
Somewhat prophetically, the film’s ending suggests that a fundamentally unjust society is
unsustainable and is likely to soon reach a breaking point and violently collapse.
The typically film noir “mood of cynicism, pessimism, and darkness” finds its equivalent
in The Dream About a Rose, but with the genre’s specifically American sociopolitical concerns
replaced with corresponding ones from the Yugoslav context.227 Valent’s nightmare is a direct
result of his drastically diminished economic status and is therefore symptomatic of the
predicament of majority of the working class Yugoslavs who struggled in the 1980s to make
ends meet. The quintessential film noir themes like detachment, psychic disintegration, duality,
paranoia, and corruption are also found in Rose and, as in film noir, strengthen the film’s
indictment of the state by graphically illustrating the effects of its flaws.228 Tadić populates his
film’s seedy urban milieu with despairing working class characters trying to navigate a society in
which the rules and values of yesterday no longer apply. The Dream About a Rose places the
culpability for this predicament—the failure to maintain a just socialist society—squarely on the
state and absolves the working class of responsibility for its actions, however unlawful. In the
Yugoslavia of Tadić’s film, a working man must become a criminal in order to afford “the
Rose.” That the money belonging to smugglers of meat would end up in the hands of just such a
man then is not a crime but poetic justice.
227 Schrader, “Notes on Film Noir,” 53. (only the phrase “mood of cynicism, pessimism, and darkness”)
228 Ibid., 58-61. (only the film noir themes outlined)
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“If the Bosnians Didn’t Exist, We Would Have to Invent Them”: Rams and Mammoths
Not surprisingly, the economic crisis of the 1980s was felt more acutely in the less
developed republics. The west weathered the storm considerably more comfortably than the east.
This imbalance was part of the legacy of Yugoslavia’s regionally uneven economic
development—itself part of the legacy of centuries of foreign imperialism.229 The consequences
of past colonial subjugation now manifested themselves in the form of a clear division between
the former Habsburg imperial possessions and those of the Ottomans. The Ottoman and
Habsburg dominions divided what later became Yugoslavia along a pseudo-civilizational fault
line which nevertheless had tangible implications to the country’s subsequent industrial and
economic development. Slovenia and Croatia “benefited” from having been colonized by a
Western European industrialized power. Slovenia managed to build an almost Western
economy—competitive, and consumer demand oriented. The formerly Ottoman parts of the
country badly lagged behind.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Slovenia became a magnet for migrant workers, especially those
from Bosnia and Herzegovina where the trend of seeking employment away from home was
more prevalent than elsewhere in Yugoslavia.230 Perceived by the Slovenians as culturally
“different,” these mostly unskilled labourers found themselves on the margins of Slovenia’s
pseudo-Western society and were pejoratively referred to as the “southerners.”231 As the
austerity measures took hold, Slovenia gradually began to dissociate itself from the rest of
229 For more on this regional imbalance, see Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 261-309.
230 Silva Mežnarić, “Bosanci”: A kuda idu Slovenci nedeljom? (Beograd: Filip Visnjić, 1986), 55-64. For a
thorough sociological analysis of patterns of migration in Yugoslavia, see Silva Mežnarić, Osvajanje prostora—
Prekrivanje vremena: Migracije umjesto razvoja (Zagreb: Sociološko društvo Hrvatske, 1991).
231 Ibid., 77.
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Yugoslavia both economically and politically, most strikingly by not abiding by the austerity
guidelines. Thinking itself sufficiently Western, Slovenia resented its association with
“Ottoman” parts of the country, became reluctant to contribute to the federal budget, vehemently
opposed any form of centralization, and instituted a hiring freeze for migrant workers.232 Susan
Woodward suggests that the reasoning behind the decision to stop hiring migrants was twofold:
“cultural—fearing the loss of Slovene national distinctiveness and cultural identity if any more
southerners arrived—and also economic—calculating that the cost of additional housing, social
benefits, and other infrastructure would begin to eat into Slovene standards of living.”233
Depicting the experiences of Bosnian migrant workers in Slovenia in three narrative
threads, Filip Robar-Dorin’s Rams and Mammoths deals precisely with this “cultural” and
“economic” prejudice which saw the migrant workers as backward “southerners” whose
presence in Slovenia is no longer tolerable. The film examines the consequences on the migrant
workers of the Slovenians’ perception of themselves as geographically, economically and
culturally Western, at least relative to the rest of the country. Robar-Dorin’s film is perhaps the
only cinematic illustration of this curious manifestation of Balkanism which Milica Bakić-
Hayden calls “nesting Orientalism.” She points out that “while Europe as a whole has disparaged
not only the orient ‘proper’ but also the parts of Europe that were under oriental Ottoman rule,
Yugoslavs who reside in areas that were formerly the Habsburg monarchy distinguish
themselves from those in areas formerly ruled by the Ottoman Empire, hence ‘improper.’234 In
232 On whom it had depended previously because it was losing its own skilled labourers to the West and
had to replace them with those from Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Woodward, Socialist Unemployment,
296.
233 Woodward goes on to say: “Slovene policymakers preferred to ignore federal wage controls and allow
wages to rise in order to entice back highly skilled Slovene workers and professionals who were working abroad,
particularly in Austria, for better incomes.” Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 64.
234 Milica Bakić-Hayden “The Nesting Orientalisms,” 922.
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the film, the stigma of “Balkanness”—a marker of distance from the Western ideal which
dictates that, however marginally, east is always more “Balkan” than west—becomes an agent of
destruction of the mythical “Brotherhood and Unity.” Its first victim is the working class.
One of the film’s narrative threads follows Huso, an affable, plain-spoken Bosnian
worker who arrives in Ljubljana only to encounter strong and puzzling enmity in his interactions
with Slovenians. Frustrated by systemic discrimination against migrant workers in their own
country, dispirited, but indignant Huso dies alone on a Ljubljana street. The second narrative
thread follows Slavko, a young Bosnian attending a vocational school in Velenje to become a
miner—part of Slovenia’s future work force. Almost antithetical to Huso’s jovial, easygoing
roughneck, the intellectual Slavko spends his days contemplating his failed attempts to integrate
Slovenia into his perception of homeland, eventually coming to the disheartening conclusion that
Slovenian exceptionalism now trumps the all-encompassing Yugoslav identity. The third
narrative thread follows Marko, a Slovenian vigilante with a pathological hatred of the
“southerners” who attacks unsuspecting migrant workers after luring them into bar washrooms
with a promise of casual sex. Following his arrest, Marko is “rehabilitated” by mental health
experts, but shunned by the migrant community when he tries to make amends.
Rams and Mammoths fuses minimally dramatized fiction which mimics the observational
documentary style of cinéma vérité with actually documentary sequences reminiscent of direct
cinema’s attempts at ontological objectivity. As it explores both private and public spaces of the
workers’ marginal existence—dorm rooms, showers, washrooms stalls, bars, dance halls—the
film offers a variant of what Robert Daudelin terms, examining the style of Canadian auteurs
emerging in the 1960s who utilized documentary aesthetics, a “marriage of the direct and
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fiction.”235 Discussing the same subject, Michel Euvrard and Pierre Véronneau describe the
aesthetic simply as combining “traditional methods (scenario, actors, etc.) with direct
methods.”236 Robar-Dorin employs this aesthetic to stage the film’s somewhat Brechtian
engagement with the migrant workers. Huso, Slavko, and Marko are played by professional
actors, but they mostly interact with what appear to be actual migrant workers and state
bureaucrats playing themselves, giving the interactions an improvisational quality and an air of
unrefined authenticity. It is precisely in the sequences combining the “traditional” and the
“direct” that Robar-Dorin gives the migrant workers the opportunity to be themselves (be
“direct”), and to discuss with raw honesty their authentic experiences in Slovenia. Robar-Dorin
facilitates conversations among migrant workers about the ways Slovenians’ discrimination
functions in practice. This, in turn, speaks to other migrant workers who might recognize their
own experiences while watching the film, and so encourages further conversation on the subject,
in effect facilitating political engagement with one’s environment.
In one sequence combining the “traditional” and “direct,” Robar-Dorin shows the migrant
workers to be without political agency, yet not without the astuteness to assess their predicament
and perhaps even possessing the ability to inspire dialogue on the topic of anti-migrant
sentiments in Slovenia among the workers watching the film. The sequence depicts Huso and his
gruff friends gathered in a dorm room after a day’s work, listening to music on the radio,
drinking, making lewd jokes. Gradually, however, the mood shifts and the sequence becomes a
platform for the workers to discuss the Slovenians’ prejudice against them. The discussion is
235 Robert Daudelin, “The Encounter between Fiction and the Direct Cinema,” in Self-Portrait: Essays on
Canadian and Quebec Cinemas, trans. Marie-Claude Hecquet and Antoinette Vidal, eds. Pierre Véronneau and Piers
Handling (Ottawa: Canadian Film Institute, 1980), 106.
236 Michel Euvrard and Pierre Véronneau, “Direct Cinema,” in Self-Portrait: Essays on Canadian and
Quebec Cinemas, trans. Marie-Claude Hecquet and Antoinette Vidal, eds. Pierre Véronneau and Piers Handling
(Ottawa: Canadian Film Institute, 1980), 82.
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prompted by a radio program featuring a politician who praises the virtues of Slovenian
nationalism, insisting that the Slovenians are “closer to Europe” and better able to uphold
European values than the “Balkanites.” Recognizing himself as the villain of the politician’s
narrative, Huso asks for the radio to be turned off and so prompts a “spontaneous” dialogue
among the workers about what they had just heard. Gathering around a table, the workers begin
to ask pointed questions about their treatment by the Slovenian state apparatus. One worker asks
why the Bosnians and other outsiders are watched by the police more closely than anyone else in
Ljubljana. Another alludes to the Slovenians’ persistent tendency, and a seemingly uncanny
ability, to identify outsiders: “They know we are Bosnians as soon as they look at us.” Huso’s
own flippant conclusion to the discussion is both humorous and insightful: “We are not Europe?
Who is then? Who killed Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo!?” Alluding to Austria-Hungary’s decision
to retain its imperial possessions by force thus starting World War I, Huso’s words contain a
sound logic: the “Balkanites” changed European history and that surely makes them European.237
The sequence gives the workers a platform to talk through the intricacies of their
predicament and blends the “traditional” and “direct” to give that platform authenticity. The
sequence’s documentary aesthetic functions to give assurance to the spectator that the workers’
concerns are genuine. Although the sequence takes place in a confined space, Robar-Dorin’s is
not a vérité camera which prods and provokes its subjects. Instead, it remains at a distance and
unobtrusively observes the workers—only occasionally zooming in or out—in a true direct
cinema fashion.238 The provocateur and dialogue facilitator is Huso, played by Božidar Bunjevac
237 Also significant is that Huso’s remark points to the irony inherent in the legacy of Western European
imperialism in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip assassinated a
representative of the Habsburg Empire into which Slovenia was fully integrated at the time. The Habsburgs included
Bosnia and Herzegovina (albeit as a possession) into Europe following the departure of the Ottomans only for the
Slovenians to now exclude them.
238 Editing in the sequence fortifies this unobtrusive approach and hardly calls attention to itself.
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who looks the part and blends in with the actual workers who appear in the sequence, never
diminishing the sense of documentary authenticity. 239 Huso/Bunjevac guides this “documentary”
mini-play through its improvised, minimally scripted assessment of the conditions under which
the migrant workers live. Ultimately, the sequence functions as a Brechtian tool of political
emancipation—it facilitates dialogue via which Huso and his friends come to recognize the
mechanisms which have cast them as the Other in the Slovenian narrative of cultural superiority
whose logic they reject outright.
Rams and Mammoths suggests that the marginalization and even criminalization of the
migrant workers goes largely unnoticed. Symbolically suggesting that the workers have been
pushed underground, the film shows Huso sleeping in a coffin-like space under the floor
boards.240 In a sequence consisting of only four shots and particularly indicative of how low the
workers are situated in the social hierarchy, Robar-Dorin shows Huso stepping out of his
“coffin” and then waiting with his friends to be picked up by a potential employer for a day’s
worth of under-the-table low-paying construction work. Huso, one of the few lucky ones who get
picked, is then briefly shown working at a construction site. The sequence’s central shot is a long
take depicting the workers as they squat (a “southern” trait) at a pick-up spot by the road. Like
prostitutes, they try to gauge when to stand up and “advertise” to drivers of passing vans—who
may or may not be potential employers—that they are available for work. It is in this long take
that Robar-Dorin employs an almost authentic direct cinema approach: he captures his subjects
239 Though by the time he appeared in Rams and Mammoths had been acting professionally for more than
20 years, Božidar Bunjevac was an untrained amateur actor.
240 He enters his “room” through an actual door in the floor. Affixed to the door is a poster for the late
spaghetti western, The Godless Ones (Roberto Bianchi Montero, 1972) which prompts one of Huso’s roommates to
comment that “there is no God in Bosnia either,” alluding to the desperate situation back home which has forced the
men to look for work in Slovenia.
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in a telephoto shot, but accompanies the shot with on-location audio of the workers’ playful
banter recorded with a mic placed very close to them. The disparity between sound (intimate)
and image (distant) stresses the importance of perspective in obtaining insight into the workers’
predicament. Because the workers have been forced into an illegal black economy, their
marginalization must be captured surreptitiously or not at all. Huso is eventually assigned a
temporary job as a garbage collector and given a room in a dorm, but he is soon criminalized
again. When Huso is cast out of the dorm like a common thug for breaking one of its petty house
rules, he gets drunk and dies alone in a dark alley. The authorities quickly remove his body,
symbolically cleansing the Slovenian society of the offending migrant worker presence.
Robar-Dorin exposes the chauvinism inherent in the presumption that the meeting of the
“southerners” and Slovenians amounts to a clash of civilizations through Eisensteinian
dialectical montages. The montages contrast the migrant workers who possess no political
agency with the Slovenian state/republican apparatus rallying to confront them. The montages
challenge the notion of Slovenians’ superiority over the “Balkanites” by implying that the
Slovenians are steeped in provincialism and narrow-mindedness. Robar-Dorin employs two
kinds of approaches to montage. One approach is the Metzian “sequence shot” whereby the
montage occurs within a single shot (as in Pavlović’s films) that gradually—through mobile
framing and deep focus photography—brings into juxtaposition, and therefore into a dialectical
relationship, two otherwise unconnected, but highly symbolic actions or objects.241 The other
approach involves a dialectical clash of entire sequences—occurring not back-to-back but at
different points in the film—analogous to one another and therefore in dialogue. Both
241 See Metz, Film Language, 124.
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approaches rely almost exclusively on the irony and metaphor that result from juxtaposition to
create the Eisenstenian “intellectual resolution.”242
Robar-Dorin employs the first approach when he alludes to the inherent paradox of the
perception that Slovenians are Europeans and migrant workers “Balkanites” through a
juxtaposition that occurs within a single shot. As a Slovenian children’s choir sings “Ode to Joy”
(the official anthem of the Council of Europe since 1972, and of the EC/EU since 1985) outside
of the Workers’ Club in Velenje, the camera slowly zooms out from a tightly framed telephoto
shot of the choir to a wide shot that reveals a graffiti scrawled on the nearby monument to
Yugoslav Partisans: “Bosnians Out.” The wider frame provides a literally and symbolically more
comprehensive view—the camera now “sees” the hidden content of the Slovenians’ pro-
European posturing, in turn enabling the spectator to arrive at the “intellectual resolution.” (The
zoom-out yet again emphasizes the importance of perspective.) The juxtaposition between the
Slovenians’ desire to be European rather than Yugoslav—represented by the choir’s call to
Europe—and their prejudice against the “southerners”—represented by the anti-migrant graffiti
on a monument to the iconic Yugoslav Partisans—suggests that the Slovenians assert their
European identity by imputing “Balkanness” to their Yugoslav Others.
Robar-Dorin employs the second approach when he mocks the Slovenians’ view that
there is some fundamental civilizational difference between them and the “southerners” by
showing, in two separate sequences, that the two groups spend their leisure time in strikingly
similar ways. One sequence contains images from a concert by one of Yugoslavia’s biggest folk
music attractions of the 1980s, Lepa Brena, held in Ljubljana and attended almost exclusively by
the migrant workers. The other sequence depicts Slovenians also partying to live music at a
242 See Sergei Eisenstein, “A Dialectic Approach to Film Form,” in Film Form: Essays in Film Theory,
trans. and ed. Jay Leyda (1949; repr., New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 62.
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dance hall. At the Lepa Brena concert, the “southerners” sing along to songs in which they are
referenced, and unselfconsciously delight in the singer’s bawdy performance.243 The Slovenians
at the dance hall are comparatively restrained in their enjoyment of the decidedly not risqué
Slovenian folk music.244 Robar-Dorin speeds up the footage at the dance hall in order to animate
the Slovenians so their party matches the intensity of the migrant workers’ revelry. The
montage’s “intellectual resolution” implies that the Slovenians’ perception of superiority can be
chalked up to “the narcissism of minor differences”—Freud’s concept which describes how
difference is utilized as an argument for superiority and how tiny distinctions between people are
amplified into justification for hostility.245 To hammer the point home, the dance hall sequence is
accompanied with a droll, ironic voice over explaining that the “southerners” are essential to
Slovenian national identity precisely because they are stereotyped as lazy, stupid, and unrefined;
their presence in Slovenia is necessary because the Slovenians need someone to differ from in
order to be Slovenian: “If the Bosnians didn’t exist, we would have to invent them.”
Rams and Mammoths illuminates the logic of “nesting Orientalism” by showing the
Slovenian state apparatus actively working to marginalize the migrant workers in order to
disassociate Slovenia from Yugoslavia’s “Balkanites” and obtain a European/Western identity.246
In doing so, the film puts on display two effects of the economic crisis of the 1980s: the
beginning of the process of unravelling of the country’s already fragile multiethnic fabric and the
243 Ironically, the lyrics portray Bosnians as superior to “real” Europeans: “I have been kissed by an
Englishman, and I have been kissed by a Spaniard, but no one kisses like a Bosnian.”
244 Slovenian folk music sounds almost indistinguishable from German or Austrian folk music, making the
reference to Slovenians’ desire to be European even more pronounced.
245 Freud, “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,” 131.
246 A similar reading of the film is offered by Darko Štrajn, “Robar-Dorin’s Mirror: Rams and Mammoths
in the Context of Yugoslav History,” New Review of Film and Television Studies 9, no. 4 (2011): 454-471.
161
completion of the process of dismantling of the working class as the backbone of the Yugoslav
society. The austerity measures destabilized the country by highlighting the regional economic
disparity, which, in turn, gradually led to interethnic animosities and to scapegoating of
Yugoslav internal Others. Rams and Mammoths puts forth one simple claim: Yugoslavia is no
longer the frame for a diverse yet integrated community, but a collection of communities
increasingly hostile to one another. By highlighting this problem through experiences of the
working class, specifically those of the migrant workers who, prompted by economic hardship,
looked for work outside of their immediate communities only to realize they were not welcome
elsewhere, the film suggests that the working class itself has become an Other. That the pillars of
the Yugoslav socialist system, “Brotherhood and Unity” and the working class, were being
jointly rejected meant the beginning of the end of the Yugoslav state.
Conclusion
While it lacked the urgency and daring of the Black Wave, 1970s Yugoslav cinema was
no less politically engaged. The six films I discussed explicitly comment on and indeed
document Yugoslavia’s decline: dwindling economy, reduction in the standards of living and
general disillusionment that followed the introduction of austerity measures. Perhaps most
importantly, the films hint that the country’s experiment with market socialism, the subsequent
debt crisis and the resulting austerity measures ultimately destabilized Yugoslavia by challenging
its unity as well as its ability to remain authentically socialist. The shocking loss of standard of
living in the 1970s and 1980s was felt most acutely by the increasingly irrelevant working class
which, paradoxically, had no hand in running the country it theoretically ruled while the battle
between the forces of centralization and liberalization exacerbated inter-republican squabbles
over trade and contributions to the budget, highlighting the increasing ethnic tensions. The films
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hold up a mirror to this reality in which the Yugoslavs could see themselves as rapacious,
grasping, lewd, boorish, chauvinistic, aggressive, cruel, and indifferent, but, more importantly,
they also directly or indirectly postulate that if the country’s most revered ideals of “Brotherhood
and Unity” and workers’ self-management do not function, Yugoslavia has failed.
At its most essential, Živko Nikolić’s In the Name of the People is a story about a country
in which corrupt policemen can raze an honest working man’s house to the ground with
impunity. By depicting the security apparatus as routinely bullying and manipulating the workers
who wallow in the deeply symbolic mud of the shanty town, the film suggests that for the
working class, the Yugoslav Dream is but a nightmare. The film’s historical depiction of
sociopolitical dynamics in a small Montenegro town in the 1960s offers “genuine authenticity
rather than static period accuracy.”247 Milutin, Todor, and Maksim may not have existed but as
archetypes of the Yugoslav socialist state, they were representative of the Yugoslav
sociopolitical reality. The film employs the specter of Ranković’s reputation as a unitarist
hardliner staunchly opposed to pluralism to highlight the disconnect between the working class
and the state. Maksim’s abuse of power mirrors that of Ranković, reinforcing the film’s
suggestion that Yugoslav socialism is inauthentic because it disenfranchises the working class.
Milutin is an irrelevant pawn whose childlike earnestness is contrasted to the shrewdness and
maliciousness of those around him. The relentless march of misfortune he experiences alludes to
the gross disregard for the spirit of the workers’ self-management system which was designed to
enable the workers to “run their own lives and their own future.”248 The system was meant to be
the “beginning of democracy” in Yugoslavia and even more importantly, “a radical departure
247 Zemon Davis, “’Any Resemblance to Persons Living or Dead’,” 26.
248 Djilas, The Unperfect Society, 220.
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from Stalinism.”249 Quickly, however, it deviated into “fetishism of form, normativism, and
dogmatic idealism,” allowing professional managers like Todor to be in charge of it, and
encouraging bullish authoritarianists like Maksim to erode it.250 As Todor’s business trip to the
Congolese capital of Kinshasa symbolically implies, In the Name of the People ultimately
suggests that Yugoslavia is not a progressive socialist country but rather one akin to a “Third
World” kleptocracy: despotic, undemocratic, repressive, run by a power hungry corrupt elite.
Zoran Tadić’s The Dream About a Rose also depicts the working class men and women
as pawns in a game with an uncertain outcome. In the Yugoslavia of Tadić’s film, the criminals
reap the benefits of the economic crisis while the working families suffer. Rose repurposes
various aspects of American film noir style and iconography into signifiers of the Yugoslav
crisis, but it is the character of Valent who becomes the symbol of the predicament of the
Yugoslav working class which was facing in the 1980s a thoroughly transformed society openly
hostile to them. Valent’s alienation from the society and his resentment at being stripped of
consumer power (while criminals are able to purchase everything from expensive cars to
women) are indicative of how most working class men and women felt in the 1980s. Like so
many of the American film noir characters, Valent is desperate and therefore prone to poor
judgement which is precisely what facilitates his transgression into criminality. Rose stresses,
however, that it is the society’s disregard for the economic woes of workers that causes Valent to
lose control of his life and give in to the forces of darkness. The film implicitly poses one
important question: Is it a surprise that a working man who cannot afford food for his family
would turn to crime? Valent’s is hardly a real criminality when compared to that of the gangsters
249 Ibid., 221.
250 Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 106.
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who rule the neighbourhood. It is also nuanced and qualified by the viewer’s implicit
understanding that in socialist Yugoslavia, a working man should be able to provide for his
family. The Dream About a Rose lodges Valent in that space between guilt and innocence so
often occupied by hapless film noir characters in order to assert that the working class has lost its
status as the backbone of the society and is now anxiously facing an uncertain future.
The experiences of migrant workers in Rams and Mammoths point to just how uncertain
the future was in the 1980s. Desperate, the workers leave their homes in search of jobs only to be
met with overwhelming chauvinism in the economically prosperous part of the country where
they are perceived as unwanted signifiers of economic and cultural “Balkanness” of Yugoslavia.
The shame associated with being “Balkan,” which in the film turns into hostility towards the
“southerners,” was rooted in the Western perception of backwardness of both the Balkans and of
socialism. In Rams and Mammoths, servile quasi-Western posturing and the drive to highlight
cultural differences between themselves and the “southerners,” become for the Slovenians the
methods of escaping “Balkanness” and of attaining the coveted European identity. The film
utilizes a documentary aesthetic in order to provide the quality of authenticity and genuine
insight to its depiction of just how stunned Huso and his friends are by being identified as the
Other and treated as unwanted foreigners in their own country. Rather than the backbone of the
society, the migrant workers are seen as a stultifying factor, preventing the Slovenians from
reaching their true potential. The film utilizes Eisensteinian montage in order to mock this
perception that to “Otherize” Yugoslavs who are not Western enough is necessary in order for
the Slovenians to attain a European identity—to suggest that the Slovenians are acquiring not a
cosmopolitan European worldview but an Orientalist one. Ultimately, Rams and Mammoths
165
exposes the emerging ethnic divisions as a side effect of the economic crisis which has
challenged Yugoslavia’s already fragile unity and began to tear the country apart.
Goran Marković’s Variola Vera offers a pessimistic allegory about Yugoslavs turning
onto each other, seemingly unable to cope with pressures of the 1980s economic crisis and the
austerity measures. There is little meaningful cooperation among the staff of the quarantined
hospital. Most look after their own interests and, ironically, disregard the well-being of the
patients. Those in positions of authority are unable to bear the burden of such a responsibility or
rally the staff together. They are revealed to be either cowardly or cynical and therefore not
authentically communist. Such depictions allude to the rising internal squabbles and
constitutional crisis which threatened to destroy Yugoslavia in the 1980s. The film’s allegory
places the burden of responsibility for this state squarely on the country’s leaders. The officials
who hastily implement the film’s quarantine at the urging of the UN and WHO are simply
another incarnation of the New Class. Driven by self-interest, they pretend to be caring for the
good of those trapped in the hospital, but retain a sense of entitlement and work exclusively to
ensure their own well-being and safety. Crucially, the involvement of the UN and WHO in the
smallpox outbreak crisis mirrors the involvement in the Yugoslav economy of the World Bank
and IMF, ultimately suggesting that the austerity measures have set the country on course for just
the kind of turmoil and disorder that occurs inside the film’s quarantined hospital.
Krsto Papić’s allegorical take on Yugoslavia, The Rat Saviour, also features duplicitous
leaders who rally behind themselves an entire class of privileged citizens willing to shamelessly
exploit the rest of the society which is completely unaware of the political dynamics unfolding
clandestinely. The film’s allegory seems to be geared towards alerting the viewer to one simple
circumstance incongruous with socialist societies: the people are not in control of their political
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environment. The film confronts the viewer with this truth—that Yugoslavia is not what it
appears to be—and creates a sense of dissonance between the viewer and the society. This vague
sense of incongruity—akin to the Freudian uncanny—is conjured up through the film’s depiction
of the shapeshifters’ nefarious conspiracy as successful only because of their ability to
masterfully pretend to be just like everyone else. The shapeshifters spread corruption and
privilege in the form of disease which creates imposters who become cognizant that they must
work to preserve their privileges and ensure the longevity of their class at all cost. The
shapeshifters serve broadly as a metaphor for the ubiquitous New Class and more specifically for
its summit: the country’s greedy leadership which was irresponsibly putting the country deep in
debt to international financial institutions. Ivan’s difficult struggle to expose the shapeshifters
and their conspiracy is itself a powerful metaphor for class division, inequality, alienation, and
anxiety about the uncertain future, but also for the temptation of belonging to a privileged class.
Ultimately, The Rat Saviour suggests that not only is Yugoslavia led by a greedy elite, but even
ordinary citizens are guilty of thoughtlessly indulging in unsustainable lifestyles bound to lead to
an even greater economic crisis.
In Vlatko Gilić’s Backbone, the Yugoslavs’ anxiety about the future manifests itself as a
mysterious disease that causes the infected to undergo an existential crisis, become
contemplative, antagonistic, and, eventually, suicidal. Backbone focuses specifically on urban
dwellers, crammed in brutalist-style highrises, who, unlike the Yugoslavs living in rural areas,
could not grow their own food and therefore were more reliant on a stable economy. The film
anticipates the disquieting climate of the austerity years when the economic crisis was at its peak
and shortages of various staples forced those living in cities into the humbling position of having
to anxiously wait for store shelves to be restocked. This, until the austerity, unfathomable
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predicament deeply unsettled urban dwellers who found themselves in an ugly competition with
their neighbours for the scarce supplies. The film’s depiction of Pavle’s increasingly pugnacious
neighbours hints at the growing animosities among the Yugoslavs caused by the economic crisis,
but, more strikingly, the film also seems to suggest that Yugoslavia is a socialist state in name
only. The strange crematorium director, the custodian of the urban hell of Backbone, symbolizes
the seemingly inevitable end of the Yugoslav socialist experiment. Backbone stresses the
absurdity of maintaining the pretense of a prosperous socialist society and suggests that
revolutionary romanticism that once helped inspire socialist spirit is antiquated and useless in the
face of a serious economic crisis threatening to disintegrate the country.
Together, the six films analyzed in this chapter, especially the three that rely on disease
as their central metaphor, allude to the fragility of the Yugoslav ideological belief system in time
of economic crisis. Following Tito’s break with Stalin, the forces of centralization and
liberalization battled on both political and economic platforms with the latter gradually gaining
advantage. Yugoslavia’s foray into the global capitalist economy eventually resulted in a severe
economic crisis which necessitated implementation of austerity measures and a radical change of
lifestyle for the citizens. Tellingly, most seemed not to object to the paternalistic insistence on
austerity measures by international financial institutions which amounted to a breach of
Yugoslav sovereignty and implied that Yugoslavia was not in charge of its own affairs. Rather,
as the films explicitly or implicitly suggest, the discontent was revealing itself in the form of
growing antagonisms between republics who now saw each other as economic competition, and
in the rising resentment of the very idea of Yugoslavia which typically manifested itself in ethnic
nationalism. The films imply not only that Yugoslavia is a grotesquely degenerated socialist state
but that the economic crisis is revealing that no one ever truly believed in its socialist ideals. The
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films implicitly suggest that if a reduction in the standard of living is enough to turn Yugoslavs
against one another, than the Yugoslav Dream was never real and petty resentments are likely to
soon turn into open conflicts.
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Chapter 3
Endgame: Darkness Descends on “Brotherhood and Unity”
This entire region has now been "Balkanized," that is, broken up into a number of
nominally "national" states, which are small, weak, jealous, afraid, economically
dependent, a prey to intrigue, and pregnant with trouble of many descriptions, not to say
wars.
— Paul Scott Mowrer, Balkanized Europe
Withering Away at the Gates of Europe
Although very few had anticipated the brutality of the 1990s conflict, Yugoslavia showed
signs of being “destined” to burn up in a fratricidal war. Michael E. Brown’s overview of debates
about the causes of intra-state ethnic conflicts which outlines specific destabilizing factors that
tend to lead to such conflicts uncannily describes Yugoslavia of the 1980s. Brown points out that
weak central states foster power struggles (economic, administrative, political, military), and
resentment among ethnic groups who come to view each other as threats.251 When ethnic discord
occurs in multiethnic states whose populations are intermingled, clear cut secessionism becomes
an impossibility since any secessionist project demands that the alien presence be purged.252
Yugoslavia’s complex “ethnic geography,” which resulted from machinations by various
imperial powers that had ruled the region in the past, facilitated ethnic discord and made tidy
ethnic separation impossible.253 Brown goes on to say that tensions between civic nationalism
and ethnic nationalism also facilitate conflict, especially when the latter begins to dominate.254
Yugoslavism was a form of civic nationalism which unfortunately never fully took hold; as the
251 Michael Brown, “The Cause of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict,
rev. ed. eds. Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), 6.
252 Ibid., 7.
253 Ibid., 5. (Only the term, “ethnic geography.”)
254 Ibid., 8.
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country decentralized, it was easily trumped by the myriad of ethnic exceptionalisms which
facilitated not “Brotherhood and Unity” as intended, but ethnic animosities. That Yugoslavia was
undergoing a major change in the late 1980s—restructuring its economic and political system—
also contributed to the escalation. As Brown points out, “political transition,” even
democratization as well as economic upheavals such as “transitions from centrally-planned to
market-based economic systems” usually accompanied by unemployment and inflation can lead
to intra-state ethnic conflict.255 Finally, opportunistic political elites provoke ethnic conflict by
employing ethnic scapegoating as they “fend off domestic challengers.”256 Perhaps most
disastrously, in the 1980s Yugoslavia, ethnic scapegoating was a tactic employed by most
republican leaders desperate to retain power as the country transitioned out of communism. Old
ethnic animosities were reawakened and new ones created as invocations of grievous historical
injustices became routine. This dynamic in particular fostered instability and suggested that,
following the death of president-for-life, Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia was not only leader-less,
but, in a very real sense, retreating back into its own traumatic history rather than moving
forward into the future.257
255 Brown, “The Cause of Internal Conflict,” 8-10. Arguably, Yugoslavia was in what Brown terms the
“semi-permanent state of economic shambles.”
256 Brown, “The Cause of Internal Conflict,” 9-10.
257 Tito’s death had not just a symbolic or psychological effect but also practical consequences for
Yugoslavia as no political figure existed who possessed the authority to succeed Tito. Prior to his death, Tito
promoted the concept of “collective leadership at all levels” rather than grooming or appointing a successor.
Slobodan Stanković, The End of the Tito Era: Yugoslavia’s Dilemmas (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981),
58. This rather progressive idea took the form of the collective State Presidency and the Party Presidium, created
prior to Tito’s death as contingency measures. They ran the country until its demise. (Rather fittingly, the only two
political figures that could have succeeded Tito each epitomized a side in the dichotomy that Yugoslavia uneasily
navigated throughout its existence. Edvard Kardelj, one of the architects of the self-management system and a
proponent of decentralization, died a year before Tito; Aleksandar Ranković, an orthodox hardliner who was always
staunchly for recentralization, was removed from political life in 1966.)
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Following Tito’s death in 1980, and especially near the end of the decade when the
demise of the Soviet Bloc appeared certain, making a change of the system in Yugoslavia, too,
inevitable, the ever-present battle between the forces decentralization and recentralization picked
up steam. It became apparent that while some preferred to preserve the country’s integrity, while
somewhat grudgingly sacrificing its socialism, by strengthening its central power, the goal of
those advocating decentralization was not a transition out of socialism, but also the country’s
dissolution. Crucially, this dichotomy was ethnically-inflected. At its ends were the Serbs, who
championed Yugoslavia, but received only a token support from the West, and the Croats and
Slovenes, whose efforts to dissolve Yugoslavia were met with a tacit approval. The Yugoslavs
appeared to be questioning the very idea that unified them, and once again, as the American war
correspondent Paul Scott Mowrer puts it when describing the effects of centuries of imperialism
and outside meddling on the region in 1921, “Balkanizing” themselves into, “small, weak,
jealous, afraid, economically dependent” tribes ready for war.258 The Yugoslav socialist state
was withering away as it was one day meant to, but petty ethnic hatreds of the past, not an
evolution towards communism, filled the vacuum where socialist solidarity and a multicultural
union, however flawed, once existed. As the Soviet Bloc crashed and Europe commenced the
process of unification, Yugoslavia’s socialist system found itself vulnerable to the whims of a
new Europe, itself in transition, which saw socialism as a vestige of the past. Yugoslavia’s
calamitous end, though first and foremost the fault of its own peoples, can also be blamed on
Europe’s insistence on rapid political and economic reforms which encouraged ethnic discord
and republican secessionism, facilitating the country’s dissolution.
258 Paul Scott Mowrer, Balkanized Europe: A Study in Political Analysis and Reconstruction (New York:
E.P. Dutton & Company, 1921), 3. Notably, this was likely the first time that the verb “Balkanize” was used.
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Unlike most communist countries, Yugoslavia maintained comparatively strong
economic and diplomatic ties with the West, especially with the European Community.259 As the
Cold War geopolitical balance began to disappear, it became apparent that economic reforms
would have to precede any more robust economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the
EC.260 This insistence on reforms proved a divisive tactic because it ensured that the EC’s
dealings with Yugoslavia tended to be regional, far stronger with Slovenia and Croatia—the two
republics perceived as more likely to eventually fully reform—than with the rest of the
country.261 This inherently Balkanist approach excluded Yugoslavia as a whole from the EC
membership consideration because the organization’s enlargement policy favoured stable
capitalist economies.262 In fact, it encouraged secessionism in Croatia and Slovenia who had
already began to perceive the “Byzantine” parts of Yugoslavia as an obstacle to becoming
259 Although the relations between Yugoslavia and individual European states were often marred by
political disagreements such as Yugoslavia’s recognition of East Germany or the Italian-Slovenian border dispute,
they gradually improved and “[f]rom the mid-1970s through 1990, […] had come to embrace a variety of functional,
consular, and multilateral issues” Zachary Irwin, “Yugoslavia’s Relations with European States,” in Beyond
Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community, ed. Sabrina Petra Remet and Ljubiša
Adamovich (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 369.
260 See Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 81-88. Arguably, the Cold War animosities had
previously made Yugoslavia less eager to radically reform. Political science scholar Zachary Irwin points to two
“myths” that Yugoslavia promoted, one asserting that both Warsaw Pact and NATO would eventually fail, and that
Yugoslavia, by virtue of its nonalignment, would survive intact and more easily adjust to this change, and the other
which propagated “threats” to Yugoslav security from both the East and West. Irwin suggests that the nonaligned
status thus “became a pretext for resisting change. As a result of the situation, Yugoslav adjustment to the decline of
polarization in Europe was relatively slow.“ Irwin, “Yugoslavia’s Relations with European States,” 351.
261 For more on the insistence on reforms, see Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 81-88.
For more on the EC’s preference for Slovenia and Croatia over Yugoslavia as a whole, see Ibid., 68-69. For the EC
to have a preference was only possible because the country had been substantially decentralized and individual
republic were able to enter into trade agreements with third parties. Despite of this divisive dynamic, the Yugoslav
leadership made a decision in 1988 “to realize associate membership in the EC by 1992.” Irwin, “Yugoslavia’s
Relations with European States,” 372. At this point, the economic and political decentralization of the past surely
seemed counterintuitive because to reform its economy (or its system overall), Yugoslavia needed a strong central
control.
262 Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 70. Balkanist because it rested on and perpetuated the
perception of the civilized, progressive North-West and the backward South-East of Yugoslavia.
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“properly” European and blamed the economic crisis specifically on the Serbs.263 As Diana
Johnstone points out, the myth of the undemocratic, anti-reformist, staunchly communist Serbs
whose Yugoslavism was simply disguised despotism that could no longer be tolerated was
perpetuated and utilized by the Croats and Slovenes—as well as by the Kosovo Albanians—
during their secessionist campaigns in order “to create the impression [for the West] that the
desire to escape from Yugoslavia was identical with the desire to escape from communism” and
embrace capitalism.264
Discourse of ethnic nationalism, however, entered the public sphere much earlier.
Encouraged by the fall of Ranković and the 1968 student demonstrations, the so-called liberals
among Croatia’s communists, gathered into a movement called MASPOK (Mosovni pokret)
from 1969 to 1971 and ostensibly pushed for economic reform and political decentralization.
Their cultural program and views on the Croatian national question, singularly focused on the
Serbs, especially Croatia’s Serb minority, however, hinted that they were envisioning a Serb-free
Croatia. The movement, also known as the Croatian Spring, insisted that the Croatian language
be extricated from the amalgamated Serbo-Croatian language; it advocated cleansing of Croatian
culture and education of Serbian influence; it suggested, not entirely unjustifiably, that the Serbs
were overrepresented in the League of Communists of Croatia and in the police force.265 Most
263 Johnstone, Fool’s Crusade, 21.
264 Ibid., 22.
265 This last point was particularly delicate because for the Croats, the Serb over representation in security
echelons “was a permanent reminder that Yugoslavia had never escaped its Greater Serbian origins” while for the
Serbs, it was “a guarantee against the resurgence of Ustase ideology.” Glenny, The Balkans, 591. For more on how
Yugoslavism and various nationalisms were negotiated in culture and education—a dynamic which manifested itself
in the conflict between the Croatian Spring, which saw itself as a progressive democratic movement fighting to
preserve Croatian culture from both the Serbs and Yugoslavs, and those who saw it as a nationalist, reactionary
movement—see Wachtel, Making a Nation, 173-226.
174
remarkably, the movement’s influence normalized discussions of Croatia’s future outside of
Yugoslavia and, as historian Andrew Wachtel points out, hardly any “Croatian intellectuals hid
their support of separatist ethnic national feelings at this time.”266 Though suppressed in 1971,
the MASPOK saw some of its demands met. In contrast to the nationalist bend of the MASPOK,
Serbia’s “liberals,” who appeared around the same time, remained deeply attached to the
Yugoslav idea. They were economic reformists and democratic socialists, staunchly opposed to
any form of dogmatism and nationalism, especially, to their credit, the Serbian. They spoke out
against their own republic’s domination in any form, and advocated equality and cooperation in
all domains.267 To the chagrin of cynics who suggested this was done solely in order to create an
illusion of parity and so appease Croatia, displeased about the fate of the MASPOK, Serbia’s
“liberals,” too, were denounced as dangerous agitators and suppressed in 1972.
By then, however, decentralizing inclinations had taken root. Delivering on the promise
that Yugoslavia would evolve into a more democratic society, one in which decisions are made
locally rather than centrally, the infamous 1974 Constitution made significant inroads towards
confederalization and altered the system in ways so radical that many thought it delegitimized
Yugoslavism.268 By shifting the power “from the national center to the ethnonational periphery,”
it arguably contributed to the country’s disintegration by helping transform “a community of
266 Wachtel, Making a Nation, 186.
267 See Lampe Yugoslavia as History, 309-310.
268 For a brief examination of the effects of the 1974 Constitution on Yugoslavia, including, most
contentiously, the right to self-determination and secession, see Vojin Dimitrijević, “The 1974 Constitution and
Constitutional Process as a Factor in the Collapse of Yugoslavia,” in Yugoslavia The Former and Future:
Reflections by Scholars from the Region, eds. Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1995), 45-74.
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nations [in]to a community of nation states.”269 Seemingly an effort to weaken the Serbs, the
1974 Constitution gave unprecedented power to all republics except Serbia whose provinces,
Vojvodina and Kosovo, both became autonomous which gave each a “near-republic status.”270
Given that there were no such concessions for the Serbs living in Croatia or Bosnia and
Herzegovina, some in Serbia saw this as an attack on the republic’s integrity.271 Especially
delicate, however, were the concerns of the Serbs living in Kosovo, formerly Serbia’s heartland,
but by the 1980s practically cleansed of Serb presence, first by the Ottomans, and later, by a
combination of poor economic prospects, low natality rates, and an organized campaign of
intimidation and violence by the Albanians.
It was understood that the Albanians’ campaign for Kosovo to become a republic was “a
prelude to secession.”272 By the 1980s, civil disobedience, demonstrations, riots, and even acts of
269 Gojko Vučković, Ethnic Cleavages and Conflict: the Sources of National Cohesion and
Disintegration—the Case of Yugoslavia (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1997), 7.
270 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 40. Notably, these two autonomous regions with majority Hungarian and
Albanian populations, respectively, acquired the power of veto on any decisions Serbia made while Serbia had little
control over theirs.
271 The 1974 Constitution made the republics into sovereign nation states (with Bosnia and Herzegovina
being an exception because of its multi-ethnic makeup) with the right to secede. (The Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina were recognized for the first time by the 1974 Constitution as a separate nationality. They had
previously generally been either Serbs or Croats of Muslim faith.) Serbia’s unease with this aspect of the
Constitution was rooted in the fact that many Serbs lived in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—if these republics
were to secede, they would take, without their consent, the Serbs living there. The Serbs’ not unreasonable
objections were cynically dismissed as Serbian nationalism, setting the stage for the almost messianic arrival, a
decade later, of the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milošević. Many in Slovenia and Croatia saw Milošević’s appeals for
Yugoslav unity as a ploy to reassert Serbia’s dominance within Yugoslavia, after rolling back portions of the 1974
Constitution, or, should the country break up, to create a so-called Greater Serbia, consisting of all the territories
where Serbs lived. Paradoxically, the thorough economic reforms argued for by Slovenia and Croatia required a
strong federal government able to have full authority over the country—they required revisions of the Yugoslav
constitution in the direction of recentralization—precisely what the much maligned Milošević advocated. Many non-
nationalist Serbs and even many non-Serbs recognized this and saw Milošević as a sympathetic figure who was
fighting for Yugoslavia rather than for narrow Serbian interests (as was, and still is, casually imputed to Milošević).
Indeed, Milošević skillfully exploited the fears of Kosovo Serbs to maneuver himself to the top of Serbian and
Yugoslav political establishment, but, arguably, his unforgivable sin, in the eyes of the Slovenians and Croatians,
was that he wanted to preserve Yugoslavia. For more on how and why the Serbs accepted the 1974 Constitution, see
Dejan Jović, Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2009), 95-141.
272 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 303.
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terrorism by Albanians became routine and intimidation of the Serb minority systematic and
effective.273 Although Serbia’s response was unreasonably harsh (Albanian irredentists were
tried under suspicious circumstances and given draconian punishments), giving some credence to
the perception of the Serbs as uncompromising hardliners, it was difficult to see Albanians as
fighters against Serbian hegemony they professed themselves to be. Yet, this was precisely the
view taken by Slovenia when, in 1988, Serbia began the process of removing the autonomies
given to Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1974 and restoring its “constitutional integrity.”274 Cynically
and cleverly, Slovenia made Albanian irredentism a cause célèbre and heavily utilized it in its
own argument for confederalization as the solution to the allegedly intolerable Serbian
despotism. Decentralization had already allowed for Slovenia’s political and economic
integration into Yugoslavia to drastically erode, but the republic continued to call for further
constitutional reforms to allow it greater control over taxation, government subsidies, and
273 In what became known as the Paraćin Massacre, an ethnic Albanian soldier in the Yugoslav People’s
Army killed four and wounded five of his fellow soldiers as they slept in the military barracks in the city of Paraćin
on September 3, 1987. In Slovenia and Croatia, the event was seen as a desperate act to draw attention to the
persecution of Albanians, allegedly being driven out of Kosovo by the Serbs, rather than as a terrorist act. The
statistics, however, suggest that the Serbs were the ones leaving Kosovo en masse. As John Lampe points out,
“50,000 Serbs left during the 1970s.” Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 304. For more on the Paraćin Massacre and its
fallout, see Jović, Yugoslavia, 263-264. Just how worried the Serbs were about their gradual expulsion from Kosovo
is suggested by the infamous draft of the memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. The state-of-
the-nation document dealt with the deteriorating political and economic situation in Yugoslavia, with an emphasis
on discrimination against the Serbs as decentralization took hold. Leaked under mysterious circumstances in 1986,
the document focused in part on the erosion of the Serbs’ national interests, especially in Kosovo, where it
somewhat hyperbolically alleged a genocide was in progress. It caused a rather cynical outcry in Slovenia and
Croatia because it allegedly advocated “Greater Serbia”—cynical because a similar document by the Slovenians
(“Contributions to the Slovenian National Program”), arguing for an aggressive approach to preservation of
Slovenians’ national interests, and for independence from Yugoslavia, arrived in 1987 to no rebuke from anyone.
Although it is typically discussed by biased pseudo-experts on Yugoslav affairs as the inspiration for Milošević’s
alleged dream to create Greater Serbia, Milošević, in fact, vehemently denounced it because of its implied
nationalism. See Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 347. Read the document in From Stalinism to Pluralism: A
Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945, 2nd ed. ed. Gale Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996), 275-280. For more on the document and its relationship to Serbian nationalism, especially in regards to
Milošević and Kosovo, see Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1994), 93-106. See also Jović, Yugoslavia, 248-253.
274 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 94.
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exports.275 The highly symbolic refusal to contribute to the budget to fund the Yugoslav People’s
Army accompanied the calls for Slovenia’s full independence in the late 1980s.276
Like Slovenia, Croatia saw Yugoslavia as a financial burden, and like the Albanians, it
saw the Serbs as an irksome wrinkle in the republic’s ethnic homogeneity. Redistribution of
revenue from tourism had long fueled Croatia’s discontent, but the situation was drastically
exacerbated by the IMF-imposed austerity measures which made a significant dent in Croatia’s
tourist industry.277 In the 1980s, Croatia deemed its contributions to the federal budget a form
tribute paid to Serbia, a suzerain greedily siphoning off the tourism revenue. This resentment,
however, was accompanied by a revival of atavistic fantasies of an ethnically pure Croat state,
that the Serbs felt derived from the doctrine of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna
Država Hrvatska or the NDH), a Nazi satellite state which conducted a campaign of genocide in
World War II as it sought to convert to Catholicism or exterminate all Serbs in its territory.278
275 For more, see Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 67-73.
276 For more on Slovenia’s opposition to and refusal to fund the YPA, see Jović, Yugoslavia, 327-331. For
more on Slovenia’s attitudes towards Yugoslavia, the Serbs, and the YPA, see Johnstone, Fool’s Crusade, 132-144.
Such symbolic acts of rejection of Yugoslavia also had practical consequences for Yugoslav stability. As Susan
Woodward points out, “Slovenia’s attempts to enhance its sovereignty by denying federal authority in ever more
fields was automatically depriving the federal government of the means to enforce any decision.” Woodward,
Balkan Tragedy, 85. For more on how Slovenia’s efforts to deny the authority of the Yugoslav government as it
plotted secession, see Ana S. Trbovich, A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 173-187. For more on the often conveniently disregarded explosion of Slovenian
nationalism in the 1980s, see Jović, Yugoslavia, 314-327. Read also Dimitrij Rupel, “The Slovene National
Question,” in From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945, 2nd ed. ed. Gale
Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 281-284.
277 The regions “with higher tourism revenue expressed grievance at having part of ‘their’ funds allocated
to development projects in poorer regions of the country.” Taylor and Grandits, “Tourism and the Making of
Socialist Yugoslavia,” 12. The Adriatic was a popular holiday destination for Western European tourists with
pockets not deep enough to take them to ritzier places. They brought in the much-needed hard currency for the state
coffers, and for the locals who earned income from room rentals and related services. Much anecdotal evidence
suggests that Croatia’s turn away from Yugoslavia and towards the West strongly manifested itself in the preference
of the locals for the foreigners who had more money to spend and ate at restaurants, and in resentment of the
vacationing Yugoslav workers who often brought food with them.
278 The NDH included not just today’s Croatia, but also all of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as parts of
Serbia. Estimates vary from 300,000 to 1,000,000 Serbs—most from the Krajina region of Croatia, and from Bosnia
and Herzegovina—killed by the Croats during World War II. In the Croatian concentration camp of Jasenovac alone
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Soon, the rhetoric of the Serb nationalists fueled fears of a repeat of the genocide. This paranoid
frenzy inspired a revival of the Chetniks, a movement with roots in Serbia’s struggle for
liberation against the Ottomans, but whose World War II incarnation was guilty of committing
atrocities in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia during World War II (though their
crimes pale in comparison to those of the Ustashe, the elite soldiers of the NDH). The Chetnik
revival was grudgingly tolerated by Serbia’s communists on account of the shared concern for
the fate of the Serbs living outside of Serbia.
By the late 1980s then, the omnipresent civic nationalist slogan, “Brotherhood and
Unity,” which not only meant that the state insisted on ethnic harmony, but also implied that to
give in to ethnic nationalism would likely mean new bloodshed, seemed ominously foreboding
and, in retrospect, ironically prescient. The dilemma that the slogan encapsulated was, as
political analyst Dejan Jović puts it, whether Yugoslavia was “an association of communities” or
“a community in itself.”279 The answer came when, following the multi-party elections and
declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, and shortly after by Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Macedonia, Yugoslavia finally ceased to exist. The Yugoslav system, as Diana
Johnstone points out, “was certainly not designed to oppress national minorities, nor did it have
that effect.”280 Yet, the difficult economic and political reforms coupled with Yugoslavia’s
complicated “ethnic geography” ensured that, only somewhat ironically, Yugoslavism, cynically
framed as Serbian subterfuge, would be the target of dissent. As Dejan Jović points out, by
it is thought that between 300,000 and 700,000 mostly Serbs were killed by methods and efficiency that allegedly
appalled even the Nazis. Glenny, The Balkans, 487. For estimates regarding the number of Serbs slaughtered by
Croats in World War II, see Srđan Bogosavljević, “Drugi svetski rat—Žrtve u Jugoslaviji,” Republika, June 1995,
xi-xvi. It should be noted that although Croats predominantly sided with the Nazis, many also joined the communist
Partisans.
279 Jović, Yugoslavia, 47.
280 Johnstone, Fool’s Crusade, 129.
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making ethnic nationalism its main enemy, the state “promoted such nationalism as the main
alternative to itself.”281 In retrospect, rejecting the Yugoslav idea outright rather than preserving
Yugoslavia, the ideal framework for the South Slavs, and confronting Serbia’s hegemonic
tendencies if necessary was senseless. Entering the post-communist 1990s, Yugoslavs found
themselves living in a smattering of hostile nation states and territories, once again susceptible to
outside manipulation, “pregnant with trouble of many descriptions, not to say wars.”
Predictions of Fire: Yugoslav Cinema after Tito
The future is known only to the gods and to dogmatists.
—Milovan Djilas The Unperfect Society
In the 1980s, Yugoslavs were busy watching American soap operas like Dynasty (1981-
1989) and Dallas (1978-1991), amused by the intrigue involving the Carringtons and the Ewings
whose affluence sharply contrasted their own daily struggles and likely soothed the anxieties
about the future. The loss of the living standards and the near-disappearance of the middle class
spelled out a simple truth: the Yugoslav Dream has run out—the good life indeed seemed to exist
only in tawdry American fantasies. Popular Yugoslav cinema of the 1980s tended towards inane
escapist comedies like A Tight Spot (Milošević, 1982) which poked fun at the country’s
economic decline by featuring loveable, folksy characters whose misadventures and antics were
acts of desperation often necessitated by financial dire straits. These massively popular films
found humour in the disappearance of the Yugoslav Dream and suggested that to laugh at one’s
own misery was the best way to escape it. Their popularity arguably indicated that most
Yugoslavs, though dismayed, were also at least somewhat optimistic that the country would
eventually rebound. Most understood that the socialist system would have to be abandoned and
281 Jović, Yugoslavia, 21.
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the old guard conservatives replaced with progressive, reform-oriented politicians in order for
Yugoslavia’s economy to catch up with the rest of Europe. That the times were changing was
obvious enough, but very few foresaw the cataclysmic end and the fratricidal war the country
would be experiencing by the early 1990s.
Spearheaded by the so-called Prague School (the filmmakers who went to film school in
Prague, Czechoslovakia, in the 1970s and who retained a taste for politically sensitive topics, if
not for the formal experimentation of the Black Wave), Yugoslav cinema went through a curious
creative rebirth in the 1980s despite difficult economic conditions. The Prague School
filmmakers revitalized Yugoslav cinema thanks to the success of such films as Emir Kusturica’s
poignant political family drama dealing with the price paid by the innocents during the clash
between Stalinism and Titoism in the 1950s, When Father Was Away on Business (1985), and
Lordan Zafranović’s The Occupation in 26 Tableaux (1978), an examination of the effects of the
Italian occupation of coastal Croatia on local population during World War II which featured
extremely graphic depictions of the Ustashe atrocities. These filmmakers somewhat irked the
establishment by achieving international recognition while addressing topics previously deemed
taboo. Perhaps most importantly, unlike the filmmakers of other socialist countries with access to
American films, the films of the Prague Group routinely outperformed Hollywood fare at the
box office.282 Yet, the Yugoslav economic crisis loomed large even over the Prague School
filmmakers whose successes did little to revamp the industry itself. Ticket prices remained low
and audiences increased, but inflation made revenues from admissions meagre; the studios
slowly deteriorated and securing financing became increasingly difficult for Yugoslav
282 Andrew Horton, “The New Serbo-Croationism,” American Film, January 1986, 24-30.
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filmmakers.283 Still, rather remarkably, this creatively revitalized, but infrastructurally collapsing
cinema, which came to be known as the New Yugoslav Cinema and encompassed many
stylistically and ideologically diverse filmmakers, offered some exceptionally astute insights into
the Yugoslav society edging towards its demise.
Daniel Goulding suggests that while some of the more pessimistic films may have
grasped the gravity of the twin economic and political crises, they hardly foresaw the country’s
break up.284 Never particularly stringent, film censorship in Yugoslavia became even more
relaxed throughout the 1980s, allowing filmmakers to address with stinging cynicism some
formerly taboo topics like Tito’s persona, the Ranković affair, the World War II atrocities
committed by Yugoslav Nazi collaborators on other Yugoslavs, and the Tito-Stalin conflict,
especially the persecution of those who remained faithful to Stalin. Films like The Battle of
Kosovo (Zdravko Šotra, 1989) examined the pre-Yugoslav past, specifically the trauma of
Ottoman imperialism and so hinted at an increasing obsession with historical memory. Others
focused on the more recent past and, defying the tendency in Yugoslavia to avoid such
discussions, dealt with topics involving crimes committed by Yugoslav against other Yugoslavs
during World War II. Hawk Did Not Love Him (Branko Schmidt, 1988) focuses on the struggle
of a Croat peasant to remain neutral at the outset of World War II when both Partisans and
Ustashe come calling. Similarly, Silent Gunpowder (Bato Čengić, 1990) deals with the dilemmas
faced by Bosnian Serbs when presented with a choice between the royalist Chetniks and
communist Partisans in World War II. By examining aspects of the country’s history previously
almost untouchable, and implicitly questioning the value of “Brotherhood and Unity,” forged in
283 Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 148-149
284 Ibid., 144.
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the mythical battles of World War II, these revisionist films obliquely engaged with the problem
of emergence of rabid ethnic nationalism in the 1980s. Some offered extremely pessimistic
visions of the Yugoslav society and did, I argue, prophesize, even if via metaphor, the country’s
demise. Overall, most of the politically engaged Yugoslav cinema of the 1980s offers depictions
of Yugoslavia as a country whose ethnic groups are frenziedly combing historical memory for
traumas to excuse their zealotry and engaging in an increasingly confrontational public discourse
of ethnic nationalism likely to lead to bloodshed.
This chapter focuses on three films particularly representative of this trend: Dangerous
Trail (Miomir Stamenković, 1984), Maternal Half-Brothers (Zdravko Šotra, 1988), and Déjà vu
(Goran Marković, 1987). Examined together, the films reveal a portrait of a country stuck in a
cycle of obsessively re-examining its traumatic past and ridden by anxieties over the escalation
of ethnic tensions caused by precisely that obsession. They imply that the state no longer has the
authority to promote let alone enforce the ethnic coexistence Yugoslavia was built upon and is
therefore powerless to prevent the country’s imminent disintegration and descent into an ethnic
war. Through their narratives about how the infamous Yugoslav “emigration”—the ultra-
nationalist expatriates living in the West, and actively engaging in propaganda and terrorist
activity against the Yugoslav state—fanned the flames of ethnic conflicts, Dangerous Trail and
Maternal Half-Brothers suggest that “Brotherhood and Unity” is a farcical notion. Dangerous
Trail is a thriller which takes place in 1980, a year before the infamous demonstrations in
Priština during which Albanians demanded that Kosovo, having acquired autonomy within
Serbia, be made into a separate republic, often pinpointed as the start of Yugoslavia’s
disintegration.285 Its narrative follows Nafi, a young Albanian living abroad as he attempts to
285 For more, see Jović, Yugoslavia, 176-200.
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smuggle weapons into Kosovo to be used by his fellow irredentists in an insurgence against the
state and in attacks against the Kosovo Serbs. Nafi’s operation, jointly organized by irredentists
based in Switzerland and in Kosovo, begins to derail after he becomes involved with a Belgrade
waitress. With police on his trail, Nafi clashes with his father and brother who do not share his
irredentist ideology. He gets arrested in the family house after his father informs the police of his
whereabouts. The story of Maternal Half-Brothers covers a period of about fifty years—from
World War II to the late 1980s—and focuses on the tragic personal fates of two half-brothers
born on the slopes of mount Dinara in Croatia who had never met. Reminiscing about the past in
audiotaped testimonials they exchange by mail, Braco, a Croat living in Austria and wanted in
Yugoslavia for his terrorist activities, and Veselin, a Serb awaiting trial for murder in a Belgrade
jail, piece together their family’s history. The film ends with the two half-brothers realizing that
Yugoslav ethnic identity politics have needlessly robbed them of brotherly bonds as they
embrace for the first time in the jail courtyard when Braco returns from exile to visit Veselin.
I jointly examine Dangerous Trail and Maternal Half-Brothers through the prism of what
Benedict Anderson terms “long-distance nationalism”—the activities of expatriates who exert
concrete political influence on their homelands through political lobbying, funding or even
committing acts of terrorism, yet cannot be held accountable by the state for their actions.286 I
deal with this aspect of the films using Svetlana Boym’s discussion of nostalgia which proposes
two overlapping yet distinct types of sentimentality for the past: restorative which aims to lead
back to some mythological former glory and often feeds authoritarian fantasies of nationalist
projects by idealizing the past, and reflective which acknowledges the loss of the past and
286 Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World (London:
Verso, 1998), 58-76.
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accepts that its memory is full of gaps and inconsistencies.287 I examine the ways the two films
implicitly suggest that Braco’s and Nafi’s projects—the retrieval, as if from a storage room of
history, of the ethnically pure environs that (may have) once existed—are driven by restorative
nostalgia and are therefore intrinsically unsound. Most importantly, throughout my discussion, I
focus on both films’ explicit and implicit disapproval of decentralization which, they imply,
encouraged secessionism and resulted in the paradigm-shifting 1974 Constitution which legally
entrenched Yugoslavia’s ethnic discord, taking the country towards dissolution.
My discussion of Dangerous Trail addresses how the film reflects the Serbs’ simmering
resentment over Aleksandar Ranković’s ousting, arguably the precursor to the more radical
decentralization of the 1974 Constitution which practically disappeared Yugoslavia “from the
constitutional order of the country, in that ‘Yugoslavia’ was now only what the federal units
decided, by consensus, it would be.”288 As a result, the 1974 Constitution, Dangerous Trail
implies, sealed the fate of Kosovo as a restive province of Serbia from which the Serbs are
slowly expelled because the state is powerless—and perhaps even unwilling—to reign in the
Albanian irredentists. Dangerous Trail implicitly laments Ranković’s ouster which indeed
signaled that the central power of the state was weakening and that hardline tactics of
suppression of dissent—even of extreme ethnic nationalism meant to destabilize the state—
would no longer be utilized. The film sides with the view, common among the Serbs, that the
1974 Constitution, which gave Kosovo an autonomous status within Serbia, encouraged
287 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 41-55. The difference
between the two types can be likened (ironically) to the difference between a metaphor and a simile. The former
establishes a relationship of equality or sameness, and its rhetorical power is in the denial that the relationship is
merely analogous; the latter explicitly claims similarity but implicitly acknowledges that the likeness would not
stand scrutiny because it is casual, even preposterous.
288 Ivan Vejvoda, “Yugoslavia 1945-91: From Decentralization without Democracy to Dissolution,” in
Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, eds. David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda
(London: Longman, 1996), 15-16.
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Albanian irredentism and its restorative fantasies and so flagrantly harmed Serbian national
interests. In my discussion, I focus on the ways Dangerous Trail argues the Serbs’ standpoint
which was that Kosovo, as the birthplace of the Serbian state, the site rejuvenation of Serbian
culture and church, and therefore the symbol of Serbian identity, is no one’s to give away.
Perhaps the most important thread that runs through my discussion of Dangerous Trail revolves
around the film’s two intertwined suggestions regarding Yugoslavia’s rapid destabilization in the
1980s. The first is that those in Yugoslavia who supported decentralization were
opportunistically aiming to weaken both Serbia and Yugoslavia by cynically championing the
Albanian cause in Kosovo while ignoring legitimate Serbian grievances. The second is that the
West, as the place from which the “emigration” stages its activities, is deeply implicated in the
process of destabilization of Yugoslavia. Ultimately, the film deems the state’s toleration of
Albanian irredentism, which indeed seemed to lack any discernable effort at consensus with the
Serbs or even a minimum of respect for their concerns, as at best misguided and at worst as
criminal.289
Like Dangerous Trail, Maternal Half-Brothers has as its subtext the processes of
decentralization, firmed up by the 1974 Constitution, which arguably made it easier for ethnic
nationalists to pursue their goals of breaking up the country. My discussion of the film focuses
specifically on its suggestion that the Croatian Spring validated anti-Serb biases in Croatia and
encouraged its “emigration,” which upheld the genocidal ideology of the NDH, to pursue
terrorist activities against the Serbs and against Yugoslavia. I especially focus on Braco as an
289 Trail could not have been more topical. The gradual expulsion of Kosovo Serbs was at the forefront of
Serbian politics and major source of frustration. Stories—some admittedly exaggerated—of violence by Albanians
against Serbs abounded and helped form the perception (cynics would say the myth) of Albanian disregard for Serb
life and dignity; street demonstrations by both Serbs and Albanians, voicing their grievances seemed routine in the
1980s.
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amalgam of restorative and reflective nostalgia. In the recordings made for Veselin, Braco
reminisces about and appears nostalgic for Croatia’s fascist past (free of the Serbs and of the
shackles of Yugoslavia), a sentiment which led him in his youth to take active part in “long-
distance nationalism” in order to restore the NDH. Yet, aspects of Braco’s recollections, coupled
with the fact that he eventually returns home to face the consequences of his past actions, also
suggest reflective nostalgia. The taped messages to Veselin, and the flashbacks they “produce,”
form an inventory of Braco’s life which concludes an era and so symbolizes Braco’s acceptance
that the past will not return. Crucially, my discussion of Braco’s recordings and of the attendant
flashbacks focuses on the gaps and omissions both contain. I argue that these omissions suggest
that neither the recordings nor the flashbacks that result from them are definitive or authoritative
in their recap of how historical upheavals affected the life among the Serbs and Croats under
mount Dinara and therefore imply that Braco’s glorification of the NDH is misguided because it
is based on a lack of concrete historical knowledge.
My discussion of how Braco’s recollections, and the flashbacks that accompany them,
hint at the interplay—and the clash—of the political and the personal relies on film scholar
Maureen Turim’s discussion of how the flashback structure facilitates a juncture between the
present and the past, offers a “rendering of history as a subjective experience,” and often
provides the “means of questioning the conceptual foundations of history in its relationship to
narrative and narrative in its relationship to history.”290 The Croat village, Šmrekovo, and Serb
village, Kulina, are the microcosms of the two ethnic groups while Braco and Veselin, of course,
symbolize the uneasy Yugoslav “Brotherhood and Unity.” Their personal histories form a history
of the Serb-Croat tensions, suggesting that the personal is inevitably political—the half-brothers’
290 Maureen Turim, Flashbacks in Film: Memory and History (New York: Routledge, 1989), 1-2.
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destinies are tragic because of the larger societal and political upheavals. Although Braco is
adamant that “the truth must be remembered,” he is unreliable as a witness to history; he does
not remember the NDH’s heinous crimes against the Serbs. By virtue of being borne out of
personal memories limited in scope, the film’s flashbacks, and the narrative they form, question
the validity of the historical basis of the Croats’ restorative nostalgia which fuels their
resentment of the Serbs and of Yugoslavia. Without Veselin’s input, Braco’s recollections are
incomplete and indeed false. The film ultimately suggests that only jointly can the two half-
brothers form a narrative of their pasts and so form a mostly accurate narrative (which,
appropriately and highly symbolically, even then remains fractured) of the Serb-Croat discord.
While Trail and Half-Brothers hint at “mere” ethnic discord, Déjà vu ominously predicts
that the crisis will surely escalate and result in a catastrophic end for Yugoslavia. The slasher
horror narrative of Déjà vu formulates a concern about Yugoslavia’s increasing obsession with
history, especially with re-examination of its traumatic past, through the symbolism of the film’s
main character’s own experience with trauma. Most of Marković’s film takes place in the 1980s
and focuses on Mihailo, a morose piano teacher traumatized in childhood by the execution of his
“bourgeois” thespian father for treason shortly after the war. The event spurred on further family
tragedy and decades of deep depression for Mihailo who finds hope for a new beginning in a
romance with the sultry Olgica. When the nearly penniless Olgica—prone to escaping the harsh
reality via sex—callously rejects the naïve and sexually repressed Mihailo, his frustrations boil
over and he lashes out at those around him in a murderous rage. In my analysis of the film, I
suggest that Mihailo’s personal traumas, which bubble up to the surface to manifest themselves
as a violent rampage, stand for the Yugoslav society’s obsession with historical traumas in the
1980s. Through the symbolism of Mihailo’s murderous rage, I argue, Déjà vu warns that
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macabre obsessions with historical trauma will spawn cults of victimhood, deepen ethnic and
political divisions, and ultimately cause Yugoslavs to violently lash out against each other.
I examine Déjà vu as a uniquely Yugoslav interpretation of the American slasher horror
genre of the 1970s and 1980s. Behind depictions of murderous male aggression in many of the
classic slashers lie oblique commentaries on American traumas like the Vietnam War, societal
ills like racism, the entrenchment of conservative social and political philosophy, and the
emergence of unrestrained capitalism. Though more pointed than its American counterparts,
Déjà vu, too, is somewhat ambiguous as it comments on its sociopolitical context. Obviously
enough, Mihailo’s anguish and subsequent explosion of anger into violence broadly represent the
discontent that pervaded the Yugoslav society in the 1980s. Like many slasher killers then,
Mihailo is a personification of the return of the repressed and allegorizes societal dysfunction
with roots in some disavowed problem. In my discussion of how Mihailo’s character conveys
concrete political message despite the film’s psychosexual genre trappings, I utilize Robin
Wood’s concept of “incoherent texts” used to describe certain American films of the 1970s
which although lacking a clear political stance are insightful and symptomatic of their
sociopolitical context—sometimes thanks precisely to the “incoherence.”291 Mihailo’s inability
to supress his rage, already seeping through the façade of affability, I argue, mirrors the way
Yugoslavia barely maintained the pretense of normality while its deeply frustrated citizens were
about to erupt in a rage facilitated by obsession with historical trauma. In my discussion, I
suggest that through Mihailo’s character, Déjà vu forewarns of the political elites soon to emerge
and play up these frustrations, magnify the real and imagined historical injustices, with
apocalyptic results.
291 Robin Wood, Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan…And Beyond, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003), 41-43.
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I develop my arguments by relying on Carol Clover’s seminal essay on the slasher horror
genre, “Her Body, Himself,” and I outline precisely how Déjà vu conforms to and transplants the
tropes of the American slasher to astutely comment on its own sociopolitical context. I especially
focus on the film’s quintessentially slasher positioning of Mihailo as emotionally cemented into
a particularly traumatic moment in childhood when, having developed a deep Oedipal
attachment to his mother, he lost her. Suffering frequent memory flashbacks to his traumatic
childhood, the adult Mihailo is extremely uneasy around others, especially women, a neurosis
initially soothed by the flirtatious Olgica. Upon witnessing Olgica’s sexual promiscuity and
realizing her ambivalence towards him, however, the “grip of boyhood” turns into a typically
slasher murderous male aggression aimed to punish the female sexual “transgressions.”292
Usually deemed a manifestation of the culture of male chauvinism, prudishness and
conservatism in American slashers, Mihailo’s inability in Déjà vu to let go of his childhood
traumas and the resulting “psychosexual fury” symbolize the Yugoslavs’ simmering anger—
fuelled by the economic crisis—that found “justification” within historical memory and trauma
and threatened to explode into a bloody conflict.293 Though it may suffer from ideological
“incoherence” attendant to slashers, Déjà vu clearly conveys the view that Yugoslavia disavowed
the severity of its ethnic discord and its connection to the economic crisis, a discord which
bubbled up to the surface in the late 1980s and exploded into the shocking brutality of the 1990s
war.
My discussion in this chapter of Dangerous Trail, Maternal Half-Brothers and Déjà vu
amalgamates the films’ commentaries on the consequences of the economic crisis which
292 Carol Clover, “Her Body, Himself: Gender in the Slasher Film,” Representations 20, no. 20 (1987): 195.
(only the phrase “grip of boyhood”)
293 Ibid., 194. (only the term “psychosexual fury”)
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destabilized Yugoslavia by prompting further constitutional changes, in turn, encouraging ethnic
discord to provide a portrait of the country as it headed towards its catastrophic end in the early
1990s. Dangerous Trail, a thriller remarkable in how directly it addresses the subject of Serbian
anxieties regarding Albanian irredentism, and Maternal Half-Brothers, a drama which equally
directly deals with Serb-Croat discord, both voice the sentiment that appeasing the (more often
than not) exaggerated ethnic grievances through decentralizing constitutional changes only
serves to further strengthen ethnic nationalists seeking to destroy Yugoslavia. Both films suggest
that such radical reforms are facilitating a complete disappearance of Yugoslavism by validating
the once frowned upon ethnic nationalism and setting the stage for the creation of ethnically pure
nation states in Yugoslavia’s place. Déjà vu taps into the catastrophic potential of these
developments which found their cultural outlet in the form of the obsession with historical
memory so en vogue in the 1980s and, forming a vicious circle, further fueled ethnic
resentments. Déjà vu symbolically suggests that this trend of wallowing in victimhood, akin to a
psychosis, is bound to result not just in a termination of the Yugoslav federation but in a
spectacularly apocalyptic demise of “Brotherhood and Unity.” Ultimately, my analysis of the
three films serves to create a portrait of Yugoslavia, a captain-less ship following Tito’s death in
1980, on its last legs as its demise quickly approached.
Long-Distance Nationalists: Maternal Half-Brothers and Dangerous Trail
The narrative of Zdravko Šotra’s Maternal Half-Brothers is comprised of a series of
flashbacks which visualize the audio recordings exchanged between Braco who works as a dog-
handler for a family of Austrian aristocrats, and the still teenage Veselin soon to be tried in a
Belgrade court for a prom night murder. Feeling some intangible connection, Braco establishes
contact with Veselin upon recognizing his half-brother in a newspaper report about a “school boy
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killer” and the two begin exchanging audio tapes in which Braco outlines for the much younger
Veselin the family history prior to his birth while Veselin describes for Braco the period after he
left Yugoslavia for Austria. The personal experiences of the two half-brothers who share the
same Croat mother, but have embraced the ethnic identities of their fathers comprise a grim
historical portrait of Serb-Croat animosities. They touch on some extremely difficult topics like
the deep wounds of the NDH genocide committed on the Serbs, the Croat perception of post-war
Serb revanchism, the implications of the Croat national “reawakening” in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, especially for the Serbs and Croats of the Krajina region, the anti-Yugoslav and
anti-Serb activities of the Croat “emigration” inspired by the NDH ideology. The taped
testimonials weave personal and family histories made tragic by war, sociopolitical upheavals,
and terrorism, the totality of which ultimately makes Braco and Veselin realize that they are
inextricably entangled. Although realizing that he would be arrested for his involvement with the
Croat “emigration” in Austria, which includes terrorist activities in Croatia, Braco decides to
come back to Yugoslavia to see Veselin. The two half-brothers embrace in the jail courtyard
under the watchful eye of the warden in the film’s faintly optimistic final image—a freeze-frame
implicitly validating the federal state and questioning the wisdom of the mythical animosity
between the Serbs and Croats
The subtext underlying Maternal Half-Brothers is the history of foreign imperialism in
the region. The film deals with the Croats’ perception that Serb presence in Croatia is part of a
sinister ploy to undermine Croatia’s statehood by forming a substantial non-Croat minority. In
reality, the Serbs, desperate to escape Ottoman oppression, found themselves in the Krajina
region of Croatia in the sixteenth century when the Habsburgs brought them in to act as cordon
sanitaire against the Ottomans in exchange for land. In order to keep the two ethnic groups busy
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with conflict and therefore less likely to politically emancipate themselves, Austria-Hungary
made sure that the Croats’ campaign for statehood in the 19th century was channeled against the
“alien” Serb minority rather than against the Hungarians who actually dominated the Croats.294
The creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 with a Serbian monarch as the head of state only deepened
the Croat resentment of the Serbs.295 After the NDH failed to eliminate the Serbs from Croatia,
the establishment of the socialist Yugoslavia meant that Croats had to again “suffer” the Serbs
who, although deeply resentful of the Croats, generally preferred reconciliation to revenge, and
never demanded a special status within the republic in order to protect their interests. Maternal
Half-Brothers suggests that the MASPOK revived Croat resentments of the Serb minority by
employing a discourse of demonization disguised as democratization and caused an upsurge in
anti-Serb rhetoric as well as in activity of the Croat “emigration” who saw this openly anti-Serb
climate as a signal from their co-ethnics to provide support for the cause through terrorism.296
Loosely based on true events, Dangerous Trail focuses on Nafi and his mission to
smuggle weapons into Yugoslavia to supply his fellow Albanian irredentists. On his journey,
which takes him across Yugoslavia, the rakish Nafi befriends a naïve Belgrade waitress to whom
he promises employment in Switzerland. A single mother desperate for work, Mila is easily
manipulated, but after realizing that Nafi is devoted to the irredentist cause and does not hesitate
294 Glenny, The Balkans, 263.
295 The clashes between Croat and Serb politicians were common in the “old” Yugoslavia, but it was not
until the formation of the Ustashe movement in 1930 that Croat efforts to rid Croatia of the Serbs (and of
Yugoslavia) took the form of terrorism including the assassination of the Yugoslav King Aleksandar in Marseille in
1934.
296 This view was fairly common and difficult to dismiss as Serb paranoia because Ustashe sympathizers in
the West continued with terrorist activities including assassinations of Yugoslav diplomats and hijackings of
Yugoslav airplanes; they even staged incursions into Yugoslavia like the one by the so-called Bugojno Group in
1972 which sought to foment a popular Croat uprising and start an armed rebellion against the Yugoslav
government.
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to murder for it, she contacts the police who pursue Nafi and his associates around Kosovo and
the neighbouring Macedonia. Nafi has Mila executed for her betrayal, but soon comes into
conflict with his own family who see his political convictions as foolish and their Serb
neighbours as having as much of a claim on Kosovo as they do. Nafi’s uncle’s auto repair shop,
the irredentist group’s safe house, is discovered by the police and raided. The group’s ringleader,
a local high school teacher, goes into hiding, but, as the film’s final title card informs the viewer,
he is “uncovered and arrested during irredentist demonstrations in Kosovo in March of 1981.”
Shortly after, Nafi is captured at the family home, and taken away by the police as his father
watches from the window emotionlessly.
The subtext of Dangerous Trail, too, is foreign imperialism. The film deals unusually
frankly with the Kosovo Albanians’ hardly disguised aspirations to separate the autonomous
province from Yugoslavia and join it with the so-called greater Albania. It taps into the fear,
pervasive in Serbia, that the Albanian irredentists’ campaign to drive the Serbs out, under the
pretense of fighting oppression, was bringing those aspirations to fruition in the 1980s. This
threat, the film suggests, must be eliminated because Kosovo’s separation from Serbia and
Yugoslavia would amount to a finalization of a fundamental historical injustice. The Serb
historical memory supported the position that the Albanians gained a foothold in Kosovo owing
primarily to the Ottoman conquest, prior to which the region had been almost completely
populated by Serbs; the Ottomans had populated Kosovo with Albanians, a circumstance which,
aided by high natality rates, now unfairly favoured the Albanians’ claim to the region. The
Albanian position was that, unlike the Serbs, they were autochthonous to the region. They saw
Serbia as a hegemonic entity occupying Kosovo and sought to cleanse it of all Serbian presence
which, the argument went, was a consequence of Slavic migration into what was from time
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immemorial an Albanian territory. Dangerous Trail suggests that the 1974 Constitution which
gave Kosovo autonomy, validated the Albanians’ irredentism—itself a validation of the
consequences of Ottoman imperialism—and is therefore in conflict with Serbian national
interests, and fundamentally incompatible with the values of “Brotherhood and Unity” on which
Yugoslavia was built.
Socialist Yugoslavia’s complicated “ethnic geography” was managed, Susan Woodward
asserts, through “an extensive system of rights and overlapping sovereignties. Far from being
repressed, national identity and rights were institutionalized—by the federal system, which
granted near statehood to the republics, and by then multiple rights of national self-determination
for individuals.”297 Dangerous Trail implies that Yugoslavia’s constitutional stability and
territorial integrity can no longer be taken for granted precisely because of this system. It warns
that the country has become a mess of “overlapping sovereignties” designed to accommodate
whims of ethnic exceptionalisms which, in turn, virtually erased Yugoslavia as a legal entity.298
More specifically and rather boldly, Trail suggests that this erasure of Yugoslavia encourages
anti-Serb bias within both Kosovo’s provincial and Yugoslavia’s federal state institutions.
Hinting that such a bias has become ingrained in Kosovo, the films depicts Albanian irredentists
as integral to its institutions. The group’s leader, Ćemail, is a high school teacher; one member
belongs to the emergency medical service personnel while another is a police officer. As
educators and civil servants presumed to be ethical and nonpartisan, they are able to go about
their business of sabotaging the state without arousing suspicion. The motorcycle policeman,
Musa, stops the traffic on a mountain pass so his cohorts can kill a hostage (a Serb truck driver
297 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 45.
298 For a brief overview of the history behind the Serbs’ and Albanians’ claims to Kosovo, see Trbovich, A
Legal Geography, 76-80.
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who became suspicious and confronted Nafi in a motel parking lot near Belgrade) unobserved by
pushing his truck off a cliff. The lone man alerted by the explosion does not call the police
because the presence of an ambulance vehicle creates the impression for him that a road accident
had occurred which has already been dealt with by emergency medical services. These
depictions imply that Albanian irredentism is not reduced to the fringes of the society, but exists
and functions unimpeded in the mainstream. Dangerous Trail suggests that Yugoslavia has so
over-accommodated Albanian ethnic exceptionalism that even the institutions of the autonomous
Kosovo are now utilized to drive the Kosovo Serbs out and so further the Albanian irredentist
cause.
The film goes even further and takes the view, controversial in the 1980s, that Albanian
irredentism is willfully ignored by the federal state because many of its officials, hoping to
weaken Serbia and Yugoslavia, support the Albanian cause. Stamenković obliquely takes aim at
the Slovene and Croat politicians who indeed routinely dismissed the then frequent both official
and anecdotal reports of Albanian violence against the Kosovo Serbs as fabrications. They
deemed such reports to be typically Serbian Machiavellianism designed to elicit sympathy for
the Serbs as they go about the business of oppressing the Albanians who naively believed the
Serbs’ flimsy guarantees of autonomy. In an informal conversation with other investigators, one
of the police inspectors searching for Nafi suggests that it is well known that Albanian
irredentists frequently use violence and intimidation against the Serbs, but all he can do is “write
reports” and ignore the complaints because “they tell me I am being too dramatic... Sometimes I
think some here prefer things to be this way.” The inspector’s hardly veiled remark alludes to
what was perhaps Serbia’s main grievance in regards to Kosovo which was that the reports of the
Serbs’ gradual expulsion from the province were not being taken seriously and were even
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regarded as paranoid hysteria by “some” federal state officials. The inspector’s words formulate
an implicit lament of the downfall in 1966 of Aleksandar Ranković whose infamous hardline
stance on Kosovo, many Serbs believed, would have curbed Albanian irredentism. Dangerous
Trail seems to support the claim, admittedly somewhat paranoid and conspiratorial in tone, that
Ranković, the champion of the strong central state that does not coddle nationalists or placate
claims of ethnic exceptionalism, was removed from politics by Tito precisely to facilitate the
easy expulsion of the Serbs from Kosovo.
Dangerous Trail affirms, however, that although Yugoslavia has been severely weakened
by decentralization, Yugoslavism still exists, but urgently requires state protection from those
who pursue narrow ethnically-inflected interests. As if to make sure its depiction of the Serb-
Albanian dispute does not exclude others (or to draw others in, a cynic might argue), the film
stresses that Kosovo is a Yugoslav, not just a Serbian problem, or, more specifically, that
Albanian irredentists are a threat to all of Yugoslavia rather than just to Serbia. The transport
trucks with a cache of weapons travel unhindered at night through virtually all of Yugoslavia.
They enter the country at its northwestern-most point, at the border between Austria and
Slovenia, and wind up in the capitol of Kosovo, Priština, in the southeast. The route symbolically
suggests a terrorist threat to the whole country, but also lets the film implicitly question the
apathetic attitude by the rest of Yugoslavia towards the plight of the Kosovo Serbs. The film
seems to imply that because the individual republics rather than the federal state are increasingly
in charge of their own affairs—including, especially, security—as if independent, it is easy for
the irredentists to conduct their operations against the Serbs. Dangerous Trail subtly assigns
blame for making the irredentists’ campaign logistically simple directly to decentralization
which has made Yugoslavia into an increasingly loose “association of communities” in which
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individual republics are concerned solely with their own affairs rather than with the common
Yugoslav one. Yet, the film “confirms” Yugoslavia existence and its legitimacy. Although the
irredentists are depicted as pathological Serb-haters who do not hesitate to kill for their cause,
not every Albanian is an irredentist. Police inspector Ramiz is an Albanian, but also a Yugoslav
who pursues the irredentists at the risk of being perceived as a traitor by his co-ethnics. Ramiz’s
Yugoslavism and the pan-Yugoslav route of the transport trucks together symbolically suggest
that although Yugoslavia still exists, if it is to survive, it must be consolidated rather than divided
into ethnically-based administrative units with “near statehood,” insulated from one another and
therefore prone to allowing those who would see Yugoslavia end easily put their plans into
action.
In Zdravko Šotra’s Maternal Half-Brothers, too, Yugoslavia’s constitutional reforms
account for how easily neighbours become enemies when ethnic resentments are validated by the
state. Veselin’s recollections of his family’s history include the consequences of the
controversial Tenth Session of the Croatian League of Communists of January 1970 at which
Croatia’s delegates rose up against the perceived economic and political domination of Serbia.
The Tenth Session, whose findings and decisions were given Tito’s approval, effectively
provided state support for the spirit of the Croatian Spring. It echoed the movement’s aims when
it concluded that Yugoslav unitarism must be curbed as it was far more dangerous than any
ethnic nationalism and that Croats should assert their ethnic identity without fear of being labeled
as nationalists.299 In the film, Croats greet the findings and decisions of the Tenth Session with
299 Croatian Spring was eventually curbed for its overly nationalist rhetoric which included claims that the
Serbs controlled Yugoslavia’s and Croatia’s power structures, that Yugoslavism was at best a passé whim and at
worst a ploy designed to disappear Croatia’ cultural heritage by imposing Serbian culture on it (via, for example, the
hybrid Serbo-Croatian language, and the synthetic Yugoslav culture), that profits from Croatia’s economy were
being systematically syphoned off by the federal state in order to benefit Serbia’s economy. For a brief summary of
the Croatian Spring, see Glenny, The Balkans, 590-593. See also Jović, Yugoslavia, 104-105.
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nationalist elation tinged with both anti-Serb and anti-communist sentiments. In the village of
Šmrekovo, “Our Beautiful Homeland,” the Croatian anthem dating back to the 19th century rings
out. This comes across as a brazen act of defiance because, although used sporadically before it
was officially reinstated as the Croatian national anthem in 1972, the song was a somewhat
controversial symbol of re-emergence of Croat nationalism. Croatian flags without the
communist red star are unfurled; posters and placards exclaim, “Long Live the Tenth Session!”
and “Croatia for the Croats!” As the villagers listen to speeches about Croatian history, their
Aryan heritage, the holiness of their God-given land, and the virtues of the Catholic faith, money
is collected for the cause. Maternal Half-Brothers bluntly suggests that following the Tenth
Session, which effectively upheld the tenets of the Croatian Spring, the kind of orgiastic
nationalist revelry that previously would have been too dangerous to engage in publicly has
become officially sanctioned. Šotra’s film proposes that by placating the Croats’ claims of ethnic
exceptionalism, the state has made Croatia’s minority Serbs into scapegoats at the whim of the
resurging Croat nationalists.
The Serbs of Kulina greet the results of the Tenth Session with dismay, believing that
they not only confirm that Croats never had a genuine investment in Yugoslavia, but also that
they set the stage for the return of the NDH. Ironically, as the Croats in Šmrekovo celebrate their
ethnic heritage and stoke anti-Serb sentiments, the Kulina Serbs are gathered to help Braco’s and
Veselin’s mother, Vranka, build a house. The only Croat woman in Kulina, Vranka begins the
construction of a new house following the death of her second husband, Veselin’s father, Krstan.
Her Serb neighbours who came to help her become agitated when, during the lunch break,
busloads of flag-waving Croats go by and leaflets are dropped calling for the “non-Croats to
leave Croatia.” Paranoia about the implications of the Tenth Session quickly ensues among those
199
gathered to help Vranka. Insinuating anti-Serb purges in the security echelons of Croatia, a
former policeman rails about having been forced into retirement “because I’m a Serb!” Another
man insists that Vranka who, ostracized because she married a Serb, has not been to Šmrekovo in
years, is still “one of them and works for their cause.” When Vranka denies, the man, alluding to
the fear of the return of the NDH and its genocidal ideology, retorts: “We came here to help you
build a house and you are preparing us for slaughter.” The anger of the Serb men gathered to
help Vranka only to be met with a display of Croat nationalist chauvinism symbolizes the Serb
resentment of the seemingly state-sanctioned resurgence of nationalism in Croatia (as well as the
Serbian alarmism which routinely exaggerated the NDH revival threat). The “house” which they
helped build and naively believed was theirs, too, has now betrayed them. Šotra’s juxtaposition
of the reactions to the Tenth Session in Šmrekovo and Kulina suggests that both Croats and Serbs
saw decentralization, the Croatian Spring in particular, as a way of ridding Croatia of its Serb
minority. Put differently, the juxtaposition sums up how the Croats and Serbs viewed centralized
Yugoslavia: the former saw it is a prison preventing them from fully expressing their ethnic
identity while for the latter it was a guarantee that the genocidal NDH would not return.
What made movements like the Croatian Spring particularly dangerous to Yugoslavia’s
“Brotherhood and Unity” was that they inspired political agitation and even terrorism from
ethnic nationalists among the Yugoslavs living outside of the country who saw such upheavals as
an opportune time to destabilize Yugoslavia. The anti-Yugoslav activities of such groups and
individuals fall under what Benedict Anderson describes as “long-distance nationalism” whereby
the expatriates engage in propaganda campaigns, and provide funding and weapons for their
cause, “all of which can have incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate
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destinations.”300 The so-called Yugoslav “emigration” consisted of individuals who left the
country for ideological reasons in the years following World War II, claiming systemic
repression of their ethnic group. Starting in the late 1960s, however, they were joined by
economic migrants, following Yugoslavia’s decision to allow its citizens to look for work in the
West as a way to alleviate unemployment at home.301 Many of the economic migrants quickly
fell under the influence of the “emigration” groups corresponding to their ethnicity and engaged
in propaganda and terrorist activities against the Yugoslav state.302 Both Dangerous Trail and
Maternal Half-Brothers tap into the anxieties regarding “long-distance nationalism”—the
activities of Yugoslavs living in the West who saw their ethnic group as disenfranchised and
aimed to affect corrective change to the country’s political system. While Braco belongs to the
original “emigration” who left almost exclusively for ideological reasons, Nafi is from the later
wave of economic migrants who were mostly indoctrinated into anti-Yugoslavism upon arrival at
their destinations. The discontent and nationalist zeal of both, however, is seemingly so strong
300 Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 74.
301 In 1968, West Germany and Yugoslavia re-established diplomatic relations, and agreed that both skilled
and unskilled workers from Yugoslavia can flow freely towards West Germany which desperately needed workers
to sustain its economic growth. As political science scholar William Zimmerman points out, this development was
an important feature of Yugoslavia’s own brand of “third way” socialism: “By the late 1960s, the Yugoslavs had
raised the notion of open borders to the level of state policy. Rather than a stance of tolerance or resignation, the
open border policy had come to be identified in official utterances as one of the key defining features, along with
market socialism and self-management, of what was distinct and positive in the Yugoslav socialist variant and
element that set off Yugoslavia from the Soviet model.” Zimmerman, Open Borders, 76.
302 The Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden was assassinated by Croat nationalists in Stockholm in 1971; a
Yugoslav Air Transport airplane en route from Stockholm to Belgrade was brought down by a bomb placed in the
cargo by Croat nationalists in 1972; in 1979, a Serb nationalist hijacked an airplane in the US, with intention of
having the pilot commandeer it into a government building in Belgrade, before getting arrested by the FBI;
Yugoslavia was infiltrated by a group of Croats who attempted to start an armed rebellion against the Yugoslav
authorities and a fight for Croatian independence in 1972. For more on the activities of the “emigration,” including
their influence on the economic migrants, see Milo Bošković, Antijugoslovenska fašistička emigracija (Beograd:
Sloboda, 1980), Sreten Kovačević, Hronologija antijugoslovenskog terorizma 1960-1980 (Beograd: IŠRO, 1981),
Milenko Doder, Jugoslovenska neprijateljska emigracija (Zagreb: Centar za informacije i publicitet, 1989), Zlatko
Skrbiš, Long-Distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.,
1999), Vladimir Ivanović, “Ekstremna imigracija u SR Nemačkoj i Jugoslavija,” Istorija 20. veka 27, no. 1 (2009):
139-146.
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that they feel compelled to stage terrorist attacks on their perceived enemies inside of Yugoslavia
in order to aid what they see as their co-ethnic’s righteous struggle for political and national
emancipation.
In his recordings, Veselin recalls a mysterious and dangerous forest fire that broke out on
mount Dinara, close to Kulina, as the Serbs sulked and the Croats rejoiced following the Tenth
Session. In his response to Veselin, Braco reveals that the fire was an arson he committed when
he infiltrated the country after twelve years away. Broadly, the fire on the slopes of Dinara is
symbolic of the escalation of discord between the Serbs and Croats. More specifically, it implies
that the Croatian Spring inspired “long-distance nationalism” of the “emigration” and was
synchronized with their efforts to intimidate the Krajina Serbs. Yet, as if to not appear overly
harsh in its judgement, the film offers a depiction of Braco’s life in Austria that reminds the
viewer that “long-distance nationalism” is, after all, a Western import by default, and so
symbolically shifts some of the blame for it from Braco and others like him onto the West itself.
With his terrorist years behind him, Braco appears to have a soul-crushingly lonely existence in
Austria. In his recordings to Veselin, he reveals that he is happiest when in the company of his
employer’s dogs or prostitutes. As he describes into the tape recorder the memories of his mother
Vranka and father Antiša, Braco is interrupted by his boss who reminds him his job is to mind
the dogs, not to absently reminisce, and even calls him “a piece of shit.” The film suggests that
Braco never integrated into Austria, in turn, symbolically implying that leaving Yugoslavia for
the West to escape socialism was a mistake because the Western capitalist alternative is
inherently hostile and uncaring, and can never make for a nurturing home.
This depiction of Braco’s isolation symbolizes the price to be paid for senseless ethnic
nationalism. Half-Brothers suggests a complete disappearance of Yugoslavism among the
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expatriates who, instead of nurturing “Brotherhood and Unity” and strengthening their ties
precisely because they are among strangers, live in adversarial “Yugoslav” sub-communities,
segregated according to ethnicity. In a letter establishing contact with Veselin, Braco points out
that he had found out about Veselin’s crime after reading a story about it in “one of your
magazines.” Braco is, of course, referring to a Yugoslav magazine read only by the Serbs in
Austria. His remark implies that Yugoslavs in Austria soothe their nostalgia for home strictly
with cultural products coded as their own.303 Yet, that Braco now reads what he thinks of as a
Serbian magazine means that he has reconsidered the wisdom of his “long-distance nationalism”
and so symbolically implies that the Yugoslavs’ ethnic segregation can be overcome and even
the most hardline nationalists reformed. The film’s depiction of Braco deftly alludes to the
somewhat paranoid anxiety, palpable in Yugoslavia, that the West, because it is antagonistic to
socialism, manufactures “long-distance nationalism” among the Yugoslavs who go there in
search of work in order to destabilize Yugoslavia. By keeping the Yugoslavs unintegrated into
their host societies and in isolated ethnic groupings, the West, Half-Brothers implies, fosters
rejection of a common Yugoslav culture among the “emigration” and provides the staging
ground for terrorist actions against the Yugoslav state.
Dangerous Trail, too, implies that, as an incubator for “long-distance nationalism,” the
West destabilizes Yugoslavia whose own political and economic reform, which resulted in an
openness towards the West, is a catalysts for this process because it allows for easy importation
of extremism into the country. On the pretense of carrying frozen meat, a Belgian transport truck
303 Notably, it is after Braco engages with the Other’s cultural product that Veselin’s crime, which,
significantly, takes place in a hotel called “Yugoslavia,” facilitates the contact between the two half-brothers. Braco,
who admits to being severely shaken up upon seeing his half-brother’s picture in the magazine, is also somewhat
impressed by Veselin’s actions: “You took revenge our way.” Fittingly, the impulse to take revenge is what connects
the two half-brothers and, symbolically, the Serbs and Croats—a senseless violent act in a fit of vengeful teen rage
in a hotel called “Yugoslavia” suggests that the inability to refrain from revenge for historical wrongs (and to live
peacefully in a common state) is, ironically, the commonality that binds the Serbs and Croats.
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containing weapons easily enters Yugoslavia. Even the ostensibly beneficial easing of trade
restrictions with the West, the film asserts, automatically results in a less safe Yugoslavia
because the West’s true intentions are to undermine the country. This porousness of the
country’s borders with the West which allows the likes of Nafi to easily enter the country
symbolically suggests that Yugoslavia is no longer in charge of its own destiny. Like Half-
Brothers, Trail implies that the West cultivates anti-Yugoslavism among the “emigration” and
provides concrete assistance for its terrorist endeavours. Belgium is assumed to be the location
from which the Albanian irredentists plan terrorist operations against Yugoslavia and acquire the
financial resources to further their cause.304 Nafi feels deeply betrayed by his brother, Rahman,
because Rahman, to whom Nafi has been sending money from Belgium with which to cheaply
buy the houses of the Serbs fleeing Kosovo, has not been making the purchases and even holds
the view that Kosovo is “theirs, too.” Ironically, Rahman, who still lives in Kosovo, is unable to
perceive the Serb “oppression” which Nafi, who lives in Belgium, seems to see everywhere.
Benedict Anderson points out that the long-distance nationalist “hero” is “radically
unaccountable” because he acts from the safety of another state.305 His father, Hasan, begs Nafi
to come back to Kosovo and live a normal life, but Nafi rejects the idea because in the West he
can be a “hero” to his co-ethnics without having to worry about the Yugoslav police. Unlike
Rahman and Hasan who have to live with the Serbs, Nafi can afford to antagonize them because
he is able to do it from afar and so remain “unaccountable.” Like Maternal Half-Brothers then,
Dangerous Trail implies that decentralization has led not do democratization or to a more just
304 The film implicates the West in subtle ways as well. French, the language of their host country, is the
main language spoken by the irredentists; Roper, the irredentists’ Peugeot-driving Belgian henchman hardly has a
personal investment in the Albanian cause, yet does not hesitate to kill for it (Because he is too suave for a common
hired criminal, and possesses impressive skills, Roper’s involvement with the irredentists can be seen as symbolic of
Western involvement in the process of destabilization of Yugoslavia.).
305 Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 74.
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society but to an escalation of ethnic nationalism and to formation of nearly independent nation
states within Yugoslavia. The film suggests that, as a consequence, the country is now unable to
control who moves about its territory or even to secure its borders against those who would
infiltrate it from the West to commit acts of terrorism and incite further ethnic discord.
The Rules of the Game: “Those Who Arrived Last Must Leave”
Dangerous Trail asserts that Albanian irredentism is driven by the firm conviction that
Albanians are autochthonous to the region while the Serbs are Slavic latecomers who must be
made to leave. The film implies that such beliefs, which gained full affirmation in World War II,
when the Albanians organized themselves into a collaborationist militia, the Ballists, and
persecuted the Kosovo Serbs, have not been sufficiently discouraged after the war and have now
been passed onto the younger generations to provide historical “justification” for the Albanians’
claims of full “ownership” of Kosovo. Nafi’s father, Hasan, confronts his own brother, Šaban,
whose auto body shop is the base for the irredentists and the place where the weapons and
propaganda materials are kept, about his influence on Nafi. Hasan demands that Šaban refrain
from indoctrinating Nafi further into the irredentist cause. Šaban is disappointed that his brother
“works against his own people” and makes it clear to Hasan that the irredentists view as enemies
those Albanians who do not share their ideological beliefs: “If you are not with us, you are
against us.” Hasan’s reply, “That’s what Ballists used to say during the occupation,” not only
points to his firm allegiance to Yugoslavism and to his opposition to irredentism, but also implies
parity between the Ballists of World War II and Albanian irredentists of the 1980s. Angry and
fearing for his son’s safety, Hasan reminds Šaban, who was a Ballist, that the authorities spared
him after the war only because they trusted that he was not genuinely fascist, but rather
temporarily poisoned by fascist influences. Hasan is disgusted that Šaban has cunningly kept
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quiet all these years about his true nature, but Šaban is unmoved: “To us, this is occupation.”
Dangerous Trail suggests that Albanian irredentism should have been methodically suppressed
by the state after the war because it has now grown even more extreme, threatening the country’s
already fragile ethnic unity by perpetuating the view that Yugoslavia is an occupying state and
the Serbs alien trespassers on Albanian land.
Similarly, Maternal Half-Brothers calls attention to the notion, prevalent among the
Croats especially since Yugoslavia’s inception, that Croatia must be ethnically and religiously
homogenous. This task, which of course meant that the Orthodox Serbs who came to Croatia at
the invitation of the Habsburgs and made parts of Croatia their home, must be killed, Croatized
or expelled, began to be carried out by the Ustashe during World War II. The film’s depiction of
the beginnings of this genocidal campaign in the Krajina region suggests that it was the treatment
of the Serbs in Croatia of the fascist NDH era that poisoned the relations between the Serbs and
the Croats in the “new” Yugoslavia because the seeds of enmity sown then sprouted later. In the
film, as soon as the “old” Yugoslavia is dissolved and the NDH established, Ustashe on mount
Dinara begin the process of ethnic consolidation using rhetoric that implies that the Serbs have
always cunningly exploited their Croat neighbours. This rhetoric sounds remarkably like that of
the Croatian Spring decades later that so angers the Serbs helping Vranka build her house,
allowing the film to suggest that the movement is at least somewhat inspired by the NDH
ideology. In one of his recordings, Braco recalls Ustashe spreading rumours among the
Šmrekovo Croats about how the Serbs from Kulina have consistently been stealing from them. In
front of the gathered villagers, the Ustashe officer Šimić proclaims that there is no room for both
the Orthodox “schismatics” and the Catholic Croats on mount Dinara: “Those who arrived last
must leave.” Met with an enthusiastic response, the Ustashe soon begin to recruit soldiers from
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Šmrekovo by offering food to those who sign up for the Home Guard, the armed forces of the
NDH, enticing the naïve Antiša, Vranka’s then husband and Braco’s father, who signs up and
becomes a gunner stationed in the steeple of the local Catholic church.
Maternal Half-Brothers proposes that, although irrational, the “long-distance
nationalism” of the Croat “emigration” can be partially blamed on the state itself for not dealing
with the Serbs’ post-war revanchism more resolutely. Benedict Anderson points out that the
long-distance nationalist is not only “radically unaccountable” but his politics “are deeply rooted
in a consciousness that his exile is self-chosen.”306 It is this precisely this awareness that gives
Braco’s “long-distance nationalism” an aura of sacrifice, and an added zeal. Maternal Half-
Brothers allows that Braco’s predicament was somewhat difficult because of his father’s Home
Guard affiliation during World War II. It suggests that it was the stigmatization he experienced
in the “new” Yugoslavia by the victorious Partisans, who were predominantly Serbs, that set
Braco on the path to radicalization and ultimately caused him to choose exile. Braco is ostracized
as a child and often reminded that his father was an Ustashe until he begins to not only resent the
jibes, but to glorify his father’s death.307 When a local Serb police officer calls him “the son of an
Ustashe,” Braco, then still a boy, carefully examines the man and asks Vranka if “they” killed his
father. It is at that moment that Braco goes symbolically “blind” to the Ustashe war crimes,
begins to blame the Serbs for his father’s death, and becomes susceptible to Croat nationalist
propaganda. Before long, Braco acquires the view, identical to how Nafi and Šaban see Kosovo,
that Croatia is under Serb “occupation.” Braco’s escape from Yugoslavia and subsequent
terrorist activity, however, seem to have a rather thin justification as he experienced no actual
306 Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons, 74.
307 Antiša was a Croatian Home Guard soldier, not an Ustashe, but very few would have cared to make the
distinction which is analogous to that between a German Waffen-SS soldier and a Wehrmacht soldier.
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persecution, only hectoring. Šotra’s film implies that the Serbs’ resentments of the Croats
following the war may have crossed into a domineering conduct, and maybe even received a tacit
approval by the state, implying that perhaps some of the concerns of the Croatian Spring were
valid. Yet, the rationale behind Braco’s exile—his mythical sacrifice for the Croat cause—seems
not necessitated by post-war maltreatment, but simply derived from the already existing Ustashe
nationalist fantasies which exaggerated the Serbs’ equally mythical villainy.
In the film, the local authorities, consisting predominantly of the Serbs who manned most
of the Partisan units in the region, deal with the remnants of the Ustashe forces hiding in the
caves of mount Dinara even as late as 1947. They are wary of the local Croats whom they
suspect of helping the Ustashe soldiers still holding out. The last Ustashe band, led by Šimić,
prowls the area demanding that the Croats provide them with food. When Vranka refuses, Šimić
proclaims that Ustashe rule is not over and pledges to Vranka that Braco, who is quietly
observing the scene through a half-opened door, “belongs to us, and we will raise him to be a
proper Ustashe when he grows up.” Frightened of losing Braco, Vranka goes to the authorities
and tells them where Šimić is hiding. Šimić soon gets killed and Vranka is publicly given the
credit for his revealing his whereabouts, making her a pariah among the Croats who burn her
house down in revenge. With no other choice left, Vranka and Braco move in with Krstan, a
local Serb communist official whom Vranka eventually marries and with whom she has Veselin.
This ethnic “switch” from Croat to Serb does not bother Vranka whose ethnic identity seems
fluid, but never quite takes in Braco who, years later in his recordings to Veselin, refers to
Krstan’s house as “your house” and expresses regret that, following her death, Vranka was
buried in a Serbian Orthodox cemetery.
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Ironically, Šimić’s vow to Vranka comes true while Braco is serving in the Yugoslav
National Army—the cornerstone and guarantor of Yugoslavia’s “Brotherhood and Unity”—
implying that the state itself contributed to the transformation of misfits like Braco into rabid
nationalists. In one of his recordings to Veselin, Braco recalls having to shoulder the implicit
burden of culpability attached by the society to those who had an association with the Ustashe
via a family member. As a young man, Braco is bitter, but still not fully poisoned by the Ustashe
ideology and, though her parents ultimately do not allow it because “his father was an Ustashe,”
even appears prepared to marry a local Serb girl, Anica. Shortly before their doomed romance
ends, Anica comes to visit Braco, a conscript in the Army and serving as a dog-handler near the
Austrian border, when he bitterly complains to her: “They stationed me in the worst possible
place because of my father.” Later on, suspecting that his father is the reason why he is so often
forced by the officers to do manual labour around the barracks, Braco confides in a fellow Croat
recruit, Josip, that his father was an Ustashe, killed by the Partisans. Josip admits that his father,
too, was an Ustashe, killed by the Chetniks. Josip’s initial response to Braco’s admission, “I had
a feeling,” and his assertion that “we will always be blamed for everything,” hints that it is
precisely the sense that they are being unduly blamed for their fathers’ sins that makes them into
allies and causes them to begin plotting their escape to Austria. Though he chooses exile, the
state places Braco in the military service near the Austrian border and trains him as a dog-
handler—a skill that later enables Braco to get a job in Austria—almost as if preparing him for it.
Braco’s willingness to marry Anica even implies a resistance to ethnic nationalism, but the
society and the state have already pegged him for an Ustashe (or perhaps even made him into
one) and so predestined him for a life in the “emigration.” The state antagonizes Braco by never
letting him forget whose son he is. It is almost out of spite that he begins to mythologize and
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glorify the Ustashe legacy and to find inspiration in the unfinished business they started in World
War II. Like Nafi and Šaban, he soon commits his life to the project of making the Serb
“latecomers” leave the territory claimed by his own people.
Restorative Nostalgia: (Flash)back to the Way We Used to Be
Nostalgia as a cultural phenomenon in Europe came into being in the seventeenth century
owing to the “greatly improved means of transportation” which enabled travel far away from
home and, in turn, facilitated extreme homesickness.308 The opening of Yugoslav borders which
allowed citizens to seek work elsewhere had a similar effect, but the brand of nostalgia often
generated among the Yugoslav expatriates was the restorative nostalgia. This nostalgia, shared
by the expatriates and their co-ethnics in the homeland, was for a particular moment in the past
when the society was organized according to the principles valued by the ethnic group engaging
in it and it aimed to bring about a return of that mythical past. Both Dangerous Trail and
Maternal Half-Brothers suggest that this project to bring back the past is one into which new
generations are easily indoctrinated as well as one that requires a disavowal of the more
undecorous and discreditable aspects of that past. Half-Brothers specifically addresses the
perception, common among the Croats, that the Serbs had cunningly inflated the scope of the
Ustashe crimes against them (or perhaps even invented them altogether). Aided by this historical
falsehood, and having usurped leadership positions in politics and culture, the argument went,
the Serb minority in Croatia set out to exact revenge by delegitimizing Croatia’s statehood and
clipping the wings of Croat culture at every turn. A denial of the extent of the Ustashe crimes
against the Serbs is integral to Braco’s ability to see the Ustashe as fighters for Croatia’s freedom
whose legacy he is now obligated to uphold. Braco’s views mirror the Croats’ restorative
308 Jean Starobinski, “The Idea of Nostalgia,” Diogenes 14, no. 54 (1966): 101-102.
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nostalgia, encouraged by the Croatian Spring, but re-emerging in the 1980s, for the NDH era
which “remembers” the Ustashe not as ruthless killers the Serbs allege them to have been but
simply as enabling Croatia to be charge of its own fate—better able make the alien Serbs
compliant.
Braco’s nostalgia for the NDH era is a restorative nostalgia which, like a metaphor, pits
the glorious past against the corrupt present and, in a case of what Mikhail Bakhtin describes as
“historical inversion,” finds the ideal to be realized in the future to already exist in the past.309 It
is based on Braco’s childhood recollections of the Ustashe officer Šimić’s stories about the
thieving “schismatics” who must leave Croatia because they “arrived last.” Through his terrorist
activities, Braco aims to rid Croatia of the Serbs and so complete the project of the NDH. As the
film’s flashback structure implies, however, his memories and therefore his knowledge of that
time are rather sketchy. Braco remembers clearly that Antiša’s heavy machine gun was placed in
the church steeple, but does not realize that the location also provided a clear view of the site of
the extermination of the Kulina Serbs by the Ustashe. With the help of the Home Guard soldiers,
the Ustashe gather the Serb men and take them to the nearby pit hidden in Dinara’s austere
landscape dotted with limestone rocks, but clearly visible from Antiša’s position in the church
steeple. Antiša and Vranka, who had stopped by to bring him lunch, watch in horror as the
Kulina Serbs are being killed one by one with a mallet blow to the head and then thrown into the
pit. Grappling with the implications of the atrocity he is witnessing, the good-natured Antiša,
who intrinsically understands that there is no point in hating one’s neighbours whatever their
ethnicity, humbly tells Vranka that the Serbs being killed are “no different from me.”
309 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes Towards a Historical
Poetics,” in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael
Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 147.
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Similarly, some Albanians, like Nafi’s father and brother, want to live peacefully with
their Serb neighbours, but too many others have been poisoned by the hawkish chauvinism of
Albanian irredentists that continues to proliferate because it had not been rooted out after the
war. This prejudice, which seeps into the psyche of the younger generations, is personified in the
character of Nafi’s uncle Šaban whose indoctrination of Nafi is driven by the same kind of
restorative nostalgia that drives Braco. Šaban, who fondly remembers the World War II era
when the Ballists were busy eliminating the Serb presence in Kosovo, has managed to convince
Nafi to choose exile and to engage in irredentism. By contrasting the influence on Nafi of Hasan,
a former Partisan with that of Šaban, a former Ballist, Dangerous Trail alludes to the dilemma,
facing not just the Kosovo Albanians, but other Yugoslavs as well of having to choose between
regressing into some pseudo-glorious, ethnically pristine fascist past, and a peaceful coexistence
based on the socialist principles of “Brotherhood and Unity.” Nafi chooses the former, but as a
long-distance nationalist, he is unaware of just how devastating the impact of his choice is on the
two ethnic communities at home. Hasan is shocked when Nafi cynically laughs off his concerns
that the stoking of anti-Serb hatred has resulted in the rape of a Serbian nun and in routine
desecration of gravestones in the Serbs’ cemeteries. Rahman, also outraged at Nafi’s callousness,
suggests that Nafi is nothing, but a fascist, and pledges that their village will remain united, with
Albanians and Serbs living together. Seemingly offended, Nafi rejects the fascist label and
makes his own sinister vow in response: “We will disunite it then.” Duped by his uncle into
believing that irredentism is about fighting for freedom from Serb oppression, Nafi disavows the
fact that it is, in fact, a continuation of—and functions to bring back—the genocidal Ballist
ideology of World War II.
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Braco’ recollections of Antiša’s and Vranka’s genuine shock at witnessing the execution
of the Kulina Serbs, and especially Antiša’s remark that the Serbs are “no different from me,” is
similarly contrasted, in Maternal Half-Brothers, with Braco’s view of the Ustashe as fighters for
Croatia’s freedom from Serb oppression. Maureen Turim suggests that in mediating between the
present and the past, flashbacks have the ability to unsettle “the conceptual foundations of
history in its relationship to narrative and narrative in its relationship to history.”310 Maternal
Half-Brothers uses the inherently subjective nature of flashbacks to deny credibility to the
historical memory and to the narrative it produced which serves as the foundation for Braco’s
restorative nostalgia. Because he is only capable of his own subjective view, Braco is ignorant of
the larger truth that the flashbacks objectively affirm for the viewer. Braco’s recollections of the
Serbs being killed, although a part of his flashback, by his own admission come from Vranka’s
memories, presumably related to him later on. Braco, still just a boy at the time, does not witness
the killings himself because Vranka and Antiša do not allow him to come up to the church
steeple so as not to traumatize him. Like Nafi, Braco is eventually made aware by his family of
the full story, but rejects the aspects of it that shame and inculpate his own ethnic group. Braco
cannot accept that Croats committed heinous and completely unprovoked crimes against the
Serbs in World War II because to do so would challenge the narrative, needed to justify Croat
nationalism, of intolerable Serb oppression which necessitated the rise of the NDH. What Braco
remembers first-hand, however, is looking for his father’s remains among the protruding
limestones of Dinara after Antiša is killed by the Partisans, and his mother Vranka gathering the
sun-bleached bones in a sack and burying them. Braco chooses to assign meaning to this
macabre memory and to disregard anything that might in any way qualify it and disrupt the
310 Turim, Flashbacks in Film, 1-2.
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construction of a historical narrative in which the Serbs are villains who killed his hero father.
Consequently, like Nafi, Braco has no sympathy for the Serbs. He sees the stories of the Ustashe
crimes against the Serbs simply as propaganda and, ironically, never heeds his father’s counsel
that the Serbs “are no different from me.”
Alluding to the 1980s trend of finding justification for self-righteous jingoism in half-true
narratives woven from flimsy accounts of historical trauma, Maternal Half-Brothers, through its
flashback structure, suggests that it is by choice that Braco does not accept that the Serbs are “no
different” from him. That Braco, at end of the film, returns to Yugoslavia not having achieved
his goal of bringing back the time in history he venerates symbolizes the absurdity of regressive
sociopolitical perspectives of ethnic nationalism that plagued Yugoslavia. The film affirms what,
sadly, bore repeating in the 1980s, which is that the NDH is an ugly edifice of the past, not an
ideal to aspire to in the future. Ultimately then, the film morphs Braco’s restorative nostalgia
into a reflective nostalgia which admits the “irrevocability of the past,” is itself “inconclusive and
fragmentary,” and can therefore be instructive in a more objective assessment of the relationship
between the past and present.311 As Svetlana Boym points out, reflective nostalgia “reveals that
longing and critical thinking are not opposed to one another, as reflective memories do not
absolve one from compassion, judgement or critical reflection.”312 Braco’s return to Yugoslavia,
especially his embrace of Veselin in the prison yard, symbolically validates Yugoslavia and
repudiates the ideology of the NDH. Presumably upon reflection sparked by his reconnection
with Veselin, Braco has re-evaluated his worldview and renounced “long-distance nationalism.”
More broadly then, by suggesting that his self-chosen exile has failed to provide Braco with
311 Boym, The Future of Nostalgia, 49, 50.
312 Ibid. 49-50.
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comfort because it has made him aim for unattainable goals, the film implies that anti-Yugoslav
agenda of the “emigration,” rooted in insubstantial historical justifications,  is unattainable.
Although both Dangerous Trail and Maternal Half-Brothers implicitly affirm the validity
of the Yugoslav state, they also imply that the notion of “Brotherhood and Unity” has always
been somewhat of an unattainable ideal. The films deal with the way the already deeply troubling
ethnic tensions were exacerbated by the activities of the Yugoslavs living abroad who viewed the
Yugoslav state as illegitimate, and actively worked to undermine it in order to “free” their co-
ethnics from its clutches. Dangerous Trail openly addresses the notion that Kosovo Albanians,
the largest non-Slavic minority in the country, never warmed up to the Yugoslav idea. The film
implies that owing to its decentralized nature—the myriad of accommodations meant to appease
those ethnic groups who claimed to have been denied their rights—and its openness towards the
West, the Yugoslav state was vulnerable to sabotage by the “emigration” working from, and
even with, the West. The film traces the lineage of Albanian irredentism to the Ballists, the
Albanian Nazi collaborators who terrorized the Serbs in World War II, suggesting that the fascist
legacy of that war had not been extinguished. Crucially, the film points to a serious discord
within the Yugoslav federation by alluding to the differences in how the Kosovo problem was
viewed within Yugoslavia. For the Serbs, the irredentist campaign to ethnically cleanse Kosovo,
and sever it from Serbia and Yugoslavia, was a matter of survival that needed to be dealt with
resolutely. For others, the Serbs’ grievances were a tactical exaggeration meant to strengthen the
argument for re-centralization and so help entrench the Serb domination of Yugoslavia. Though
the irredentists’ weapons smuggling operation is foiled and Serbia’s (and Yugoslavia’s)
constitutional and territorial integrity symbolically affirmed, the title card at the film’s
conclusion informs the viewer that the infamous March 1981 demonstrations are yet to come and
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so implies that the true events depicted in the film are only a prelude to a more comprehensive
plot to break apart both Serbia and Yugoslavia likely to soon unfold in reality.
Like Dangerous Trail, Maternal Half-Brothers deals with the anxieties about the
“emigration,” especially regarding how its activities synced up with internal political movements
like the Croatian Spring in order to invalidate the Yugoslav idea as a Serbian ploy to rule others.
In doing so, the film brings into dialogue two opposing views: the Serbs’ position that the Croats
are nostalgic for the NDH and waiting for an opportune moment to carry on with extermination
of the Serbs commenced in World War II, and the Croat view that the Serbs have always been
busy plotting how to sideline Croatia and hinder the Croats’ economic, cultural and political
interests. Maternal Half-Brothers implies an ideological lineage between the rise of nationalism
in Croatia, evident in movements like the MASPOK, and Croatia’s past as a Nazi satellite state.
The film depicts the Croatian Spring as fuelled by anti-Serb paranoia and an irrational
resentment of the Serb presence in Croatia, especially in politics and culture, and as aimed at
creating not a more democratic, but an ethnically clean Croatia. The film concludes, however, on
a somewhat hopeful note which validates the Yugoslav state. Although “destined” to be enemies,
the two half-brothers, whose tragic personal narratives are enmeshed with equally tragic
historical ones, tearfully embrace, symbolically endorsing the precarious Yugoslav “Brotherhood
and Unity.”
Horrors Yet to Come: Finessing the Genre in Déjà vu
Go on—remember everything.
—Bobika, Déjà vu
Seen to be shallow and in bad taste, even at the height of their popularity in the 1980s
slasher horror films remained firmly on the fringes of Hollywood. The graphic violence depicted
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in the films was thought to facilitate male fantasies of sadistic aggression against women via
mechanisms of spectator identification inherent in the film-viewing experience. The slashers
were often accused by the critics of propping up the oppressive patriarchal morality and so
facilitating a backlash against feminism among their target audience: young men.313 Some critics
and scholars disagreed with this assessment and suggested that slasher films provided, however
opaquely, a politically progressive alternative. Unbound by the prohibitive etiquette of the
mainstream public sphere, the films’ very transgressions functioned to vent the otherwise
repressed content by giving it radically subversive outlets. Robin Wood suggests that, although
often ideologically untidy, many 1970s American horror films channel anxieties that are “the
logical product of patriarchal capitalism.”314 These anxieties are caused, Wood goes on to say, by
various “predetermined roles” the system insists the citizens play which require repression of our
true selves in order for the pillars of the system like patriarchy, monogamy, heterosexuality, and
capitalism to be enacted.315 Precisely because their politics are often nearly unintelligible and
they tend not to be taken seriously by the larger public, “innocuous” genres like horror “can be
far more radical,” Wood suggests, in how they rebuke the system than those films whose politics
are lucid and consistent and which often unwittingly prop up at least some aspect the system.316
313 In an episode of their show dedicated entirely to debates around the subject, film critics Gene Siskel and
Roger Ebert discuss depictions of violence against women in the slashers. Siskel calls slashers “a depressing
development in American movies” within which violence against women is “grotesquely routine,” and suggests that
the trend is a “primordial response” by men to “the growth of the women’s movement in the last decade.” Sneak
Previews, “Extreme Violence Directed at Women,” (originally aired on WTTW Chicago September, 18 1980).
314 Wood, Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan, 64.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid., 70.
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For Wood, it is indeed the ideological “incoherence” of horror films that speaks most eloquently
about “the quandary of a civilization.”317
A subdued interpretation of the American slasher horror films of the 1970s and 1980s,
Goran Marković’s Déjà vu transplants most of the genre’s tropes, and with them the ideological
“incoherence,” into the Yugoslav context. While Déjà vu is more politically astute than the films
from which it derives, its indictment of its own sociopolitical context is made somewhat
ambiguous by the trappings of the genre. Most of the film takes place in the early 1970s, and
focuses on Mihailo, once a promising concert pianist, now an anxiety-ridden loner. Although he
no longer plays the instrument, Mihailo teaches piano at a night school grandiosely named
“Workers’ University.” The skulking Mihailo has been traumatized by a series of events,
incorporated into the narrative as nightmarish flashbacks, which occurred in his childhood and
adolescence. Still just a boy, Mihailo witnesses his mother attempt suicide following a divorce
from his womanizing father. A few years later, deeply attached to his mother, the teenage
Mihailo is devastated when he is unable to be with his mother in her final moments when,
presumably stricken by cancer, she dies an agonizing death. Shortly after World War II ends,
Mihailo’s father, a professional actor, is sentenced to death for treason by the new communist
government because he and his troupe continued working after the Nazis had occupied Belgrade.
Much of the family property is swiftly nationalized with one half of the family apartment going
to Stole, an abrupt and eager UDBA operative on whose testimony Mihailo’s father was
convicted. Decades later, Mihailo still shares the apartment with Stole, now bitter that he has
been let go by the UDBA following the fall of Ranković, and his family, and must endure Stole’s
frequent drunken rants seeping in from behind the French door dividing the apartment. Mihailo
317 Ibid., 63.
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finds solace with the oversexed Olgica, a fashion modeling instructor at “Workers’ University,”
who is desperate to escape her own grim reality of near-poverty. Mihailo’s world begins to
unravel, however, when Olgica’s presence triggers vivid childhood memories and Mihailo’s
present starts to uncannily parallel his past as if repeating it. Olgica, livid when Mihailo suffers
from stage fright and cannot perform Chopin’s “Revolutionary Étude” at an important function
she organizes in order to ingratiate herself to the officials of the local branch of the League of
Communists, leaves Mihailo for a new man. Realizing that Olgica never loved him, Mihailo
mentally snaps and goes on a killing spree inside Olgica’s house, massacring Olgica, her new
lover, and her father as Olgica’s younger brother observes the carnage from the shadows.
Robin Wood points out that horror monsters are often “products of the family.”318 Like
most slashers, Déjà vu appears to position its main character’s psychosis as directly resulting
from an Oedipal aberration in his psychosexual development: festering anger explodes into
violence when Olgica, Mihailo’s chosen mother-surrogate, fails to meet the criteria of the ideal
Mihailo wishes her to fulfill. The film’s adherence to this quintessential slasher trope, however,
is misleading. It is the state who initiates Mihailo into “monsterhood” by breaking apart his
vaguely bourgeois family of artists for dubious ideological reasons and then inserting into it
Stole, himself unstable because the state has “betrayed” him, who exacerbates Mihailo’s anguish
until he violently lashes out. Broadly, Mihailo’s predicament and neurosis can be said to
metaphorize the anxieties of the Yugoslavs no longer able to play their “predetermined roles”
and perform happy socialism while (squeezed by the 1980s economic crisis) rapidly losing belief
in the Yugoslav idea. As Daniel Goulding puts it, Mihailo’s “repressive psychological structure”
is linked “with larger forms of political and social repression” and “evokes the possibility of
318 Wood, Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan, 76.
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repetitive and imitative cycles of violence erupting at both the individual and societal level when
life is lived within rigid authoritarian and repressive structures.”319 Yet, what hazily emerges
when this broad critique of Yugoslav socialism is more closely examined is an indictment of the
dynamics of Yugoslav ethnic identity politics of the 1980s which revolved around mining of
history for unacknowledged injustices and scapegoating the “enemy” ethnic groups who (may or
may not have) committed them. Though Déjà vu never explicitly introduces the ethnic
dimension, Mihailo’s neurosis, rooted in a traumatic past, takes him from a sheepish victim to a
raging monster who takes the lives of innocents he perceives as guilty, and so uncannily mirrors
the Yugoslav sociopolitical dynamics which encouraged “repetitive and imitative cycles of
violence” in the 1980s and saw them to fruition in the 1990s.
Yugoslav politicians, public intellectuals, historians, and journalists spent the 1980s
discussing the historical traumas and mythologizing the victimhood of their own ethnos, and, in
retrospect it is easy to assert, fueled ethnic resentments and encouraged revenge. The heated
debates stoked the fires of chauvinism and helped give rise to rampant paranoia and, in turn, to
nationalist leaders who, as Yugoslavia expired in the early 1990s, used their co-ethnics’ fear of
their “enemies” to grab (or retain) power in their home republics. In retrospect, this morbid
public theatre, pitting against one another the competing claims of intertwining ethnic
exceptionalism, victimhood, and martyrdom, made for a fitting prelude to Yugoslavia’s break up
along the same ethnic lines that once propped up the ideal of “Brotherhood and Unity” which
held the country together. Mihailo’s agonizing past and the vengeful force it gives rise to not
only analogize this jingoistic obsession with historical trauma, but also symbolically suggest that
Yugoslavia is creeping towards a violent break up as bloody as Mihailo’s rampage at the end of
319 Goulding, Liberated Cinema, 181.
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Déjà vu. By depicting those around Mihailo as never bothering to try to alleviate his anxieties
and so possibly repair his psyche and restore his ability to tell apart the past from the present, the
film symbolically suggests that the state itself is somewhat to blame for the Yugoslavs’
obsession with historical trauma. Historical controversies should have been settled long ago
through productive dialogue rather than glossed over and disguised by “Brotherhood and Unity”
and its barely maintainable veneer of civility; old wounds would have been healed, and new and
respectful interethnic relationships forged, the film implies, thus never allowing traumas to fester
into time bombs metaphorized by Mihailo’s character. The violent eruption of Mihailo’s anger
then is a unique example of the horror trope of the return of the repressed in the socialist context.
It symbolically predicts that the citizens’ disillusionment with the Yugoslav socialist system,
already exacerbated by the economic crisis ravaging the country in the 1980s, having found its
expression in the myths of collective ethnic victimhood provoked by unattended-to historical
traumas, will develop into jingoistic posturing and explode into a catastrophic ethnic conflict.
Though it mimics the tropes of the American slashers, Déjà vu suffers less from the
“incoherence” that dulls the slashers’ political edge because Marković defuses and modifies
those tropes, especially the contentious emphasis on Oedipal aberrations and misogynist
fantasies of punishment for female sexual transgressions which he repurposes to indict the
aberrations and transgressions of the Yugoslav political system. In “Her Body, Himself,” Carol
Clover outlines how the slashers construct their brutal fantasies and lists the most essential
ingredients of the genre as psycho killers, promiscuous teen victims, houses that trap the victims,
phallic cold weapons used by the killers, virginal female survivors, and shockingly graphic
violence.320 In the American slashers, the killer typically corners his victims in a house, termed
320 Clover, “Her Body, Himself,” 194-204.
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by Clover the “terrible place.”321 Already steeped in horrific lore, usually connected to the
killer’s own past, the house, although at first a safe zone, becomes a trap in which the killer re-
enacts the site’s and/or his own past.322 In Déjà vu, there are two locations which jointly make
for a “terrible place”: Mihailo’s apartment where he endures daily reminders of his family’s
tragic fate, and Olgica’s house where the murders occur and which has its own unsettling history.
As in the American slashers, the “terrible place” provides insight into the killer’s psychology and
motivations, and offers clues as to what the victims might symbolize (both to the killer and to the
spectator). Olgica’s house is a site which she desperately wants to escape even before Mihailo’s
rampage. The cavernous, oppressively-lit house where she lives in near-poverty with her
alcoholic father and a sickly younger brother in desperate need of an expensive eye operation
denotes not just Olgica’s dire economic predicament, but that of all Yugoslavs. With the (for a
socialist country) near-profane images of the homeless gathered around a fire just outside the
front door, the site bluntly illustrates the severity of the economic crisis of the 1980s when
poverty was threatening to become a reality for many. The “place” is “terrible” because it houses
a family living in shockingly un-socialist conditions and so hints that the economic crisis, not
malice, leads Olgica to (manipulate) Mihailo and, consequently, to her demise.
The other half of the “terrible place,” Mihailo’s apartment which he shares with Stole and
his family, “houses” Mihailo’s trauma and acts as a constant reminder of the injustice done to
him by the state, barely allowing Mihailo to maintain his sanity. Only a credenza blocking the
living room French door separates Mihailo from Stole who moved in on the same day Mihailo’s
mother died. Stole and the credenza played a part in what was perhaps the most traumatic event
321 Clover, “Her Body, Himself,” 197.
322 Ibid.
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of Mihailo’s life. In one of his more agonizing flashbacks, Mihailo recalls the day his mother
succumbed to cancer. As he takes a glass of water to her, Mihailo’s path is blocked by the
credenza Stole and his friends had just brought in. The woman dies in agony as Mihailo, hearing
her anguished screams, begs Stole to let him to pass through to comfort her. Years later, Mihailo
has to put up with seeing the back of the credenza every day and has to listen to the torrent of
abuse hurled at him from the other side of it by Stole who rails against the enemies of the state
which include Mihailo to whom Stole refers as “that faggot” whenever he knows Mihailo is
within earshot. The apartment is “terrible” because it torments Mihailo and hints that his violent
breakdown, though incited by Olgica’s sexual transgressions, has its origins in a tragic history of
heartbreaking trauma caused by the state.
Like many slashers, Déjà vu features a killer who is still in “the grip of boyhood”—still
subject to a deep Oedipal attachment—and whose rage is “propelled by psychosexual fury.”323
Though Mihailo ostensibly kills because the “loose” Olgica is unable to emulate his mother and
so alleviate his anxieties, Mihailo’s irrepressible anger is a result of the actions of the state.
When Mihailo’s mother divorces his philandering father, Mihailo, who seems to only find
comfort in his mother’s arms, chooses to live with her. He, however, almost instantly arrives at a
crushing realization that his love is insufficient to keep his mother happy. Immediately following
the divorce, Mihailo’s mother attempts suicide by breaking a window and smashing her wrists
against the shards of glass still protruding from the window pane. As his mother is restrained,
little Mihailo walks up to the window and licks the blood as it streaks down the remaining
window glass. The morbid gesture of tasting his mother’s blood hints at Mihailo’s bond to her,
323 Clover, “Her Body, Himself,” 195, 194.
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and foreshadows the carnage it “necessitates” at the end of the film.324 Mihailo is indeed made
into a monster by his family. The womanizing father and the alternately emotionally distant and
coddling mother were bound to make Mihailo into an unstable adult. The family and so
Mihailo’s sanity, however, were ultimately wrecked by the state’s actions which prevented
Mihailo from getting past his Oedipal obsessions. The divorce may have removed the father as
an immediate competitor for the mother’s affection, but the trial and the resulting death penalty
removed him completely and forever. The state eliminated any possibility of Mihailo working
through his mother fixation and becoming a healthy adult. Instead, it made him into a raging
man-child stuck in a moment in the past. When, having selected Olgica as a mother-surrogate
with whom to “reconstitute” the family unit, Mihailo realizes that Olgica is flirtatious and
promiscuous and therefore more like his father, Mihailo’s psychic unity is shattered. When
Olgica becomes involved with Zoran, the karate instructor at “Workers’ University,” Mihailo
finally snaps. Mihailo’s realization that he cannot “save” Olgica (nor she him) is the final straw.
Mihailo kills Olgica and others for what he sees as an unendurable repetition of the sense of loss
he experienced upon the breakup of the “original” family unit.
While his victims are not teenagers suffering “postcoital death,” on the face of it as
punishment for being prematurely sexually active, Mihailo’s rampage is set in motion by what he
perceives as Olgica’s sexual transgressions.325 A typical slasher interpretation might suggest that
Olgica’s “punishment” is meant to satisfy the male viewer’s desire to see his patriarchal and
puritanical worldview violently reasserted by a killer whose moral criteria he shares. An against-
324 Mihailo’s “taste for blood” is further encouraged by the sultry house maid. As Mihailo watches the maid
slaughter a chicken in front of him, he licks the blood splattered over his lips. (Here, he also symbolically learns how
to kill.)
325 Clover, “Her Body, Himself,” 200. (only the term “postcoital death”)
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the-grain one might identify the film’s “incoherence” and suggest that the “punishment” is a
symbolic indictment of the aberrations of Yugoslav socialism. Mihailo’s murderous rage,
unleashed on Olgica and on anyone who happens to be around, symbolically predicts for
Yugoslavia a cataclysmic comeuppance for having built an anti-humanist society populated with
desperate, maladjusted individuals (whose potential to resist the system Mihailo‘s rage also
metaphorizes). Not realizing just how fragile Mihailo is, Olgica sets out to make the boy into a
man, but, unfortunately for her, Mihailo’s rite of passage includes putting him through an
emotional run-around and eventually breaking his heart. Olgica is frustrated that Mihailo does
not compliment her on her outfits; when he gives her flowers, she chastises him for “wasting
money”; when, like a schoolboy, he gives Olgica a love note at work, she callously tears it up in
front of him. Mihailo is devastated when he witnesses Olgica flirting with Zoran and
encouraging his advances. The memory of catching his father groping the giggling house maid
come flooding back in a torturous flashback and Mihailo begins to unravel, his pent-up anger
bubbling to the surface as he realizes that his feelings have been disregarded by the “loose”
Olgica much like his mother’s were many years ago by her rake of a husband.
Marković makes sure, however, that Olgica’s “looseness” is qualified as a symptom of
the defectiveness of the Yugoslav system, especially of the rampant economic crisis. The
ramshackle “Workers’ University,” barely maintaining a veneer of functionality, symbolically
hints at the absurdities of Yugoslavia’s failing socialist system and at a complete disillusionment
of the Yugoslavs with their country. The school offers everything from driving to modelling
lessons and seems to exist solely for the misfits unable to prosper within the system who are
eager to acquire additional qualifications in order to find employment and survive. Olgica’s
“looseness” is integral to her sudden outburst of ambition and its presence within this microcosm
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of Yugoslavia is a symbolic disturbance of the status quo. It is a shocking attempt by a desperate
ordinary citizen to “work” an unjust system and ensure her survival by whatever means
necessary. The male students in the Esperanto class are unable to focus on the absurd task of
learning to recite Petar Petrović-Njegoš’ famous poem, “The Mountain Wreath,” in the idealistic,
but non-existent language because they are distracted by Olgica’s strutting in a far-too-short mini
skirt just outside the classroom. When the instructors gather to discuss the possibility of
“Workers’ University” becoming a candidate to organize an important cultural event, almost all
are pessimistic about their ability to win the nomination as a rather detailed program of festivities
needs to be prepared. To everyone’s surprise, Olgica rallies the faculty and volunteers Mihailo to
play Chopin’s “Revolutionary Étude” at the event. That the instructors are initially lukewarm to
Olgica’s idea suggests they understand they are living in a system within which one knows one’s
place and simply performs the role of a happy socialist subject. Alluding to the system’s
hierarchy of power and influence, the school director bluntly explains to Olgica that it had likely
already been decided who would host the event and that competitive bidding is a mere formality.
Yet, desperate Olgica manages to persuade them to try. She hopes that if the event is a success,
as one of the organizers, she would be favoured to become a member of the League of
Communists which would, in turn, put her on a fast-track to get a full-time job and a flat. When
Mihailo struggles to get the Chopin piece right in the rehearsal sessions, afraid that her plan was
already falling apart, Olgica gives Mihailo a cruel ultimatum: if the étude is not rehearsed to
perfection in time for the event, she will never see him again. In Mihailo’s neglected skill as a
musician, Olgica sees an opportunity to improve her life. It is the desire to escape the effects of
the economic crisis, the “terrible house” in which she is trapped, that drives Olgica to use her
226
sexuality to heartlessly manipulate Mihailo and to futilely try to experience socialist prosperity
that has already run out.
Fittingly then, Marković gives Olgica’s “looseness,” perhaps precisely because of its
causal relationship with Olgica’s economic hardships, tangible political agency—the capacity to
be a catalyst for dissent against the unjust system. Olgica openly admits to Mihailo that only sex
allows her forget her miserable life. This “affliction” helps to sexually liberate Mihailo, but also
facilitates his symbolic revolt against the system. When Mihailo is hesitant to take the always
horny Olgica to his apartment for the first time, she insists and asks: “Who do you hide there,
you old pervert?” Olgica’s loud moaning during sex outrages Stole—the symbol of the injustice
done to Mihailo and his family—whose theory about Mihailo’s sexuality falls to pieces. When
Stole’s and his friends’ drunken singing coming from the other side of the apartment annoys the
brusque Olgica, she calls the men “peasant swine” and demands they shut up. Enraged, Stole
shouts over the credenza, promising to kill the “slut” as Mihailo breaks down crying, realizing
that the walls of his sheltered life are coming down. Olgica’s “loose” presence in Mihailo’s life
is the agent that brings him into conflict with Stole whom he has had to tolerate—hide in his
psyche—and appease for years, but will soon confront and so symbolically confront the system
that has wronged both him and Olgica.
At first, Olgica’s “looseness” so reinvigorates Mihailo that he plays the piano for the first
time since his mother’s death. Yet, he remains unsettled because he sees the ghost of his mother
in Olgica who inadvertently plays up the resemblance. When Olgica, after rummaging through
Mihailo’s mother’s closet, puts on an outfit the woman used to wear, shocked Mihailo can only
stare at her in stunned silence. Uninterested in his emotional moment, Olgica callously insists
that Mihailo give her the pendant which belonged to his mother to prove that he truly loves her.
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Mihailo agrees, locking Olgica into the role of his mother-surrogate. Yet, Olgica’s “looseness”
also disturbs the Oedipal spell Mihailo is under by alerting him to his incestuous desire.326 While
making love to Olgica, Mihailo flashes back to a moment in his childhood when he walked in on
his parents having sex. As Olgica moans in ecstasy just like Mihailo’s mother did, the position of
her body identical to that of his mother’s on that day, Mihailo appears shocked by this uncanny
repetition. Importantly, his horrified facial expression also suggests a deep shame upon recalling
this moment when he began to resent his father. The event is “replayed” yet again, even more
exactly, when Olgica’s brother, Bobika, walks in on Mihailo and Olgica having sex, this time at
her home. With a manifestation of his childhood self staring accusingly at him, the adult Mihailo
seems to become aware for the first time of his incestuous desire for his mother. Facing
“himself,” and weeping from the shock and shame, Mihailo begins to realize that just like his
mother never belonged to him, Olgica may not either.
With a brief period of happiness over, Mihailo is even more uneasy than before, hinting
that he may soon break down and bring events to a violent and catastrophic conclusion.
Unfortunately, his confidence is shattered just before the performance at “Workers’ University.”
As the festivities celebrating the virtues of Yugoslav socialism begin, the sight of the crowded
hall triggers in Mihailo the memories of his father’s trial. In the flashback, teenage Mihailo,
seated in the audience, observes as the prosecutor insists the actors could have and should have
refused to work under the Nazis. The aggressive courtroom audience led by a young Stole
clamors for death sentences for the frightened thespians. Recognizing him as the son of one of
the actors, Stole comes face to face with Mihailo and shouts the famous Yugoslav Partisan
slogan: “Death to fascism! Freedom to the people!” As the same slogan rings out in the packed
326 Olgica’s “looseness” even symbolically indicts patriarchy by disturbing Mihailo’s child-like
understanding of how a woman should behave.
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hall at “Workers’ University,” Mihailo shakes off the unwanted memory just before he is to walk
onto the stage. Once he sits down at the piano, he is only able to utter, “I can’t,” before the
Esperanto instructor awkwardly starts to recite “The Mountain Wreath” to the confused audience
who laugh out loud at the absurdity of hearing the poem recited in a language no one
understands.
That night Mihailo wakes up in agony, having replayed in his dreams the day he was
prevented from being with his mother on her deathbed, his screams mimicking hers in her final
moments. He finally reaches the breaking point and starts to bang on the French door that divides
the apartment in two until the credenza behind it comes crashing down. Symbolically taking
back what is his, Mihailo triumphantly enters Stole’s side of the apartment as Stole observes in
utter amazement, realizing that Mihailo is no longer a timid loner he can push around, but a
dangerous psychotic. Leaving the confused Stole behind, Mihailo heads to Olgica’s house.
There, he first strangles the family dog and then kills Olgica’s father by pinning him to the
bathroom door with a kitchen knife through the throat.327 Shortly after Olgica and Zoran arrive,
Mihailo attacks Zoran as he undresses while Olgica is in the shower. Mihailo first slashes Zoran
across the chest with a sabre he finds in the house and then, when Zoran tries to utilize his karate
skills, almost cuts his hand off. The hand dangles grotesquely as Zoran screams in pain and
Mihailo cackles maniacally. Mihailo then uses the sabre to stab Zoran, now on his knees and
crying for help. As almost every slasher killer does, Mihailo uses weapons that ensure “closeness
and tactility” to murder Zoran and Olgica’s father, but not surprisingly reserves the closest
contact for Olgica.328 As the police barge into the house, having been alerted to the commotion
327 An apparent hommage to John Carpenter’s Halloween (1978) in which Michael Myers kills Bob, one of
the film’s doomed teenagers, by pinning him to a door with a kitchen knife.
328 Clover, “Her Body, Himself,” 198. (only the phrase “closeness and tactility”)
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by the neighbours, they hear muffled screams coming from the bathroom where Mihailo
strangles Olgica, still in the shower, with his bare hands. Only Bobika escapes Mihailo’s wrath.
He emerges from a dark corner of the house as the police take Mihailo away and, like Mihailo
after his mother’s attempted suicide, gives the blood splattered over the door a taste as Mihailo
grins approvingly.
Unlike most American slashers, Déjà vu does not depict violence particularly graphically.
As Carol Clover suggests, slashers tend to take full advantage of advances in special effects “to
show maiming and dismemberment in extraordinarily credible detail,” the jarring shock of
which, especially when it follows an understated build up, comes with a degree of campiness and
self-parody and so causes the films to not be taken “seriously.”329 Though Zoran calling for his
mother upon seeing his hand hang limply by a thread of skin makes for an almost farcical
moment, it is also one of gruesomely poetic justice. For Zoran’s hand, an all-too-obvious
symbolic phallus, to be cut down with a weapon possessing an equally obvious phallic
symbolism seems appropriate. Brimming with confidence for the first time ever, Mihailo
reasserts his masculinity in a clash with a ladies’ man who took Olgica away from him. Yet, as
Mihailo administers a coup de grâce and finishes Zoran off, Marković’s camera is focused on
Mihailo’s grimacing face as if to remind the spectator that Mihailo’s rage is righteous, not to be
taken lightly, and about much more than petty male rivalry.
In an unusual case of intertwining tropes, Mihailo, like most slasher killers, leaves a
legacy in the form of a “successor.” Classic American slashers typically feature a “final girl”
who, having come very close to death, is the only surviving witness to the horror. Smart,
329 Clover, “Her Body, Himself,” 205.
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practical, boyish, and atypical in that she restrains her sexuality, she manages to survive thanks
to her ingenuity, and sometimes even exacts revenge on the killer.330 Déjà vu features not a “final
girl,” but a “final boy”—Olgica’s younger brother Bobika. It is Bobika’s character that Marković
utilizes particularly pointedly to indict the trend of wallowing in trauma and passing it on from
generation to generation. The grown up Bobika only appears in the two brief sequences, one at
the beginning and one at the end, situated in the film’s present. In the opening sequence, Bobika
encounters the now aging Mihailo at a piano concert. Mihailo, who appears ancient well beyond
his years, has been brought up from the mental institution, where he had presumably been placed
following his killing spree, as an emergency replacement for the pianist who is unable to play
that evening.331 Stunned, Bobika cannot help the flood of grisly memories of the night he
watched Mihailo kill his father and sister and mutters to himself, “Go on—remember
everything,” before the film flashes back to the early 1970s. The film ends where it began, with
ageing Mihailo playing piano on stage and Bobika observing him from the audience. (Unlike
years before at “Workers’ University,” Mihailo performs flawlessly.) As his doctors take Mihailo
away following the performance, Bobika squeezes in his hand the pendant that once belonged to
Mihailo’s mother and Mihailo had gifted to Olgica as a token of his love. The film’s credits roll
as Bobika sneaks up behind Mihailo, who is now wandering alone through corridors of the
concert hall, summoning the courage to strangle Mihailo using the pendant chain.
Like the “final girl” in an American slasher, Bobika has a special connection with the
monster, but also mirrors the monster as if predestined to become one himself. When Bobika
walks in on Mihailo and Olgica having sex, he is “playing” Mihailo in a restaging of an incident
330 Clover, “Her Body, Himself,” 201.
331 Mihailo’s appearance seems to be a reference to Grandpa from Tobe Hooper’s The Texas Chain Saw
Massacre (1974)
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from Mihailo’s childhood. When Bobika licks the blood splattered over the living room door
after the murders, he is echoing Mihailo’s own reaction after his mother attempts suicide. The
two seem to be the adjoining monsters in a chain of many created by the state. Like Mihailo,
Bobika grows up in a highly dysfunctional home that falls apart when Mihailo goes on a
rampage and effectively initiates Bobika into “monsterhood” by passing onto him the trauma and
rage with which he had been “endowed” by the state. It is by “merging” Bobika’s and Mihailo’s
characters then that the film perhaps most effectively “evokes the possibility of repetitive and
imitative cycles of violence” when citizens are forced into “predetermined roles.” In the opening
and closing sequences, Bobika appears to be a maladjusted loner who prowls the streets and
lurks in dark corners just like Mihailo used to and who might one day snap under the weight of
his traumas just like Mihailo did. As he tries to embolden and incite himself to strangle Mihailo
by repeating the words, “Do it. Now. Don’t hesitate,” Bobika observes Mihailo through a
distorted fish-eye lens first-person perspective that up to now only Mihailo possessed.332 By
giving this subjective perspective, typical of slasher killers, to both Mihailo and Bobika,
Marković hints that the two are one and the same monster. The main body of Déjà vu, the
content wedged in between the two sequences that take place in the present, can even be seen as
Bobika’s own flashback, symbolically suggesting that Bobika’s trauma “contains” Mihailo’s.
The two monsters are integral to the same trauma, reflecting one another in a kind of mise en
abyme, with Bobika now entrusted with the responsibility of keeping alive the traumatic memory
and possessing the potential to further replicate the trauma. That the past is bookended by and
332 Early in the film, as he develops an interest in Olgica, Mihailo lurks around the “Workers’ University”
and secretly observes Olgica from dark corners of the building. Marković gives Mihailo the typically slasher
“predatory,” subjective point-of-view (hand-held, darting camera movement mimicking human movement and
perception, accompanied by the sound of heavy breathing) Carol Clover refers to as “I-camera.” Clover, “Her Body,
Himself,” 190.
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reverberates in the present ultimately implies then that the past destabilizes the present—unfolds
within it as if it belonged there—symbolically alluding to the enduring and seemingly self-
perpetuating obsessions with traumatic historical events unsettling the Yugoslavs in the 1980s.
Arguably, the politics of Déjà vu are obscured by the trappings of the slasher genre. Like
many slasher killers, Mihailo is a psychopath whose rage is grounded in a kink in his
psychosexual development and provoked by victims who appear to be incompatible with his
moral universe. The Oedipal frustrations of a psychotic man may not seem, even metaphorically,
to encapsulate aspects of the social and political climate of the 1980s Yugoslavia. Even when
Mihailo’s rage is given distinct political connotations which suggest that its true background is
the mistreatment Mihailo and his family received at the hands of the state, the film’s political
concerns appear archaic. The specifics of that mistreatment—Mihailo’s father’s death sentence,
based on flimsy evidence of collaboration with the Nazis and nationalization of the family’s
property that follows it—seem to suggest that Mihailo’s rage articulates dismay at the bullish
behaviour of the state towards the ideological misfits during post-war transition to socialism—
more than forty years before. A look at how Déjà vu appropriates the slasher genre, especially at
how Mihailo’s victims, Olgica chief among them, differ from those of other slasher killers,
however, reveals that the symbolism behind Mihailo’s rage is neither archaic nor Oedipal, but
rather concerns the imminent breakdown of the Yugoslav society. Though brash and “overly”
sexual, Olgica is not a carefree teenager, but a desperate citizen almost as damaged as Mihailo
himself. It is Olgica’s desperate effort to escape her economic circumstances that drives her to
use her sexuality to manipulate Mihailo and so provoke his murderous rage. Mihailo’s anger at
Olgica’s failure to alleviate (or to even acknowledge his trauma) qualifies his murderous
rampage as a metaphor for a catastrophic failure of the Yugoslav system that will come, the film
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suggests, as a result of Yugoslav obsessions with traumatic historical events. Personified in
Mihailo, this inability to let go of historical traumas is about to produce a carnage as bloody as
Mihailo’s. Crucially, however, through Olgica’s character, Déjà vu implies that the trend of
wallowing in resentment and bitterness over real and imagined past injustices is a byproduct of
the economic crisis. Just as Mihailo’s trauma, elevated into a mythical martyrdom and, in turn,
into a reason to kill those who disregard it, finds an expression in Mihailo’s killing spree, so will
the Yugoslavs’ obsession with historical trauma, spurred on by catastrophically poor economic
prospects, eventually channel itself into a bloodshed. However seemingly “incoherent” then,
Déjà vu pointedly and ominously predicts that the economic crisis ravaging Yugoslavia in the
1980s will ultimately result in a war likely to destroy the country.
Conclusion
The mild optimism on the cusp of the new decade when the economic reforms seemed to
be leading towards a recovery and Yugoslavia appeared to be a feasible prospect for EC
membership was dashed when sporadic violence broke out in 1991. In hindsight, it is easy to see
the signs foreshadowing the ethnic war that quickly followed, lasted five years, and engulfed
much of Yugoslavia. The economic crisis and the devastating austerity measures seemed to
prove that the state was unable to navigate the global economic waters. Tito’s death in 1980
provided a deeply symbolic omen that Yugoslavia, too, might soon suffer the same fate. The
EC’s hesitance to welcome Yugoslavia into its fold likely exacerbated the effects of austerity
measures, further undermining the authority of the federal government and, in turn, encouraging
Slovenes and Croats to attempt join the EC without the “backward” parts of the country,
especially without the Serbs they deemed inherently incapable of internalizing European cultural
values and bent on taking over Yugoslavia while mercilessly crushing anyone who dared stand in
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their way. The ongoing process of decentralization, too, had undermined the federal government
and, ironically, destabilized the interethnic relationships. Arguably, Yugoslavia’s statehood was
being eroded for a democratic cause—the state was withering away as it was meant to—but the
power seemed to go to the republican actors who were “completely unaccountable,” asserted
their power increasingly without compromise, leaving the citizens “further disenfranchised.”333
The Serbs were vilified for pushing for political and economic re-centralization and were
portrayed by the Slovenes and Croats as being recklessly antagonistic in their efforts to entrench
themselves in power. For its part, Serbia claimed that the Serb minority in Croatia was once
again facing repression at the hands of increasingly hostile Croats nostalgic for the fascist NDH
and that the Serbs living in Kosovo were already being openly being persecuted by the
Albanians. By the end of the 1980s, the interethnic relationships were so tense that the
“Brotherhood and Unity” of the Yugoslav Dream seemed a laughable phrase.
Together, Maternal Half-Brothers, Dangerous Trail, and Déjà vu are representative of
the post-Tito era Yugoslav cinema in that they deal with the fallout of this infighting over the
country’s constitutional make up which they anticipate is going to further encourage ethnic
nationalism, already severely exacerbated by the economic crisis, and result in a bloody ethnic
war and possibly Yugoslavia’s end. In examining the Yugoslav interethnic dynamics, Maternal
Half-Brothers and Dangerous Trail reach far back into the history of the region. Both films
indirectly engage with Ottoman imperialism which severed the Balkans from Europe and planted
the seeds of future conflict and with Austro-Hungarian imperialism which, in seeking to contain
the Ottoman threat, only further exacerbated ethnic animosities. Šotra’s film examines how the
Croats’ resentment of the Serb “intruders,” who settled in Croatia after being offered land in
333 Vejvoda, “Yugoslavia 1945-91,” 16-17.
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exchange for military service along the border between the Habsburg and Ottoman domains,
which manifested itself during World War II when the NDH committed genocide on Serb
population in its territory, still reverberated in the socialist Yugoslavia as practically a constituent
element of the process of decentralization. The film voices the fear, prevalent among the Serbs,
that Croatian “liberals” were Ustashe in-all-but-name. The film suggests that the Croatian
Spring, in its efforts to decentralize Yugoslavia, promoted nostalgia for the NDH, encouraged
“long-distance nationalism” and even terrorism among the “emigration” in order to destroy
Yugoslavia which the movement disdained as a repressive edifice erected by and for the Serbs.
In telling the story by intertwining the half-brothers’ subjective flashbacks, Šotra attempts to
provide an objective insight into how the two ethnicities came to be in conflict. Maureen Turim
suggests that there are “psychoanalytic implications” to flashbacks—they form a “case history”
which the viewer interprets the way a psychoanalyst might interpret a patient’s dreams.334
Braco’s and Veselin’s versions of events that unfolded in the past are not antithetical to each
other, but rather combine into a single more complete narrative. That narrative ultimately
suggests that the two men most comfortably occupy the space where the two ethnically-inflected
and supposedly mutually exclusive versions of history intersect rather than where they converge.
The intermingled destinies of Braco and Veselin, which saw the two navigate Yugoslavia’s
complex mixture of ethnic identities and their politics, are perhaps best interpreted as a “case
history” of Yugoslavia, ultimately suggesting that ethnic nationalism is most harmful to those
who, even if seduced by it, are unable to easily take sides.
Miomir Stamenković’s Dangerous Trail also deals with the difficulties involved in taking
sides in ethnic conflicts as it examines the animosities between the Kosovo Serbs and
334 Turim, Flashbacks in Film, 18.
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Albanians—one of the thorniest political issues in Yugoslavia. As in Maternal Half-Brothers, the
subtext is the history of imperialism in the region and the process of Yugoslavia’s
decentralization. Kosovo’s autonomy, achieved through Yugoslavia’s constitutional reform in
1974, boosted Albanian irredentism, the film implies, and allowed it to consolidate its campaign
of expulsion of the Serbs from Kosovo, in effect picking up the work commenced by the
Ottomans in the fourteenth century and continued by the Ballists during World War II. In taking
this position, Dangerous Trail sides with the view, taken for granted in Serbia, that the autonomy
is merely a prelude to Kosovo’s complete extrication from Serbia and Yugoslavia, soon to be
“legitimized” by the Albanians’ numerical advantage achieved by driving the Serbs out with
intimidation and violence. Yet, the film does not portray Albanians as singularly hostile towards
the Serbs and, as the conflict within Nafi’s own family symbolically implies, suggest that
irredentism is a movement whose merits should be re-evaluated by Albanians themselves
because it divides them internally when they are faced with the difficult choice of taking sides.
Like Maternal Half-Brothers, Dangerous Trail indicts the “emigration” whose nostalgia for
some mythical Serb-free past spurs on and nurtures “long-distance nationalism” and terrorism.
Although the state eliminates the immediate danger at the end of the film, Dangerous Trail
ominously suggests that the threat remains and posits that Albanian irredentism should be curbed
before a larger conflict breaks out the state will be powerless to contain.
Goran Marković’s slasher horror, Déjà vu, predicts just such a catastrophic end for
Yugoslavia, inevitable precisely because of the trend of mining the past for wrongs to be righted
in the present. Though it suffers from “incoherence” less than the 1970s and 1980s American
slashers from which it derives, Déjà vu, too, as it transplants slasher tropes into the Yugoslav
context, is somewhat ideologically ambiguous. Mihailo lashes out when his Oedipal desire does
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not find satisfaction in the oversexed Olgica. In a classic American slasher, Mihailo’s reaction
might be interpreted as misogynistic and patriarchal moralizing—the “loose” female character is
forced into obedience. Behind Mihailo’s rage, however, is a history of injustice, regrettably not
taken seriously by Olgica (or by anyone else around Mihailo) and that injustice is responsible for
the carnage that unfolds at film’s end. Mihailo’s rage is a symbolic artifact of the past,
“unearthed” in the present by a society that has reached an impasse. More specifically then,
Mihailo’s inability to come to terms with the injustice alludes to the historical traumas which
were sources of animosity among Yugoslav ethnic groups in the 1980s and his killing spree
suggest that those animosities are about to boil over. Crucially, Yugoslavia’s economic crisis is
firmly integrated into the reasoning behind Mihailo’s rampage. Through the character of Olgica,
manipulative because she is desperate to escape a life of poverty, the film suggests that the
conduit for the trend of mining of history for evidence of injustice was the economic crisis which
so frustrated Yugoslavs that it encouraged ethnic scapegoating. Suggesting that there will be no
respite for Yugoslavia’s problems—that victimhood mentality, spurred on by the economic
crisis, will lead to violence—the film’s apocalyptic finale prophesies chaos and self-destruction
for Yugoslavia. Whatever “incoherence” the film might suffer from is perhaps fitting as it
enables Déjà vu to mirror the “quandary of a civilization” mired in a bewildering cacophony of
the competing claims of ethnic exceptionalism and victimhood, integral to the general confusion
and turmoil engulfing the country in the 1980s.
Together then, Maternal Half-Brothers, Dangerous Trail and Déjà vu expose one of the
most disastrous effects of global capitalism’s reach into Yugoslavia’s economy: the economic
crisis which prompted some republics to give up on Yugoslavia and turn solely to ethnocentric
politics, always likely to destroy the country. In their assessment of the sociopolitical
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environment of the 1980s Yugoslavia, Maternal Half-Brothers and Dangerous Trail indirectly
allude to the specter of Balkanism which made itself especially visible in the 1980s when
Yugoslavia began to divide itself into the allegedly hopelessly economically backward and
staunchly communist east, and the supposedly economically advanced and democratic west.
Echoes of Aleksandar Ranković’s ousting and of subsequent intensification of the processes of
economic and political decentralization reverberate through Maternal Half-Brothers and
Dangerous Trail via their depictions of how Yugoslav reforms encouraged, in parts of the
country, anti-Yugoslav sentiments and a nostalgia for the pre-Yugoslav past while Déjà vu
predicts that once the notion of Yugoslavism—the backbone of “Brotherhood and Unity” that
ensured the country’ conceptual stability—completely disappears, so will Yugoslavia itself.
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Conclusion
Back to the Front
As historian Dejan Jović points out, in order to define the ever-evolving nuances of
Yugoslavia’s identity, the state had to define its main Others: “prewar Yugoslavism”
(constitutional monarchy, liberal democracy, capitalist economy, class difference), abandoned
following World War II and replaced with its socialist iteration, and “Soviet-style socialism”
(extensive state bureaucracy which fully controlled all aspects of the economy and political life),
abandoned after Tito’s split with Stalin in 1948 when the doctrine of self-management and
market socialism were introduced.335 Locating Others in both communist East and capitalist
West was the most symbolic as well as the most hazardous aspect of how Yugoslavia perceived
and positioned itself. This commitment to what can be seen as a “third way” was cemented in
1961 when Yugoslavia—together with Egypt, India, and Indonesia—founded the Non-Aligned
Movement, remaining its most-prominent member until the country’s dissolution in 1991. As the
Soviet Union weakened while itself pursuing reforms through the perestroika in the late 1980s,
Yugoslavia’s “third way” lost meaning because it longer had one of its Others. What followed
was an uneasy transition to capitalism, accompanied by an ambition to join the European family
at perhaps the most opportune moment—when the European Community was being transformed
into the even more binding European Union. Its many problems notwithstanding (a weak
economy being the chief one), Yugoslavia seemed far better positioned to join the EU than any
other European soon-to-be former communist state. Yet, ironically, a union of European peoples
seemed to have no place in the unifying Europe.
335 Dejan Jović, “Communist Yugoslavia and its ‘Others’,” in Ideologies and National Identities: the case
of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe, eds. John Lampe and Mark Mazower (Budapest: Central European
University Press, 2004), 281.
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Even as the 1990s war approached, Yugoslavia’s last Prime Minister, Ante Marković,
believed that the country was to be a part of the European integrationist project. His economic
reforms, implemented in 1989 and 1990, made it clear that “Yugoslav authorities had understood
that their next step had to be a change of the system.”336 Though Yugoslavia actively pursued
economic ties with the EC even at the height of the Cold War, the organization’s cooperation
always remained heavily conditioned on economic and political reforms. Although its
geographic position and relative economic and political openness should have made Yugoslavia
an ideal candidate, the EC continued to keep Yugoslavia at arm’s length and no sincere effort to
preserve the country’s integrity was made by the organization.337 Arguably, an offer of
accelerated membership would have served as the strongest possible incentive for Yugoslav
republics to negotiate an end to the political crisis and so avoid the war. Instead, as the more
economically developed Yugoslav republics, Croatia and Slovenia remained the primary sites of
interest for the EC. Surely not coincidentally, these were also the “civilized,” Western-oriented
Yugoslav republics that had already renounced socialism, began to embrace capitalism, and had
always seen Yugoslavia as their prison, with the Serbs as its wardens.
336 Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 85.
337 In retrospect, despite its problems, the late 1980s Yugoslavia should have been a serious (and perhaps
the only formerly communist) prospect for EC membership because it was reforming its political and economic
system. Accompanying Prime Minister Ante Marković’s economic recovery program was a radical transformation
of the republican communist parties, yet there seemed to be little interest within the EC in helping Yugoslavia along.
The country was still not represented by an official delegation to the EC—it remained at the doorstep, still excluded
from the elite company (the future EU) in the making. As Branislav Radeljić points out, ”the Community was
unfamiliar with the problems Yugoslavia was facing, while Yugoslavia was exempted from any concerns linked to
the Community.” Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 48. It was as if the EC was simply waiting for
Yugoslavia to “wither away.” Zachary Irwin points out that “EC-Yugoslav trade had increased consistently, by as
much as 17 percent between 1987 and 1988 for a total of 38 percent of all Yugoslav exports.” This, however, was
insufficient to alleviate the effects of the economic crisis—a substantial financial assistance was desperately needed.
It came in May of 1991 in the form of a promise of “some 730 million ECU shortly before Yugoslavia’s crisis
would descend into civil war.” Irwin, “Yugoslavia’s Relations with European States,” 373.
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Yugoslavia’s rejection of the Soviets in 1948 served to appease not just the West, but also
the west of the country, especially Slovenia and Croatia who saw the Russians as Serb allies and
therefore as their “natural” antagonists. This fracture in Yugoslavia’s unity was only temporarily
narrowed, however, and became a gaping chasm in the years leading up to Yugoslavia’s break-
up when (mostly disingenuous) protestations to Western powers about Serbia were common in
Slovenia and Croatia who claimed Serbia to be despotic, oppressive, and slow to reform.338
Resurrecting those pre-Yugoslav “pet Balkan people” dynamics, at the beginning of the
Yugoslav crisis, “Slovenes and Croats sought support in Austria, Germany and Italy, while the
Serbs had a degree of consensus with the Russians.”339 Boris Yeltsin’s Russia was, however, far
too weak to be of any assistance to Serbia in championing the Yugoslav cause thus tipping the
balance towards the emerging European superpower, Germany, who appeared to not want
Yugoslavia integrated into Europe “proper” as single state and arguably facilitated the country’s
dismemberment into mini states. Branislav Radeljić stresses that Yugoslavia’s demise, more than
being a result of the demise of communism, or a failure due to some innate Balkan dysfunction,
was “achieved by a selective international recognition policy of its internal republics”340 While
some EC members (France, Great Britain, Greece, for example) were cautious and favoured
approaches that ensured Yugoslavia’s survival, Germany dismissed Yugoslavia as a legal entity
338 More than ever before, European identity was secured on the basis of proximity and an imagined kinship
to Western Europe. The perpetual efforts by Slovenia and Croatia to prove their European credentials through—if
being authentically European is impossible—being a barrier between the West and its Eastern Others (starting with
Serbia) picked up speed as the country destabilized in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
339 Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 25. It is difficult to disregard that this dynamic was a
resumption of past alliances. Croatia and Slovenia sought the help of former Axis powers—as they did in World
War II—to escape Yugoslavia; the Serbs, whose reputation from two world wars as fierce fighters against
historically aggressive states like Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, afforded them some (though
apparently not enough) respect from Britain and France, looked towards the staunchly anti-fascist Russians.
340 Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 26.
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by first encouraging Croatia and Slovenia to declare independence and then lobbying, or rather
insisting that other EC members recognize the new states.341 The western-most and therefore
least “Balkan” Yugoslav republics were seen as ready to depart the allegedly hopelessly
backward eastern part of the Yugoslav federation and as the only ones suitable for eventual
integration into the European family.
The ensuing war involved “humanitarian” military interventions by Western powers and
left a legacy of continued economic and political instability in most of what used to be
Yugoslavia, not to mention a complete breakdown of interethnic relationships—a sad ending to
what was a viable solution for the South Slavs whose cultures Yugoslavism once synthesized.
Ironically, the West saw the Yugoslav wars as revolting—shockingly incompatible with modern
Europe—and the former Yugoslavs as bellicose slaves to mysterious historical traumas which
warrant revenge rather than as having been led into war by outsiders who seemingly could not
allow a “third way” country to remain standing. The most insidious aspect of this dynamic was
the deepening of the “civilizational” fracture running between Yugoslavia’s east and west. The
341A cynic might argue that Germany, the dominant EC state, made sure that Yugoslavia was not integrated
into Europe “proper” as single state. Branislav Radeljić suggests that it was the “activism of non-state actors” that
had a great deal of influence on Germany’s apparent preference for Yugoslavia to break up. Radeljić, Europe and
the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 6. For instance, Radeljić argues, that the Croatian and Slovenian diasporas lobbied
various German political parties to, in turn, lobby the German government to take up the two Yugoslav republics’
causes of independence. This particular foreign policy matter became subject to intense internal pressure to take up
the idealistic Wilsonian principles of self-determination and nation-building, and use this unique opportunity to
improve Germany image by portraying the country as a champion of democracy, and as a humanitarian, principled,
resolute future EU leader. As this issue was rather “soft,” not much was at stake in this approach—there was no
imperative to take outside views into consideration, some of which were calling for an EC-wide non-recognition
policy. Ultimately, faced with the possibility of some EC members not falling in line, Germany acted unilaterally
and recognized Croatia and Slovenia as independent states, so ensuring Yugoslavia’s end. Indeed, the rest of the EC
quickly followed Germany’s lead. For more on Croatia’s and Slovenia’s diasporas lobbying efforts in the EC
(including, significantly, the Vatican), see Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia, 93-168. Though
difficult to verify, a popular claim within the Yugoslav breakup lore is that in exchange for cooperation on this issue
Germany made mollifying promises to “difficult” EC members such as to allow an opt-out clause for Great Britain
in the Maastricht Treaty, and to support Greece in its dispute with Macedonia. Radeljić, Europe and the Collapse of
Yugoslavia, 3.
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Western drive to transform the Yugoslav economy into a capitalist one, a process which
predisposed the western portion of the country for EC membership, “announced” the later
disregard for the legitimacy of Yugoslav statehood as well as the NATO intervention against the
Serbs—the side in the conflict most peripheral to Europe “proper.” The Serbs, who did lash out
particularly violently against others during the war, had little to gain from Yugoslavia’s
destruction as it was always going to see them dispersed among several newly-independent
states. Yet, they were cynically deemed by the West to have been Yugoslavia’s sole destroyers
whose hegemonic ways could simply no longer be tolerated and forced the hand of the
democratic and progressive west of the country which had to secede.342 This is a rather reductive
interpretation of the roots of war and takes into consideration none of the nuances of Yugoslav
political reality. The Serbs’ own nationalist paranoia, occasional bullishness and sense of
entitlement notwithstanding, the more complete explanation is that the war came when
manipulated Yugoslav peoples started to perceive their neighbours as their Others—when, while
attempting to reorganize their post-communist social and political environment, they were
presented with a false choice, East or West, forcing them to leave the “third way” behind.
Arguably, the Yugoslav Dream was tantamount to this balancing act between the global
East and West as well as between the country’s east and west. Assessed this way, ironically, the
Yugoslav Dream—manifested in the litany of adjustments to the political and economic
342 Playing on Western Russophobia (which, of course, incorporated anti-communist sentiments), media
reports on the war almost invariably described Serbia as “a traditional Russian ally” whose preference for
Yugoslavia to survive was alternately compared to Nazism and Communism (equals in the Western imagination)—a
ploy to continue to subjugate non-Serbs desperate to secede from Yugoslavia and escape Serb hegemony.
Discussing the proliferation of anti-Serb sentiments in Europe at the time, Diana Johnstone points out that “by
portraying Serb attachment to Yugoslavia as an aggressive nationalist plot to create ‘Greater Serbia’, the
secessionists transformed this obstacle into an asset. Serbs’ desire to stay in Yugoslavia was transformed into the
main argument for destroying it.” Johnstone, Fool’s Crusade, 124. The Western media seemed to accept this
assessment and used it to “Nazify” the Serbs by depicting them as bloodthirsty and “genocidal.” Subsequently, the
Serbs became the sole guilty party in almost all discourse about the Yugoslav wars.
244
systems—is what made Yugoslavia far too geopolitically ill-defined and therefore susceptible to
being destabilized both from without and from within. The difficulty with making Yugoslavia’s
“third way” work—a struggle perhaps best defined by the opposition between Milovan Djilas’
democratic socialism and Aleksandar Ranković’s hardline authoritarianism—is the somewhat
obscured dialogical thread that runs through this dissertation. It was the Black Wave filmmakers
who first, however obliquely, engaged with the notion of lack of clarity as to what precisely
Yugoslavia was by suggesting that the New Class thrived because it had perfected the
performance of the balancing act. Black Wave films I analyze imply that political elites count on
such murkiness to allow them to finesse the system—to materially benefit while insisting on
their own irreplaceability as experts at “third way” without implementing tangible changes
because the system could not be altered without upsetting the balance between East and West
(and east and west). The films suggest that the positions of such elites remained safe because the
system rewarded those who propped it up and allowed the country to navigate that much longer
the global political and economic dynamics.
The focus of Živojin Pavlović’s Ambush on the cusp period immediately after World War
II symbolically suggests that the country remains in transition and always amidst reforms,
forever suspended between the “old” and “new”—between East and West—never fully crossing
over into either camp. In Pavlović’s When I’m Dead and Gone, the anxiety about the future of
the younger generation is embodied in the character of Jimmy whose hopes of escaping
impoverishment are without any potential to succeed because they are halted from above—
because some class difference is expected in a system which is borderline capitalist. As ordinary
citizens navigate the pseudo-socialist environment with great difficulty and subordinate anew
whenever political and economic “reforms” take place, the elites easily adjust to and play
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whatever roles are necessary in order to remain in power. Through a Reichian assessment of
totalitarianism as rooted in sexual repression, Dušan Makavejev’s WR: Mysteries of the
Organism mocks revolutionary romanticism of socialist societies—their pedagogical overtones,
and their drive to indoctrinate and/or rehabilitate their subjects. In WR, benign romantic
revolutionaries are but a reform removed from the old-fashioned authoritarians who shun
physical love and prefer power and material possessions. Unlike WR which maintains a smug
distance as if to avoid getting “dirty,” Želimir Žilnik’s Early Works, though no less smug, is
more radical and formulates its critique of the system as a direct involvement in the political
environment.343 Yet, perhaps the film is less keen to expose its own ideological construct, or to
put on display its conviction that to directly point to injustice is to directly contribute to
democracy than it is to suggest that it is unclear to the citizens of Yugoslavia what exactly
socialism is.
That Black Wave was acclaimed in the West, in part for being in synergy with the
Marxist humanist philosophers of the Praxis School who challenged the Yugoslav establishment
to transform the country into a more liberal and democratic polity, itself speaks to Yugoslavia’s
culturally and politically liminal existence somewhere in between East and West. The 1968
student demonstrations in Yugoslavia, which paralleled similar unrest around Europe,
denouncing conservative values and demanding input into how countries are run by younger
generations, were quite accurately seen as being in alignment with Black Wave filmmakers
whose films asked that Yugoslav leaders be open to constructive criticism rather than be made
343 Discussing the era, Žilnik is eager to identify Aleksandar Petrović and Živojin Pavlović, the first
generation of Black Wave directors who adapted the work of novelists and worked with screenwriters connected to
the communist nomenclature, as too close to the Yugoslav establishment, asserting that he and others of his
generation (about a decade younger) distanced themselves completely from the state and, as a result, made films
more pointedly critical of the system. Kirn, Sekulić, and Testen, “Those who Make Revolutions,” 62.
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untouchable by the cult of World War II, the memory of which was routinely used as a means of
legitimation of authoritarianism. Filmmakers like Žilnik, Makavejev, and Pavlović explicitly
questioned the entitlement of old-school communist functionaries to be the absolute authority on
all matters pertaining to Yugoslavia’s development. Put differently, they could not help but rebel
against the dogmatism that had not gone away with Tito’s break with Stalin. They demanded
more Djilas and less Ranković—a more democratic Yugoslavia, unstifled by the masters of
pseudo-reforms which maintained Yugoslavia’s balancing act.
Making this balancing act work meant acquiescing to Western (and western) demands for
political and economic reforms which implicitly involved a reassessment of what kind of
socialist country Yugoslavia was to be—one whose economy was guided by the global capitalist
market or one in which the Yugoslav producers themselves made all decisions pertaining to the
matters of economy. Market reforms not only contradicted and effectively dismantled the
workers’ self-management system almost as quickly as it was implemented, leaving the workers
with no voice in a system meant to be their own, but also involved ethnically-inflected concerns,
putting additional emphasis on that “civilizational” fracture running through the middle of the
country. Zoran Tadić’s The Dream About a Rose and Živko Nikolić’s In the Name of the People
bluntly put on display the results of the succession of reforms which eroded the very foundation
of the Yugoslav socialist system, including the economic model based on social rather than state
property and, most egregiously, the workers’ self-management system. Vlatko Gilić’s Backbone,
and Goran Marković’s Variola Vera both hint at the disillusionment and despair at the economic
crisis as well as at the internal discord that resulted from the country’s attempts to enter the
global economy—a process which first necessitated excessive borrowing from the IMF and
World Bank and later a course of austerity measures. Krsto Papić’s The Rat Saviour points to the
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frustration with the cycles of reforms which never seemed to make the economy any better and
were, in any case, the domain of the New Class—the imposters who ruled the country on false
premises—busy enriching themselves the way political elites do in Western societies.
Filip Robar-Dorin’s Rams and Mammoths, however, hints at the gravest of consequences
of the destruction of the workers’ self-management system. The loss of the modern, progressive
ideal of equality around which all, regardless of ethnic identity, could coalesce seemed to
facilitate a swift regression into ethnic consolidation. The failure of the hallmark of Yugoslav
socialism, coupled with deep disillusionment over the economic crisis, seemed to ensure a
division between the country’s east and west, with the latter seeing the way out of the crisis in
extricating itself from association with the former and joining the West. As sociologist Duško
Sekulić suggests, “the process of European integration […] made Europe attractive for the
reform-minded, communist leaders of Slovenia and Croatia” who sought ways to join the club
and leave the allegedly hopelessly backward east behind.344 This inherently Balkanist dynamic
mimicked the Western view of the East as politically and economically backward. As Andrew
Hammond suggests, the perception of backwardness and the resulting division were amplified by
the country’s “entrance into a globalizing economy”—a process that could not but leave portions
of Yugoslavia behind.345 Being a part of the world economy, however marginally, meant that
global economic upheavals, especially the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, affected Yugoslavia as
well. The resulting debt and the austerity measures converged to make Yugoslavia’s 1980s
economic decline staggeringly fast and, in turn, the desire of the country’s west to leave
Yugoslavia for Europe “proper” that much more urgent. Put differently, Yugoslavia was brought
344 Sekulić, “The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State,” 175.
345 Andrew Hammond, "The Uses of Balkanism,” 617-618.
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to the brink by the “crisis of Fordism in western capitalism” that caused a “debt crisis which was
manifested in declining real incomes, hyperinflation […] unemployment, economic stagnation,
and balance of payment problems” […] followed by “the suppression of domestic consumption
[which] only served to translate the debt crisis into a political crisis.”346
Even without the added stress of the economic crisis, a major part of Yugoslavia’s
balancing act was the ever-precarious negotiation of sentiments of ethnic exceptionalism and
attendant animosities which typically implied divergent allegiances of different ethnic groups
either to the East or to the West. Not surprisingly, such sentiments were handled cautiously and,
as Susan Woodward points out, were “institutionalized,” that is managed via “an extensive
system of rights and overlapping sovereignties.”347 The global rivalry between East and West
still played out on a smaller scale in Yugoslavia, most intensely as a rivalry between the Serbs
and the Croats. The points of contact between the two, especially within Croatia proper, seemed
to mirror the parent rivalry in that they resulted in an uneasy coexistence—as if there was an
unbridgeable chasm between the two and as if each somehow connoted “their” sides, with the
Serbs “playing” the role of the East and the Croats “performing” the West. Though absurd, this
was not an entirely surprising predicament because, as Misha Glenny points out, the Krajina
Serbs effectively provided a buffer zone between “the empires of Islam and Christendom for
three centuries” as well as acted as the “line of fissure […] between the Roman Catholic and
Orthodox Christian faiths.”348 The trend of appeasing the West as well as alleviating the fears of
Yugoslavia’s west about the Serbs’ affinity for the Russians, which started with Tito’ break with
346 Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 87-88.
347 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 45.
348 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: the Third Balkan War, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1996),
6.
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Stalin in 1948, was fine-tuned throughout Yugoslavia’s existence in the form of constitutional
reforms which entailed concessions to the western republics. Appeasing those who feared
Serbia’s nationalists with the 1974 Constitution which weakened Serbia by giving autonomy to
two of its regions with large minority populations while not taking the opportunity to afford the
Serbs living in Croatia a similar status, made the constitutional reform an oddly partisan gesture,
deeply resented by the Krajina Serbs who felt—with some justification—that they needed
protection because a rehabilitation of the NDH was under way.
How this alleged civilizational chasm between the global East and West is performed by
the Serbs and the Croats—between Yugoslavia’s east and west—is the subtext of Zdravko
Šotra’s Maternal Half-Brothers. The film assesses the Croat view that it is intolerable that the
Serbs would even be present in Croatia let alone be a part of the cadre of its state apparatus as an
attitude validated by the Western view that the East is inherently hegemonic. The film suggests
that the NDH ideology did not disappear after World War II ended but was, in fact, perpetuated
among the Croats and functioned to establish a belief that the Serbs are underhanded
opportunists who diluted not just the ethnic homogeneity of Croat territories, but the Croats’ very
ability to be Western. The film implies that ethnic exceptionalisms were perhaps overly
“institutionalized” in order to appease the West as well as the country’s west, both of which
insisted on political and economic decentralization. The film directly links the anti-Yugoslav and
anti-Serb sentiments of the by-definition Western “long-distance nationalism” with the
decentralizing reforms which seemed to implicitly give credence to the view that the Serbs have
indeed polluted Croatia by their very presence. The memory of the crimes of the NDH became a
hot-button issue in the 1980s because the Serbs deemed that the Croats have remained Nazi
sympathizers, lying in wait until the opportunity presented itself to secede from Yugoslavia and
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to expel the Serbs from the territory of Croatia. This view implied that in being pro-reform, the
Croats were simply performing Western “democratic” values while rehabilitating, assisted by the
state, the NDH without any regard for how traumatic the memory of World War II was for the
Serbs. Ultimately, Šotra’s film is a warning that Yugoslavia’s interethnic relationships are
dangerously poisoned because decentralization has allowed the West to inspire in Yugoslavia’s
west jingoistic dreams of ethnically pure nation states—because there has been too much Djilas
and not enough Ranković.
Like Maternal Half-Brothers, Miomir Stamenković’s Dangerous Trail implies that the
West is complicit in the project of destabilization of socialist Yugoslavia. The film suggests that
Yugoslavia’s very existence is seen by some ethnic groups as an affront to their identity and an
obstacle to freedom and that the attempts by the state to provide conciliatory solutions in order to
not be perceived as Serb-dominated only encouraged separatism and irredentism and, in turn,
created resentment among the Serbs who saw themselves as the victims of this policy of
appeasement. This lapse in judgement occurred, the film implies, because authoritarians like
Aleksandar Ranković became pariahs once Western-style reforms began to be implemented and
their hardline methods of supressing ethnic nationalism (and outright dismissal of claims of
oppression) came to be seen as excessive and counter to the liberal drive of the reforms.
Arguably, decentralization was effectively “institutionalizing” Yugoslavia’s dissolution.
Kosovo’s autonomous status within Serbia was one of the most hotly debated topics in
Yugoslavia partly because it was understood that the autonomy was the initial step towards
Kosovo’s independence and eventual integration into Albania (without the consent of the Serbs,
obviously, and after expelling them from the area entirely). The film ultimately suggests that
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Albanian irredentism is a Western import, brought in via reforms and disguised as a concern for
the health of the country’s democracy.
The lack of consensus on Yugoslavia’s constitutional make up was, rather predictably,
always going to lead to the kind of carnage hinted at in Goran Marković’s Déjà vu. The
country’s western republics pushed for decentralization and looked for ways to ensure ethnic
purity of their territories while claiming that the system facilitated curtailment of their ethnic and
cultural heritage and economic prosperity in favour of the Serbs. The Serbs aimed to preserve the
country as they saw that dissolution would inevitably result in bloodshed not unlike the one of
World War II and tirelessly whipped up paranoia regarding the fate of the Serbs living outside of
Serbia in the event of a break up. If Maternal Half-Brothers and Dangerous Trail suggest that
constitutional reforms facilitate ethnic consolidation and an easy way for an ethnic group to
locate its Others, Déjà vu fittingly “sees” the outcome, the breakdown of the system and an
ethnic war, as a result of a conflation of the present and the past. The constitutional reforms were
a step back in time of sorts—towards the archaic Western-style nation states which are almost
always violently carved out. Mihailo, “frozen in infantile fury”—in his own past—cannot
express his frustration except through violence.349 His violent rampage can therefore be seen as a
symbolic return to the pre-Yugoslav era of open ethnic antagonism—a move back in time
seemingly necessitated by the failure of Yugoslavia’s “third way.”
South Slavs were united by the Yugoslav idea in order to avoid being dominated by
colonial powers whose legacy in the region has been one of ethnic discord, so it seems ironically
fitting that the country would be undone by neocolonial powers and by the ethnic discord they
produced. Yugoslavia’s gradual economic collapse of the 1970s and 1980s, caused by the
349 Clover, “Her Body, Himself,” 195. (only the phrase “frozen in infantile fury”)
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country’s unwise—though perhaps unavoidable—policy of acquiescing to the West, which
coincided with the emergence of ethnic nationalism, confirmed that Yugoslavia could not, after
all, shake off the clutches of economic neocolonial servitude. Yugoslavia disintegrated, in part,
because it could not “solve the economic crisis of the 1980s thus preventing the ethnic and
regional grievances from being resolved and allowing them to accumulate to the point where a
national policy of economic reform became impossible.”350 Making matters worse, once the
Soviet Union began to weaken in the 1980s, Yugoslavia’s “third way,” as Duško Sekulić points
out, ceased to be of benefit to the West because Yugoslavia was no longer a “communist
dissident,” and “without outside pressures to hold it together, no charismatic leadership, and with
no possibility of creating and sustaining internal legitimacy, because of the crisis of communism
and the deteriorating economic situation, [Yugoslavia] simply exploded.”351 The country’s
formerly communist elites which degenerated into ethnic nationalists in the late 1980s and early
1990s in order to remain in power and ultimately led Yugoslavia into a senseless war are not the
only ones responsible for that war. Above all, Yugoslavia was undone by neocolonial meddling
that went on for most of the country’s existence which exacerbated ethnic discord “planted” by
the colonial powers dominating the region long before Yugoslavia even existed.
Yugoslavism emerged as a potential solution for those whom hegemonic empires—past
and present—regarded as inconsequential. Its politics were modern, inclusive, humanist, anti-
imperialist, and its attempt at synthesizing a South Slavic culture as judicious as it was bold.
Making the Yugoslav idea work in practice was clearly a difficult, and ultimately impossible,
undertaking, especially after the catastrophe of World War II which nevertheless provided an
350 Phillips and Ferfila, The Rise and Fall, 86.
351 Sekulić, “The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State,” 176.
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opportunity for the Yugoslav idea to be put into practice while “rolled into” communism whose
internationalist bend found its minor equivalent in the supra-national Yugoslavism. I hope that
my analysis of the thirteen works of Yugoslav cinema makes plain my view that Yugoslavia’s
failure does not invalidate the Yugoslav idea (or socialism), nor does it suggest that Yugoslavs
were inherently incapable of peacefully coexisting—a Balkanist suggestion still routinely made
in the West. If this dissertation implicitly validates or shows admiration for any formerly
Yugoslav political movement, it would be the Croatian “Illyrians” of the nineteenth century
whose progressive doctrine shunned petty nationalism and aimed to unify the South Slavs
trapped within Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman domains, and whose legacy was often paid lip
service to but only occasionally authentically upheld during the existence of the socialist
Yugoslavia. Conversely, I am implicitly critical of those forces which defaulted to petty
nationalism and sought to thoughtlessly destroy Yugoslavia no matter the consequences. Overall,
my strategy in this dissertation was to identify the mechanism behind Yugoslavia’s failure (the
type of inquiry that has so far been reserved for the social sciences) as a contentious rather than
agreed upon issue and to, via analysis of Yugoslav cinema, advance debates around it in a
direction that redeems the Yugoslav idea. What I meant to accomplish then was to not only
contribute to the knowledge base around Yugoslav cinema, but also to alter the reader’s
understanding of what he/she might have previously viewed as stable knowledge about
Yugoslavia itself. Ultimately, it is my hope that this work bolsters the rather underwhelming
amount of scholarship on Yugoslav cinema by bringing attention to films previously undiscussed
(or barely discussed) and helps develop it in a direction free of anti-communist paranoia and
Balkanist stereotypes. For me, it forms the blueprint for future research and further inquiry into
Yugoslavia and its cinema.
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